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The process of decolonisation has led to the emergence of a number of ethnically 
complex states in the Middle East. The present thesis addresses the Kurdish minority in 
Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran, investigates and analyses the nature and structure of these 
four states. The nature of the four states is complex in terms of their population; each 
one contains more than one faith, ethnicity, and language. One ethnicity, faith or sect 
may dominate the state which may not necessarily reflect the majority of the population, 
for example, the minority of Alawis dominating Syria, or the constitution, penal code 
and political system may be biased to a majority sect (Shia in Iran). The present study 
investigates, compares and contrasts the twenty-first century policies of Turkey, Syria, 
Iran and Iraq towards the Kurds, it examines whether the concept of equal citizenship 
does exist or not in the four states.  
   The minority rights including the Kurds are the key to pluralism and peace in the 
Middle East. Over the last 50 years, many Middle Eastern and North African minorities 
have been oppressed or have struggled to survive, national groups (Berbers, Kurds, 
Turkmens, etc.), religious communities (Christians, Zoroastrians, Baha'is, etc) or both 
(Armenians, Jews, etc.). Sects, such as Shia in the Gulf States and Sunnis in Iran have 
not been successfully integrated within Islam itself. 
   The central argument the present thesis seeks to examine is how equal citizenship 
(equal access for political, educational, social and economic institutions of the country) 
can be delivered for the Kurds in the four countries. In order to achieve this, the legal 
status of the Kurds needs to be changed via reforming and amending the constitution 
and penal codes of the four states. Recognition of the legal rights of the Kurds and 
abolishing the discriminatory laws are the cornerstone of a healthy civil society and the 
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1 Chapter one: Introduction  
The status and treatment of ethnic minorities are vital political, moral and academic 
issues and it is the intention of this thesis to address them in relation to the Kurds here. 
Although there are a significant number of minorities in the post-colonial states in the 
Middle East, this study is concerned with investigating the legal status of the Kurds 
living in the states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria in the twenty first century. It 
examines whether the concept of equal citizenship exists in these states, it compares and 
contrasts the states‘ policies towards the Kurds, and outlines possible solutions for the 
successful inclusion and fair treatment of the Kurds in these states.  
   After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the 1920 Treaty of Sevres promised the 
Kurds an independent state. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne superseded that promise and 
the Kurdish people were divided between four countries without being legally 
incorporated. Now the majority of the Kurds live in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria as 
dominated minorities. Statelessness and lack of recognition of Kurdish rights have 
caused domestic instability in all the mentioned states. The absence of political 
consensus has also led to conflicts in the region.  
   The Kurds have a unique position in the Middle East as a politically organised 
minority, with territorial claims, known as Kurdistan, within the four states. This built in 
antagonism over the four states allows for a clearer comparison to take place. The states 
have controlled parts of Kurdistan have all, to various degrees, failed to guarantee the 
basic rights of the Kurdish people. This thesis analyses the extent to which these states 
and their apparatuses have been problematic and questionable in the Middle East.  
   Contemporary international law and the international community have recognised all 
the declared states in the Middle East. However, the question remains whether these 
states represent the aspirations of their populations. The level of success in the 
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international arena and being a member of the United Nations do not guarantee state 
competency within its own society. They cannot be considered democratic states 
without complying to the principles of democracy including: managing their internal 
and domestic affairs according to the rule of law and basic principles of human rights, 
especially the rights of minorities including the legal rights of the Kurds.  
   In this study the concept of equal citizenship is discussed in the context of these four 
Middle Eastern states. Even though the states claim to implement the principles of 
democracy, to protect the rights of their population, to hold general elections, and to 
create modern institutions such as parliament and ministerial administration, they have 
shortcomings in implementing principles of democracy and democratisation.  There is 
no a genuine effort by the international community and the United Nations to take 
measures to protect the Kurds‘ basic rights in the Middle East. An obvious example was 
the international community‘s silence about the massive human suffering of the Kurdish 
people during the period of Ba‘th regime in Iraq 1968-2003. Another issue is the 
international community‘s silence about Turkey‘s continuous oppression of the Kurds. 
Undoubtedly, the main policy of the international community has been to respect the 
sovereignty of the states. A number of questions arise out of this: To what extent does 
the theory of sovereignty constrain international efforts to end atrocities against a 
minority? Can major human rights violations in the Middle East constitute a threat to 
the security and stability of the international community? Should the international 
community interfere when a state commits major atrocities against its own minority 
groups? 
   Regarding the relationship between the state and its citizens, this thesis defends the 
argument that the rights of citizens, including the rights of minorities, regardless of their 
colour, language and ethnicity, should be protected by the state. In addition, the state 
should represent the wishes and interests of its citizens. In response, citizens should 
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respect the state and its apparatuses and not harm the interests of their state. To what 
extent has this hypothesis been achieved in the Middle East? It is argued the western 
states contributed to the oppression of the Kurds in the Middle Eastern states, by 
bypassing the international laws, norms and treaties and sided with the states‘ to 
oppression by the states of the Kurds. 
   This thesis is divided into eight chapters. After outlining the issues in this chapter the 
thesis addresses the historical background of the region in chapter two. This discusses 
colonisation and decolonisation and provides a short history of the Middle East. To 
understand the current situation in the Middle East, and particularly the four states, it is 
important to understand the processes of colonisation and decolonisation and their 
legacy. Colonisation, decolonisation and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the 
aftermath of World War I are investigated followed by the emergence of the new states 
as four independent nation-states. Chapter three gives an overview of the modern 
Middle East and the four covered countries of the study. It would be difficult to 
investigate the legal status of the Kurds without addressing the structures and 
backgrounds of the four examined countries. This chapter also gives an overview of the 
Kurds in general.  
   Chapter four will discuss the phenomena of nationalism, statehood and ethnicity in 
Iraq. The major components of this chapter are: the Ba‘th party and its policies towards 
the Kurds and the Iraqi state‘s failure in incorporating and dealing with the Kurds. In 
addition, the implications of the current constitution of the country are examined. The 
paper argues the unsuccessful policies of the Ba‘th regime are still practiced in the 
region by different people towards the Kurds and other minorities of the region. Thus, 
the Ba‘th‘s agenda is not behind us, but is still ongoing. An understanding of Ba‘thism 
and its relationship with nationalism, ethno-religion and the nation-state in Iraq are 
outlined here.  
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Chapter five emphasises Turkey. The political developments in Turkey, which has the 
largest Kurdish population, are assessed. The chapter analyses the current constitution 
and legal system of Turkey with emphasis on dealing with the Kurds. The current legal 
status of the Kurds in Turkey is examined extensively. The chapter concludes by its 
findings in light of the theory of equal and constitutional citizenship which has been 
stated in the first chapter.   
   Chapter six is mainly about the current legal status of the Kurds in Iran. The 
assimilation policies of the state of Iran towards the Kurds are investigated. The ill-
treatment of the Kurds by the Iranian authorities exposes the absence of a system which 
handles its citizens equally. Investigation is carried out on three issues and how they 
interact with one another; the dominance of the Shia sect in political and judicial 
systems of Iran, the consequences of the Persian-Shia concept on the Kurds and the 
constitutional attempts in Iran to assimilate the Kurds into the framework of the Iranian 
nation. Articles of the Iranian constitution, legal structure of the country and the policies 
of the government are addressed.  
   Chapter seven examines the false ethnic homogeneity of Syria. Assimilation of the 
Syrian Kurds is assessed here. Treatment of the Kurds according to the Syrian 
constitution and the penal code of Syria are analysed. Examining equal citizenship 
(equal access for political, educational, social and economic institutions of the country) 
for the Syrian Kurds are the major aim of this chapter. The judicial system, internal 
oppression and absolute denial of the Kurds in Syria are highlighted.  
   Chapter eight sets out discussions and conclusions; the necessary discussions which 
surrounded the legal status of the Kurds is one of the conclusions. This chapter 
highlights the major and significant reforms and approaches needed in order to establish 
a state which guarantees the equal rights for the Kurds. Absent of equal citizenship for 
the Kurds should be taken seriously and further research is necessary.  In order to 
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achieve this aim, this chapter addresses five issues and how they interact with one 
another. These will be how the identities of the countries of (Iraq, Turkey, Syria and 
Iran) are in crisis, the absence of a liberal constitution and existence of a biased political 
system to a sect, language or ethnicity and the consequences of this climate on the 
Kurds. This chapter summarises the constitutional attempts of the above four countries 
to assimilate the Kurds rather than guarantying equal citizenship for them, and finally 
what can be done through international organisations and conventions to change the 
legal status of the Kurds.   
1.1 Theoretical Framework: The theory of citizenship  
The concept of citizenship, based on rights, was a Roman development with roots in 
Greek thought and practice. For the Greeks citizenship was an inherited privilege and 
clearly marked the boundary between non-citizens and citizens. From the very 
beginning the term entailed exclusion since not everyone was in possession of it. It was 
restricted to a small group of privileged people and this led to inequality and injustice. 
For the Romans citizenship became established as a strictly legal status defining 
membership of the Roman political community.  
   This conception of citizenship as a legal category was connected with the distinction 
made between state and society whereby a legally codified set of relationships defined 
the rights and duties of the individual. Huddleston and Kerr (2006:13) define citizenship 
‗[T]he term 'citizenship' has several different meanings: A legal and political status, in 
its simplest meaning, 'citizenship' is used to refer to the status of being a citizen – that 
is, to being a member of a particular political community or state‘. Citizenship in this 
sense brings with it certain rights and responsibilities that are defined in law, such as the 
right to vote, the responsibility to pay tax and so on. It is sometimes referred to as 
nationality, and is what is meant when someone talks about 'applying for', 'getting', or 
being 'refused' citizenship. Involvement in public life and affairs, the term 'citizenship' is 
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also used to refer to involvement in public life and affairs – that is, to the behaviour and 
actions of a citizen. It is sometimes known as active citizenship. Citizenship in this 
sense is applied to a wide range of activities – from voting in elections and standing for 
political office to taking an interest in politics and current affairs. It refers not only to 
rights and responsibilities laid down in the law, but also to general forms of behaviour – 
social and moral – which societies expect of their citizens. What these rights, 
responsibilities and forms of behaviour should be is an area of on-going public debate, 
with people holding a range of views. An educational activity, finally, 'citizenship' is 
used to refer to an educational activity – that is, to the process of helping people learn 
how to become active, informed and responsible citizens. Citizenship in this sense is 
also known as citizenship education or education for citizenship. It encompasses all 
forms of education; from informal education in the home or through youth work to 
more formal types of education provided in schools, colleges, universities, training 
organisations and the workplace. On the importance of teaching citizenship and its 
relationship with the democracy, Crick (199:30) argues ‗[c]itizenship is more than a 
subject. If taught well and tailored to local needs, its skills and values will enhance 
democratic life for all of us, both rights and responsibilities, beginning in school and 
radiating out‘.   
   The concept of citizenship has two uses. The first is expressed by Turner as ‗that set 
of practices (judicial, political, economic, and cultural) which define a person as a 
component member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources 
to persons and social groups‘. (Tuner 1994:2). Citizenship can be refer to the way in 
which a variety of institutions-most typically the state, historically at least-apprehend 
and incorporate individuals as equal members of a polity, rather than outsiders. In 
another sense, citizenship refers to a ‗status‘ or more precisely to a complex and shifting 
set of statuses that determines a set of rights and responsibilities, and the relation of 
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individuals to the state, and to each other.  As Narayan (1997:27) argues ‗[w]hilst 
citizenship has been used as critical tool by groups seeking to achieve inclusion and 
participation within a given community, it has at the same time functioned as a 
mechanism for excluding minority groups‘. On the nature of exclusions, she explains 
further and states ‗[T]he Exclusions are two types: external exclusions-those abroad or 
exiled, the genuine outsiders who live beyond the geographical borders of the political 
community. But there are also internal exclusions. Some people are present, and 
presumed at the founding of citizenship regimes; but simultaneously absent, and 
excluded from citizenship as a practise‘. (Narayan 1997:27). The second type of 
exclusion (internal exclusion), to large extent, is relevant to the legal status of the Kurds 
in the four examined countries of this thesis.    
   Citizenship as a social fact and legal status, as an idea and an ideal, continues to be a 
problematic concept with no agreed-upon definition. Even within a single society, 
citizenship has many dimensions and bears many meanings. Scholars of citizenship 
have analysed the concept in a variety of ways. Four dimensions seem to capture 
citizenship's essential, normative and positive meanings. These four dimensions are: 
political, legal, psychological, and sociological.  
   After briefly defining each aspect of citizenship, this chapter discusses the most 
important policy variables that states deploy when they enact their collective visions of 
citizenship into law. The political dimension of citizenship (at least in a democratic 
state) affirms the value of public participation in the project of self- government. This is 
tempered by an exclusionary principle that certain type of political activity, notably 
voting, is limited to those who meet the standards for full membership in the polity. 
These standards are defined by the state. The legal dimension of citizenship is the most 
easily defined and measured aspect. It emphasises the positive law that determines the 
distinctive status of citizens in a constitution or other fundamental charters. It 
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specifically prescribes the citizen‘s rights and obligations, not including others who may 
be living on the state‘s territory.  
   The psychological aspect is dependent upon the political identity of citizens. Political 
identity, on the other hand, is determined by whether individuals conceive of 
themselves primarily as members of a particular state rather than another political 
community, by how salient this identity is for them, and by the identity that others 
ascribe to them. Political identity is consistent with other facets of identity such as 
ethnicity. It is also compatible with the possibility that citizens may identify with more 
than one polity as many dual and single citizens do.  
   The sociological dimension of citizenship looks to how individual citizens are 
integrated into civil society. This has a stronger normative resonance in public debates 
than the other dimensions. A notion like "second-class citizenship" is used colloquially 
to criticise the effective exclusion of women, minorities, or other groups from full 
participation in the economic, cultural, political, or other aspects of community life 
despite their legal status as citizens. Conversely, critics may point to a polity's failure to 
accord citizenship status to long- resident groups, such as third-generation Turks in 
Germany, that may be integrated in some ways (e.g. socially and linguistically) more 
than others (e.g. in terms of economic mobility).  
   The state's laws regarding citizenship, immigration, and the rights of aliens‘ 
instantiate its values about how inclusive it should be, along which dimensions, and on 
what terms. Although immigration is the only gateway to citizenship for most foreign-
born individuals, few states viewed themselves as countries of immigration until very 
recently. Even states that did, such as the U.S.A., Australia, Canada, and Israel, had 
imposed certain racial, religious, or ethnic barriers. Italy, Ireland, and some other 
European states still think of themselves as countries of emigration even after 
experiencing net migratory inflows. Peter H. Schuck (2000:211) argues: 
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The extreme example is Germany despite almost 10% of its population now 
being foreign-born (a larger share than in the U.S.) and a demographic profile 
that ensures that this share will steadily grow. Millions of German residents 
were born, raised, and are permanently settled there without having gained 
German citizenship for them- selves or even for their German-born children or 
grandchildren. (The German nationality law enacted in 1999, however, should 
gradually reverse this pattern through liberalisation of the rules governing just 
sanguineous [of or relating to blood] citizenship, dual citizenship, and 
naturalisation. 
 
Hammar (1999:201) outlines four interrelated meanings of citizenship; namely legal, 
political, social and cultural, and psychological. The legal dimension is formal 
membership in a state, based on specific rules which guarantee a number of rights and 
duties. The political dimension specifies the position of the individual in the polity as 
citizen, and thus forms the basis of the state. In the cultural and social sense it signifies 
membership of a nation. And finally, psychologically it provides an expression of 
individual identification. From Hammar's perspective, it is obvious that citizenship is 
more than a legal status. It is seen as an identity expressing an individual's membership 
in a definitive politico-cultural community. Generally speaking, citizenship can be 
acquired in some or all of the following ways: birth within the state's territory, birth to 
parents who are citizens of the state, marriage to a citizen, naturalisation after a 
prescribed period of legal residence, or as a result of ethno-cultural ties. Other, less 
common routes to citizenship include service in a state's military and incorporation 
through annexation. Although these rules are generally a matter of national law, some 
federations legislate them at the sub-unit level. 
Another leading scholar of citizenship and multicultursim, Kymlicka (2002:32) 
connects the term of citizenship with the liberal ideas and he argues ‗citizenship is 
initially linked to liberal ideas of individual rights and entitlements on the one hand, and 
to communitarian ideas of membership in and attachment to a particular community on 
the other. Thus it provides a concept that can mediate the debate between liberals and 
communitarians. It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been an explosion of 
  
15 
interest in the concept of citizenship amongst political theorists‘. It could be confidently 
stated that ‗the concept of citizenship has gone out of fashion among political thinkers‘. 
(Herman 1990:9).  
   According to Marshall (1949:27), citizenship is essentially a matter of ensuring that 
everyone is treated as a full and equal member of society. And the way to ensure this 
sense of membership is through according people and increasing number of citizenship 
rights. Marshal divides citizenship rights into three categories which he sees as having 
taken hold in England in three successive centuries: civil rights, which arose in the 
eighteenth century; political rights, which arose in the nineteenth century; and social 
rights-e,g. to public education, health care, unemployment insurance, and old-age 
pension-which have become established in the twentieth century. For Marshall, the 
fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal-democratic welfare state, By 
guarantying civil, political, and social rights to all, the welfare state ensures that every 
member of society feels like a full member of society, able to participate in and enjoy 
the common life of society, Where any of these rights are withheld or violated, people 
be marginalised and unable to participate. This is often called ‗passive‘ or ‗private‘ 
citizenship, because of its emphasis on passive entitlements, and the absence of any 
obligation to participate in public life. It is still widely supported. When asked what 
citizenship means to them, people are much more likely to talk about rights than 
responsibilities or participation. For most people, citizenship is, as the American 
Supreme Court once put it ‗the right to have rights‘.  Citizenship is not just a certain 
status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. It is also an identity, an expression 
of one's member- ship in a political community. Marshall saw citizenship as a shared 
identity that would integrate previously excluded groups within British society and 
provide a source of national unity. He was particularly concerned to integrate the 
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working classes, whose lack of education and economic resources excluded them from 
the "common culture" which should have been a "common possession and heritage".  
   The events of twentieth century have made clear that the health and stability of a 
modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its basic institutions, but also on 
the qualities and attitudes of its citizens: e.g. their sense of identity, and how they view 
potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their 
ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; 
their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and 
hold political authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and 
exercise personal responsibility; in their economic demands, and in personal choices 
which affect their health and the environment. Without citizens who possess these 
qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable. As Habermas note ‗the 
institutions of constitutional freedom are only worth as much as a population makes of 
them‘. (Habermas 1992:7).    
   On the emergence of equality which has a link with the used concept of this thesis 
(equal citizenship), Armstrong (2006:29) argues ‗[I]t has recently re-emerged in 
response to the ‗equality of what‘ literature; this idea has a long heritage. A theoretical 
link between equality and citizenship can be found in the work of Marx and Rousseau, 
in the socialisms of Tawney or Titmuss, and in the New Liberalism of a century ago the 
link between equality and citizenship was explicit‘.  In relation to inequality and its 
consequences, Warbner (1999:39) states ‗Inequality occurs when we can identify 
oppression, when individuals or groups exist in relations of hierarchy, or are prevented 
from standing together as peers‘.  
   If the sole implication of the concept of equal citizenship or equal protection is merely 
to ensure that the government enforces all laws fairly, and passed no discriminatory 
measures, and then while it would still be important, the concept would not have been 
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implemented towards the Kurds in the four examined counties of the thesis. What the 
international courts and legislatures have understood is that equal protection or equal 
citizenship is a root concept of citizenship. Just as a person cannot fulfil the duties of a 
citizen without the ability to speak freely and hear different viewpoints, so one cannot 
be a full member of the community if subject to discriminatory classification. 
   An essential component of equal citizenship is respect, the recognition by one person 
of another's parity in the social contract and in public affairs. Any irrational form of 
stigmatisation is based on race, gender, or religion, automatically assigns individuals 
who have that trait to an inferior category. Tied in with this is the value to the polity of 
participation. How can the majority take seriously efforts by the minority to participate 
in civic life if that minority has been branded as invariably inferior? Also, how can the 
minority be expected to behave responsibly if its members are consigned to a category 
that implies they cannot do so? These questions are relevant to the legal status of the 
Kurds and the viability of delivering equal citizenship for the Kurds in the four 
examined countries of this thesis.   
   On the values of equal citizenship, Warren (1967:21) writes ‗[t]hese three values of 
equal citizenship – respect, participation, and responsibility – are the characteristics one 
expects of all citizens in a democratic society. It is impossible to legislate social or 
economic equality; few people would, in any case, want that. But the courts and the 
legislatures in a democratic society have attempted to ensure that at least in three areas 
deemed "fundamental" no person or group of persons will face discrimination‘. Through 
examining the articles of the constitutions, penal codes and policies of the four countries 
(Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria), the thesis investigates to what extent the values of equal 
citizenship are implemented towards the Kurds.  
   Citizenship can be defined as a document regulating the relationship between the 
individual and the state, and specifically between the individual and the modern state, 
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whose midwife has been the American and French revolutions of 1775 and 1789 
respectively. Davis (1997:212) states: 
The right to citizenship is a right that is won by the people from the state 
through struggle (sometimes necessitating revolution), often with a huge 
sacrifice against the sustained resistance of the state. In Western liberal 
democratic states citizenship represents a recognised basic claim of the 
individual vis-à-vis the state of which he is a citizen, a right to equal access to 
the resources of the state: equal access to the civil resources of the state (e.g. 
courts of law); the power-political resources (e.g. the vote and elections); social 
services resources (e.g. land and water). Elements of citizenship: Political, 
Civil and social. Democratic citizenship empowers equal citizenship by 
allowing the people to have equal access to the civil, political, social and 
economic resources of the state.  
 
Citizenship has come to determine equality in relation to a largely centralised state 
during the twentieth century. The modern conception of citizenship has been based on 
the idea that membership of society must rest on a principle of formal equality (Davis 
1997:232). This means that in order to be a full member of a community, one should 
have the same rights and duties as the others and that all citizens should be equal in the 
eyes of law without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or sexuality. 
Similarly, The UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 1966 and the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973 states:  
In this Convention, the term "racial discrimination" shall mean any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national 
or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field of public life. 
 
In light of the above international document, the legal status of the Kurds in the Middle 
East is examined in this study. The major question of this thesis is examining equal 
citizenship for the Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. There is, however, a tension 
between equality and the recognition of difference. On the one hand the Kurds want to 
have the same basic rights as members of the dominant group, while on the other they 
want to be recognised as a different entity in society. Both of these issues have caused 
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problems with the central states in the Middle East. While Iran may be more tolerant in 
recognising the Kurds‘ differences, Turkey, Iraq and Syria have used violent strategies 
to suppress these differences. These differences are explored in this thesis. 
   Gewirth (1978:33) outlines ‗the general principle of human rights‘ which states all 
persons have equal rights to freedom and to well-being. Gewirth‘s guiding idea is that 
we have equal rights to freedom and well-being because they are the necessary 
conditions of agency and the achievement of our goals. His general approach to 
grounding special obligations is to say that the principle of human rights justifies social 
rules and institutions if they express or protect people's freedom and well- being. In this 
way Gewirth overcomes what might be thought of as a general difficulty with a Kantian 
approach to justifying special obligations to compatriots: that it is committed to a 
voluntarism account of special obligations according to which these obligations can 
arise only from promises or contracts, and there has been no such contract between 
citizens or between citizens and the state.  
   Will Kymlicka‘s Multicultural Citizenship represents an extraordinary attempt to put 
applied political philosophy to work in the empirical context of contemporary political 
debates about immigration and ethnic minorities in western society (Favell 255:1998).  
Of the many people pursuing these concerns across different applied fields, Will 
Kymlicka is rightly seen as one of the leading exponents of applied philosophy and 
public affairs on multiculturalism in pluralist liberal societies. In his work, Multicultural 
Citizenship (1995), Kymlicka offers a defence and justification of the range of special 
group-based allowances and protections-and their limitations- that national or ethnic 
minority groups may justly claim within a host liberal society. The text is throughout 
interspersed with illustrations taken from a range of pluralist liberal societies said to 
face the problems that Multicultural Citizenship identifies. Kymlicka‘s raw material 
stretches beyond his Canada, to the US, to other ‗new world‘ immigration societies such 
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as Australia, to old world problems faced in Europe by France, Britain, Belgium, or 
Germany, and even situations involving minority ‗national‘ cultures such as the Basque 
region or parts of Eastern Europe.  Kymlicka (1989:23) argues ‗[S]pecial rights are 
consistent with the liberal commitment to individual autonomy (i.e., the view that we 
have a fundamental interest in our moral power of forming and revising a plan of life). 
Our capacity to form and revise a conception of the good is intimately tied to our 
membership in a culture, since the context of individual choice is the range of options 
passed down to us by our language and culture‘.  He emphasises on multiculturalism 
and citizenship in the liberal societies of Western countries and giving special rights to 
groups in a liberal society. However, the present study‘s context is Middle Eastern 
societies which are not liberal yet. Therefore, despite that Kymlicka‘s work is beneficial 
for this study (in particular giving special rights to minority groups) his theory cannot 
be used by this study to investigate the legal status of the Kurds in the four examined 
countries.   
   This study‘s claim has been more modest: that none of these principles can justify the 
idea that compatriots should have special obligations to each other, to participate fully 
in public life, and to give priority to each other's needs. If there are such special 
obligations, then they can be defended only on the basis of a particular ideal of equal 
citizenship.  It is vital to mention the view of Andrew Mason (1997:435) who writes:  
Citizenship has intrinsic value because in virtue of being a citizen a person is a 
member of a collective body in which they enjoy equal status with its other 
members and are thereby provided with recognition. This collective body 
exercises significant control over its members' conditions of existence (a 
degree of control which none of its members individually possesses). It offers 
them the opportunity to contribute to the cultural environment in which its laws 
and policies are determined, and opportunities to participate directly and 
indirectly in the formation of laws and policies.  
 
In order to investigate the legal status of the Kurds, this thesis utilises Andrew Mason‘s 
theory of citizenship, especially the first part of the above quote which states 
‗[c]itizenship has intrinsic value because in virtue of being a citizen a person is a 
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member of a collective body in which they enjoy equal status with its other members 
and are thereby provided with recognition‘. This is relevant to the question of this 
research. The theories of friendship and special obligations of the citizens are not the 
necessary tools to examine the legal status of the Kurds in the four relevant countries. In 
light of the Mason‘s theory, the present thesis attempts to examine whether Kurds enjoy 
equal rights with others and whether they are provided with recognition.   
1.2 Methodology, thesis questions and hypothesis 
Modern societies unfolded within the confines of nation-states. On the one hand, the 
modern principles of democracy, citizenship, and popular sovereignty allowed for the 
inclusion of large sections of the population previously confined to the status of subjects 
and subordinates. On the other hand, however, new forms of exclusion based on ethnic 
criteria developed. Belonging to a specific ethnic group determines access to the rights 
and services which the modern state is supposed to guarantee for all its citizens. 
Wimmer (2002:123) states: 
The main promises of modernity- political participation, equal treatment before the law 
and protection from the arbitrariness of state power, dignity for the weak and poor, and 
social justice and security- were fully realised only for those who came to be regarded 
as true members of the nation. The modern principles of inclusion are intimately tied to 
ethnic and national forms of exclusion.  
 
 
By contrast, pre-modern empires integrated ethnic differences under the umbrella of a 
hierarchical, yet universalistic and genuinely non-ethnic political order, in which every 
group had its properly defined place. This pyramidal mosaic was broken up when 
societies underwent nationalisation and ethnic membership became a question of central 
importance in determining political loyalty and disloyalty towards the state.   
   In the first few decades following decolonisation, talk of multiculturalism and 
pluralism was often discouraged, as states attempted to consolidate themselves as 
unitary and homogenising nation-states. Today, however, it is widely recognised that 
states in the region must come to terms with the enduring reality of ethnic and religious 
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cleavages, and find new ways of accommodating and respecting diversity. The pursuit 
of national homogenisation has led to resistance movements, and even civil war-in 
countries like the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, China, Burma, Indonesia, India, Sri 
Lanka, Pakistan, to name a few.  
Kymlicka and He (2005) argue ‗[w]hatever the explanation, Asia is witnessing the rise 
of ‗identity politics‘. People are mobilising along ethnic, religious, racial, and cultural 
lines, and demanding recognition of their identity, acknowledgment of their legal rights 
and historic claims, and a commitment to the sharing of power‘.   
Expressions of ethnic discontent arose. Indeed, several ethnic conflicts have become so 
rooted that it is difficult now to reconstruct the sense of unity that accompanied 
independence. The specific explanations for this vary from country to country. 
Moreover, these explanations are themselves matters of intense political contestation. 
According to some minority leaders, members of the dominant group betrayed a 
promise to share power, and have used the postcolonial nation-state as a tool to promote 
its particular identity, culture, and economic interests at the expense of other groups. 
According to some state officials, minority ethnic discontent is the artificial legacy of 
colonial divide-and-rule policies, or of communist subversion, or of other forms of 
external interferences. Other commentators explain the rise of ethnic mobilisation as the 
result of state weakness, with people fallings back on ethnic ties when the state has 
proven unable to provide basic security or basic needs. Yet others suggest that 
democratisation itself encourages ethnic mobilisation, either because local politicians 
have an incentive to appeal to an ethnic constituency, and/or because democratisation is 
linked to human rights, which in turn is linked to resistance to inherited ethnic and 
racial hierarchies.   
   In terms of categorising minorities Kymlicka and He (2005) make a distinction 
between Western models and Asian models. Western models of multiculturalism and 
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minority rights have been adopted in response to the demands of particular types of 
groups. In Western theories of multiculturalism, it is common to distinguish a. 
Indigenous people, b. National minorities, c. Immigrant groups. A similar distinction is 
found in the emerging international law of minority rights, with some international 
norms targeted at indigenous peoples (e.g. the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples), others targeted at national minorities (e.g. the Council of Europe‘s 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities), and others applying 
to migrants (e.g. the UN‘s Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers).  
These sorts of categories may make sense in the Western context, but are they 
applicable to Middle East? Western scholars and international organisations have been 
quick to apply these categories to various minorities in Middle East and Asia. For 
example, many ‗hill tribes‘ in Thailand or Bangladesh have been labelled as ‗indigenous 
peoples‘, in part because their traditional culture and their economic and political 
marginalisation compares with that of indigenous peoples in the Americas. Similarly, 
many movements for regional autonomy, such as in Aceh or Tamil Nadu, have been 
labelled as forms of ‗minority nationalism‘, in part because their claims seems 
comparable to those in, say, Catalonia or Scotland.  
   These are just some of the more obvious and consequential differences between the 
West and Asia including Middle East. The individual chapters below identify a number 
of other issues, often specific to individual countries. Taken together, these factors 
suggest that Western models may have limited relevance to several Middle Eastern 
contexts including the four case studies of the present study.  
Kymlicka (2005) provides a coincide overview of recent developments, focusing in 
particular on three trends 1. Emerging models of multination federation to accommodate 
national minorities. 2 Emerging models of self-government and land claims for 
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indigenous peoples. 3. Emerging models of multicultural citizenship for immigrant 
communities.  
   The thesis attempts to pose questions that are in direct relation to the different aspects 
of equal citizenship and then to provide research-based answers to the posed questions. 
The following questions are part of the central argument of the present thesis: Why 
should the Kurds be represented by their own representatives rather than by members of 
the majority or other groups? To what extent the constitutions and judicial authority of 
the four relevant countries (Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq) implement the policy of equal 
citizenship towards their Kurdish indigenous populations?  Is it true that recognition of 
the Kurds would assist the stability of the nation-state system in the four relevant 
countries? And would it be possible for the four relevant countries to deal with the 
Kurdish issue without thinking of them as a security concern?  
   This study uses the comparative approach and document analysis. This part analyses 
the relevant articles of the twenty-first century constitutions and penal of the four 
mentioned countries and examining the practical policies of these four countries 
towards the Kurds in the chapters of three, four, five and six. An extensive investigation 
of the notion of nation-state and the nature of post-colonial states in the Middle East are 
carried out in chapter two. This part emphasises on the theories of states and arguments 
in favour of or against the nation-state. The nature of states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria is compared with nation-states in Europe. Can the term ‗nation-state‘ be used to 
describe states which are ruled by one faith, sect or ethnicity? The application of this 
term to the four countries is discussed. Here it is acknowledged that despite differences 
between these complex states there is a consensus on dealing with the Kurds at a 
theoretical level. In terms of handling the Kurds successfully, theoretical approaches are 
introduced as solutions in the conclusion sections of each chapter and in the final 
chapter (discussions and conclusions).  
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1.3 Literature review  
This study differs from the current literature on the Kurds in the following aspects. 
Firstly, current literature has emphasised on the Kurdish nationalist movements and 
their opportunities and challenges. This thesis, on the other hand, focuses on the twenty-
first century policies of the four states (Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran) towards the Kurds. 
Secondly, this study emphasises the failure of these states in securing the legal status of 
the Kurds and this, it is argued, has amounted to discrimination. Thirdly, the twenty-
first century constitutions and policies of these four states are examined. It is shown 
how a radical change in the policies of these states is necessary and there is an urgent 
need to implement the policy of equal citizenship. Fourthly and finally, without 
recognising the rights of minorities, including the Kurds, a stable Middle East is not 
viable.  
   There is no doubt that the treatment of minorities within a state is an issue of global 
importance and it has a long history across the world. It is significant that the post-
colonial states in the Middle East were carved out in this area constituting various, non-
homogenous entities. This research intends to make a significant contribution to 
addressing these issues and to the study of the rights of the Kurds. It is an examination 
of political phenomena that have consequences on the lives of a significant number of 
people in the region. It will be shown that several massacres have been carried out 
behind borders.  Research concerning the twenty-first century policies of Turkey, Iran, 
Syria and Iraq towards the legal status of Kurds has not been particularly extensive. 
There is, to my knowledge, no existing single study devoted to the question of my 
thesis. Extensive research has been carried out by different authors and institutions 
about the rights of minorities in the region. A wide range of literature also exists on the 
Kurdish nationalist movements. In the following sections, this section highlights few 
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major studies which have been carried out about the Kurds and the Kurdish nationalist 
movements.  
   Wadie Jwaideh (1961) was the first scholar to write a history of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement. He emphasised the significance of the Sheikh Said rebellion. 
Jwaideh traces the Kurdish culture and roots with emphasis on the Kurdish Nationalist 
Movement. This research was conducted at the end of 1950s, thus it is not directly 
relevant to the question of my thesis. It is an extensive research on many aspects of 
Kurdish society such as: Culture, language, politics and social life and geography of 
Kurdistan. The origins and development of Kurdish nationalist movement is analysed 
extensively, including the rebellions of Muhammad Pasha of Rawnduz and Sheikh 
Ubayd Allah of Nehri. The rise and fall of the south Kurdistan confederation has also 
been discussed here including the Sheikh Mahmud‘s rebellions, Sheikh Sa‘id of Piran‘s 
revolt, Barzani rebellion of 1931-1932 and 1943-1945, the Kurdish Republic of 
Mahabad, and developments in the Kurdish question since the fall of Mahabd. 
Jwaideh‘s (1961) study is unique in addressing the Kurdish nationalist movements and 
their structure. In his conclusions, the author was speculating the protection of the rights 
of Kurds under the Qasim regime in Iraq. Unfortunately history proved that the Qasim 
regime was unable to handle the Kurdish issue.  
   Robert Olson‘s book (1989) is concerned with British policy towards Kurdish 
nationalism. However, Olson places this discussion within the overall context of 
Kurdish nationalism as it developed from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and 
he concludes with a chapter describing the international implications of the Sheikh Said 
rebellion. As Olson (1989:153) writes ‗[w]hile the Sheikh Said rebellion was a 
nationalist rebellion, its mobilization, propaganda, and symbols were those of a 
religious rebellion‘. Olson admits that banditry, tribal feuds, and personal vendettas 
were "prominent causal factors in the rebellion" and that the Kurds of the cities did not 
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support the rebels. Kurdish nationalism was thus not nationalism in the European sense, 
not nationalism of the people. He accurately states the religious character of the 
rebellion was of use to Kemal Ataturk in his drive to secularism. Whether or not the 
rebellion was a nationalist one, it is obvious that the Turkish government treated it as a 
religious rebellion which justified actions against the traditional place of Islam in 
government and society. Olson deals with the continuity of Kurdish nationalist 
movement over the past century and the weaknesses within the movement that continue 
to prolong the struggle. The author examines the characteristics of Kurdish society in 
this regard: multiple dialects, urban- rural distinctions, Sunni- Shia- Alevi rivalry, and 
tribal- nontribal differences. He also chronicles the development of international support 
for the idea of an independent Kurdistan, as expressed in the Treaty of Sevres and by 
the League of Nations. This book has a substantial contribution, both for its history and 
as one element in the debate on Middle Eastern nationalism.  
   Martin van Bruinessen (1992) emphasises on the study of "primordial loyalties" which 
inhibit the formation of national and class consciousness in Kurdish society. The 1961-
75 national movement of Iraqi Kurdistan led by Mustafa Barzani was, according to the 
author, a "people's war, a peasant war" (1992:2) comparable to the Mexican, Chinese, 
Vietnamese, Algerian and Cuban revolutions (1992:10). While these movements were 
progressive (justice-seeking, anti-exploitation and anti-imperialist), the Kurdish 
movement had a conservative and even reactionary appearance, in spite of the justness 
of its demands. Bruinessen looks for ‗internal reasons why the Kurdish movement in 
Iraq became more openly conservative during 1964-66‘ (1992:2). Conservatism is due 
to the persistence of "primordial loyalties" which are, according to Bruinessen, those to 
family, tribe (tribal chief and landlord), and religion (the shaykhs, i.e., leaders of 
tariqas). The main body of the book, chapters 3-5, examines the formation and gradual 
decline of tribal and religious loyalties, and their interaction with external factors such 
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as the states ruling over Kurdistan, and the formation of Kurdish nationalism in 
interaction with these primordial loyalties.  
   In chapter five Bruinessen deals with Sheikh Sa'id's revolt of 1925 in Turkey. He 
addresses the controversial question: was it nationalist or religious? He argues it ‗was 
neither a purely religious nor a purely nationalist one‘ (1992:298). The author concludes 
in the last chapter ‗[A]ll in all, although we seem to perceive a general trend toward the 
weakening of primordial loyalties, these take a long time to disappear, and may re-
appear‘. Although the book provides a considerable documentation of class struggle in 
rural areas, it does not provide an adequate picture of the nationalists' suppression of 
class conflict in favour of national struggle. The book is probably the best study of the 
social and political structure of Kurdistan. A major shortcoming of Bruinessen‘s 
discussion of Sheikh Sa'id's rebellion is that the conflict was much more important than 
he suggests. First, its direct and indirect consequences influenced Turkish and Kurdish 
history for the remainder of the 20th century, and, second, Kurds and "Kurdistan" 
played a large role in European, especially British, policy toward the peoples and 
governments of the Middle East. Bruinessen's work is invaluable because he was able to 
do research in, or at least to observe and visit, many Kurdish areas in Iran, Iraq, and 
Turkey. 
   Gareth Stansfield‘s doctoral thesis (2003) is devoted to the Kurdish Nationalist 
Movement in Iraq with emphasis on the performance of Kurdistan Regional 
Governments (both Kurdistan Democratic Party-KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan-
PUK) during the 1990s in Iraqi Kurdistan. Stansfield argues the KRGs strongly linked 
the political divisions between (PUK) and (KDP). Therefore, he states in the 
introduction ‗[M]y hypothesis is that the current divided political and administrative 
system is a direct manifestation of the historical developments and characteristics of the 
political system in Iraqi Kurdistan‘ (2003:5). The author also questions whether the 
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experiment of the Iraqi Kurdistan can be used for the whole Iraq or not. He addresses 
the theoretical and methodological approaches. He assesses the development of political 
party system in Iraqi Kurdistan. The ideologies and foundation of political parties are 
illustrated. The Kurdistan Regional Government(s) from 1992-2002 are dealt with in 
chapter seven.  
   The author concludes a possible solution to the de-facto state of Iraqi Kurdistan and 
warns of the dangerous consequences of quick unification of the KRGs as agreed by 
both political parties in Washington Agreement in 1998. He points out ‗internal needs‘ 
and ‗external pressures‘ are challenges for the KRGs. He argues both democratic 
progresses internally and dealing with external issues carefully is necessary for the 
political system in Iraqi Kurdistan. In his conclusion, he emphasises the advantages of 
keeping the two KRGs separate for internal and external reasons. This study has made 
contribution to the study of Kurdish nationalist movements in Iraqi Kurdistan and the 
KRG administrations during 1990s. The legal status of the Kurds in Iraq has not been 
addressed in this book.  
   Denise Natali‘s (2005) study is mainly about Kurdish ethnicity and ‗Kurdayeti‘ - or 
Kurdish national movement. The major question which the book wants to answer is 
how Kurdayeti has become ethnicised. Comparison between Kurdayeti and its 
challenges is the focused of this book. Political space is a term which is widely used 
here. Natalie emphasises the relationship between central governments of Iraq, Turkey 
and Iran and their citizens and how this affects Kurdayeti considerably. Natalie 
approaches the question of Kurdish nationalism differently by reconsidering the 
phenomenon of Kurdish nationalism which she strongly links to political space. The 
author argues ‗Whether Kurdayeti becomes ethnicised and salient depends upon the 
positive and negative incentives offered by central governments and the actions and 
reactions of Kurdish groups to these incentive structures. What it means to be a Kurd, 
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therefore, must be considered in relation to what it means to be a citizen of Iraq, Turkey, 
and Iran‘ (2005:xviii).  She states ‗Whereas the political space in Iraq was relatively 
large for Kurds, for Kurds in Turkey it became virtually nonexistent‘ (2005:70).  
   On the status of the Kurds of Iran, Natalie argues political space was more 
accommodating to the Kurds, as compared with Turkey and Iraq. She then concludes: 
‗Political space is not constant across space and time. Variations have created 
differences in the manifestation of Kurdeyeti in three different settings over period of 
150 years‘ (2005:180).  In each setting after the early 1990s, Kurdayati became highly 
ethnicised across Kurdistan, regardless of the different political space inside each state. 
The policies of the above countries towards the legal status of the Kurds in the twenty-
first century have not been covered in this thesis.  
   David Romano (2006) addresses different Kurdish nationalist movements and how 
they compare amongst the Kurdish political parties of PKK, KDP, and PUK. He 
compares their structure, policy and leadership. Romano uses synthesis of the 
theoretical framework: opportunity, structures, resource mobilisation, and cultural 
framing approaches to understand social movements and revolutions. This study 
emphasises on the Kurdish movement in Turkey. In relation to the PKK, the author has 
makes an interesting statement. He argues ‗If the PKK had succeeded in convincing 
Turks in general that it was not seeking a separate Kurdish state, but rather a better 
society in Turkey that would be to everyone‘s benefit, the Turkish populace‘s appetite 
for continued conflict might have diminished‘ (2006:179). David Romano‘s research is 
more theoretical one and states ‗[t]he main contribution of this book is theoretical one. 
The analytical approaches that I planned to apply to the Kurdish cases of nationalist 
mobilisation (resource mobilisation and national choice theories)’. Romano extensively 
covers the Kurdish nationalist movements in the region with emphasis on the Kurdish 
nationalist movements and the PKK in Turkey. The author touches upon opportunities 
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and challenges for the Kurdish nationalist movements in the region. The legal statues of 
non-dominate ethno-religious communities and the Kurds in the region have not been 
covered.  
   Christopher Houston (2008) argues the foundational practices of nation building and 
state formation in the Middle East after the First World War have led to many writings 
about the Kurds. He states his book ‗brings these two processes together: the production 
of knowledge about Kurds and the ceaseless instituting of the nation by the regional 
states of Iraq, Iran and Turkey‘ (2008:2). The book does not include Syria. It argues 
important similarities and differences between Kemalism and Khomeinism. Kemalism 
is a key concern of the book. He argues ‗Kurdish ethnicity is a relational and creative 
act, something made by-not given to- every Kurd. The genesis, context and content of 
Kurdish ethnic or nationalist discourse may be historically explicable, but its assertion is 
not inevitable.... because of the relationally of ethnic or national identity, this book is as 
much about the imagining and producing of Turkish, Persian and Arab identities as it is 
about those Kurds‘ (2008:6). He acknowledges his study devotes more space to Turkey 
and does not extend to consider national selves of Iraqi Kurdistan which currently under 
way.  
The book concludes by proposing de-Kemalisation of the Turkey. The author argues 
Kemalism is a phenomenon of the region and emphasises on de-Kemalisation in the 
education system. It is obvious that legal status of the Kurds and equal citizenship are 
not examined by Christopher Houston.  
   This chapter addresses theoretical framework, methodology, questions of the thesis, 
chapter outlines and literature review. The question of this thesis which is the legal 
status of the Kurds in the four examined countries is examined in light of the theory of 
equal citizenship. The status of Kurds is different in each country (Iraq, Turkey, Iran 
and Syria); however, there are common concerns and issues which are interacted. This 
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chapter briefly outlined the structure of each chapter. In the section of literature review, 
an effort has been made to cover all related academic papers to the question of the 
thesis. They have touched many aspects of Kurdish nationalism and policies of the four 
countries in dealing with the Kurds. This thesis differs from other studies by 





2 Chapter two: Emergence of Nation-States in the Middle East   
In order to understand the current status of the Middle East and the four studied 
countries of this thesis, it is necessary to study the colonisation and decolonisation of 
the region. These processes have had vital affect on the current status of post-colonial 
states of the Middle East. The historical background of the colonised and coloniser 
countries is outlined here alongside the process of decolonisation, the post-colonisation 
period, the collapse of Ottoman Empire, and the emergence of new post-colonial states. 
The notion of racial otherness is discussed in this chapter because of its importance in 
the construction and maintenance of nineteenth century colonisation. Another important 
factor is the rise of nationalist aspirations in the Middle East which played an important 
role in the decolonisation process. Nationalism was also an important factor in the 
shaping of the post-colonial states within their current borders. 
2.1 Historical background of the colonised countries and colonisation  
The term ‗colonisation‘ has been used and defined differently by experts from various 
fields. Whereas linguists may go back to the root of the word philosophers and 
academics explain the term through its problematic moral consequences. Bush 
(2006:46) argues ‗[C]olonisation is a phenomenon of colossal vagueness. Originating 
from the Latin colonial, a farm or settlement, in the Roman Empire, a colony was 
defined as ―a public settlement of Roman citizens (especially veteran soldiers) in a 
hostile or newly conquered country‘. The author then goes on to point out ‗colonialism‘ 
in the modern sense of the term was not in usage until 1850. He defines ‗colony‘ as a 
certain kind of ‗socio-political organisation‘ and ‗colonialism‘ to be ‗a system of 
domination‘.  Thus, according to Bush, colonialism in its modern sense has roots in the 
nineteenth century and is closely tied to the concept of domination.   
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According to Bush (2006:54) colonialism started as a ‗discourse analyses in the literary 
and cultural studies developed in the travel narratives and it expanded into the field of 
politics. It is believed that colonialism is strongly linked to human life and experience 
and it has reached every aspects of human knowledge. Loomba (2005:53) points to the 
role of colonialism in relation to the structures of human knowledge. The author states 
‗[c]olonialism reshaped existing structures of human knowledge. No branch of learning 
was left untouched by the colonial experience. A crucial aspect of this process was the 
gathering and ordering of information about the lands and peoples visited by, and later 
subject to, the colonial powers‘. Edward Said (2003: xiv) as a modern theorist of 
orientalism and colonisation states ‗[M]y argument is that history is made by men and 
women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and 
elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ―our‖ East, 
―our‖ oriental becomes ―ours‖ to possess and direct‘. Therefore, colonisation is seen as 
a division between those who ‗posses and direct‘ and those who are possessed and 
directed. In other words it is a division between those who dominate and those who are 
dominated.  
   Colonialism, however, is not just related to the European empires. In fact it has 
always been a part of human history. Various non-European empires and colonisers 
have emerged throughout history. Loomba (2005:8) defines colonialism to be ‘the 
conquest and control of other people‘s land and goods‘. He then goes on to argue that 
colonialism ‗is not merely the expansion of various European powers into Asia, Africa, 
or the Americas from the sixteenth century onwards; it has been a recurrent and 
widespread feature of human history’.  
Colonial studies emerged as a result of European expansions. Thus, ‗the colonised‘ was 
studied in the nineteenth century as ‗the other‘ or ‗the subject‘.  The colonisers‘ 
institutions studied ‗the colonised‘ due to the policies of hegemony and domination. 
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Dutch universities were the first which started studying colonised peoples. Wesseling 
(1997:27) argues:  
Tropical colonial studies, as they used to be called, have a long tradition in the 
Netherlands. From the very beginning, European expansion stimulated some 
forms of study of the East, its flora and fauna, its geography, and its 
topography. All the same, one might say that the systematic study of the East 
started only in the nineteenth century. This was obviously due to the expansion 
of colonialism. Colonial studies were introduced into some Dutch universities, 
especially in Leyden, where the training of colonial civil servants was 
incorporated in the University in 1877.  
 
The majority of the world was under colonised rule before the Second World War. 
Loomba (2005:3) points out that European colonialism has been the most extensive 
form of colonialism in history in terms of the size of colonised regions across the world 
‗]B]y the 1930s, colonies and ex-colonies covered 84.6 per cent of the land surface of 
the globe. Only parts of Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Tibet, China, Siam and 
Japan had never been under formal European government. Such a geographical sweep, 
and colonialism‘s heterogeneous practices and impact over the last four centuries, 
makes it very difficult to-theorise- or make generalisations about the subject‘.  There 
have been different kinds of colonisation but the nature and the relationship between 
colonisers and colonised have always been unstable.  
   To sum up, colonisers have been different and they have had different kinds of 
agenda. While colonisation was starting in some parts of the world decolonisation was 
already happening on other parts.   
2.2 ‗Racial otherness‘ and nineteenth century colonialism                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
The nineteenth century European expansions to the East, in particular to the Islamic 
East, were led by Great Britain and France. This process was constructed militarily, 
economically and culturally. The colonial discourse was well supported by European 
schools of thought. Notions, myths and images of the ―other‖, complemented the 
colonial project. This section examines how notions of ‗difference‘ and distinctions 
  
36 
drawn between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ through Orientalism helped maintain colonialism. The 
racial discourse alongside notions of class and gender served to create and maintain a 
hierarchical social structure. These discourses were combined to support colonialism 
both at home and abroad. In the oriental discourse the distinction between ‗us‘ and 
‗them‘ has been a starting-point to define the ‗other‘. Racial, cultural and gender 
differences were important elements in the 19
th
 century Empire structure of power and 
dominance. Historically, the primary aims of the majority of European travellers, 
especially in the nineteenth century, were to gather and record information about a place 
and a people which were unknown by their countrymen. The question that arises here is: 
What was the intention behind this process? Through understanding the discourse of 
Orientalism, it would be seen the ‗otherness‘ imagined in a vast literature was 
constructed by European travellers.   
   The colonists and in particular European colonists invented and conceptualised 
Orientalism. Orienalism is a type of study about the East, which concerns geography, 
culture, language etc.  To define Orienalism, it is useful to go back to one of the major 
theorists, Edward Said (1935-2003), who had a key role in analysing and exploring this 
term.  In his famous work Orienalism, Said (2003:3) states ‗Orientalism is a style of 
thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‗the 
Orient‘ and (most of the time) the Occident‘. Said, through his career as a university 
professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University and his well-
known two books (Orientalism, 1978 and Culture and Imperialism, 1993) studied 
eighteenth and nineteenth century European literature. He observed how the Westerners 
collectively imagined and described the Easterners.   
The power of knowing was one of the most important elements Said refers to. Through 
this process the Occident has imagined the Orient. Not understanding the Orient in 
reality, they made myths about ‗them‘. For example, the East and its people were seen 
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as exotic and alien as Edward Said (1995:45) mentions ‗[T]he Orient was almost a 
European invention , and had been, since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, 
hunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences‘. The author goes on to say 
that a discourse of differences between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ has coloured the European 
narration. Although these differences were constructed through the imagination and 
mythical discourses, this did not happen unconsciously but was rather deliberate. Ranna 
Kabbani (1986:06), states in the European narration of the Orient, there was a deliberate 
stress on those qualities that made the East different from the West, exiled it into an 
irretrievable state of ‗otherness‘.  The idea of the erotic Eastern was discovered by 
travellers. A place like a Harem or a Seraglio was pictured as very exotic where a vast 
number of naked, pretty women served a Sultan‘s desire. A Harem was not only 
perceived as an immoral place but it also showed lack of humanity and barbarousness. 
Hence, the travellers made a distinction between ‗us‘ as respectable and rational 
civilians and ‗them‘ as romantic and irrational creatures. The travellers did not always 
create these images. They inherited them from a historical discourse. Kabbani (1986:22) 
points out ‗[t]he European retained a sense of sexual expectancy from the East, having 
encountered in both mythological and theological texts the prototype of the seductive 
Eastern women‘.  
   One of the best-known works of oriental literature in the West, between eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, was ‗A thousand and one nights‘ (Alf Laila Wa Laila), which 
was widely translated into many different languages. The travellers keenly selected 
these tales and re-told these stories because of their personal backgrounds and class 
position. The following figures are just some examples of travellers who collected and 
translated ‗A thousand and one nights‘ from various disciplines and interests; Sir 
Richard Frances Burton (1821-1890), Rev. Edward Forster, Antoine Galland (1646-
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1715), Edward William Lane (1801-1876), John Payne (1847-1916), Jonathan Scott 
(1754-1829), and Henry Torrens (1779-1828).   
   The relationship between modernity and colonialism is controversial. Scholars have 
argued that exporting the values of modernity to the Eastern countries was an important 
factor in justifying colonialism. Therefore, colonialism, and in particular the European 
nineteenth century colonialism, had many different directions. A co-operative enterprise 
in which military, intellectual and cultural elements were significant, led the modern 
West to the tribal East, as Said (1993:229) ARGUES ‗[C]ultural texts imported the 
foreign into Europe in ways that very clearly bear the mark of the imperial enterprise, of 
explorers and ethnographers, geologists and geographers, merchants and soldiers‘. The 
nineteenth century European countries were hierarchical and patriarchal societies 
dominated by the privileged class and the notion of masculinity.  Reflection of the 
notions of class and gender are difference in the Orientalism discourse.  The notion of 
gender indicates to women travellers and femininity point of view towards ‗other‘ in 
this case Easterner in particular. Unlike the male travellers there were some significant 
women figures who had different views on Eastern women; they also had a different 
interpretation of the harem. Many studies show that women travellers had different 
representations compared to their countrymen. As Dianne Sachko Macleod (1998:63) 
states ‗Nonetheless, in picturing the harem as a place of female autonomy, women 
travellers in the Ottoman Empire provided an alternative discourse to the male 
representation of the harem as a site of sexual submission‘.   
   Few liberated women disagreed with the masculine stereotyping of the exotic and 
erotic Easterner. They admired the Turkish women, for example, for their rights and 
freedom compared to the women from their home country. Lady Mary as wife of British 
representative to Constantinople in 1717, Lord Wortley Montagu, had an opportunity to 
get involved in the women‘s movement. Her ‗Embassy Letters‘ explained the 
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impression she had about the women‘s situation in the Ottoman Empire. In one of these 
letters to her sister, Mary Montagu writes ‗[I]t is very easy to see they have more 
Liberty than we have…Neither have they much to apprehend from the resentment of 
their husbands, those Ladies that are rich having all their money in their own hands, 
which they take them upon a divorce with an addition which he is obliged to give them. 
Upon the whole, I look upon the Turkish women as the only free people in the Empire‘ 
(Macleod 1998:69). Thus, some British women regardless of how Westerners imagined 
Eastern women wore Turkish women‘s dress when they got back to their country ‗Mary 
Montagu‘s fascination with the luxurious texture, colouring and design of Turkish 
garment is a reversal of the standard relationship between coloniser and the colonised‘ 
(Macleod  1998:70).    
   In European literature boys and men were conceived of as heroes who gave their lives 
to the imperial enterprise.  Linguistically, terms such as hero, boy, man, hunter and 
explorer all referred to masculine metaphors which fed into the empire literature in the 
Victorian era of Great Britain. These terms were linked because they all shared one 
function which was ‗discovering‘ the exotics. For example it could be seen how Angela 
Woollcott links the hunting of wild animals in Africa with the imperial project. The 
author goes on to point out how colonial administrators hunted for leisure but this came 
within a cultural and historical context ‗[i]f actual big game hunting was the pastime of 
the privileged few, its cultural celebration was partly the result of the many published 
travelogues based on hunting narratives: The British manliness such as coolness, 
bravery, restraint and humour that the hunter reputedly embodied‘ (Woollcott 2006:71).      
   In Victorian society, in the late nineteenth century colonialism, distinction between 
the classes was obvious.  Thus, notions of identities in terms of culture, gender and class 
were strongly constructed in the context of colonialism. There is plenty of literature, 
writing, and exhibitions which reflect the Victorian hierarchical society. Similarly, to 
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exclude others from their realm of superiority, the upper and aristocratic class saw the 
lower class as ‗the other‘. Therefore, the notion of difference widely reinforced 
colonialism in both situations external and internal. Grace Moore (2004:22) looks at 
Dickens‘ involvement with issues such as race and class ‗[t]he connections between the 
colonised and the urban poor went far deeper than mere metaphor. The British 
territories overseas replicated the class and labour relations of the home market, 
replacing class division with the even more rigid and insurmountable category of race‘.    
   To conclude, nineteenth century colonialism was intellectually constructed and 
maintained by the notions of ‗difference‘ to create ‗othernesses. Thus, ‗the other‘ was 
not only people who belonged to a different race or religion, but also those who came 
from a different class and gender of the colonialists‘ peer group.   
2.3 Colonies in the nineteenth Century  
There are two main groups of colonies: full colonies and semi-colonies. Besikci 
(2004:18) states ‗[F]ull colonies are societies which have not yet reached the stage of 
founding a state. The capitalist state, in the process of expanding and taking on 
imperialist qualities, subjects the economy of a traditional society under its domination 
to its economy‘. To facilitate such exploitation politically a particular order is 
established in the colonised lands. This order is undoubtedly the product of the 
imperialist or colonised power and under the latter‘s political, administrative, military, 
cultural, and economic control. Administrators known as governors, inspectors, regents 
and viceroys are placed at the heads of bodies through which the colonial power rules 
the colony.  
   As this organisation establishes sovereignty over a specific territory, it is possible to 
speak of the resulting entity as a colonial state. Besikci (2004:18) provides number 
examples of ‗full colonies‘. These include British colonies such as India, Ceylon, 
Malaysia and Burma in Asia; Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Botswana, Sudan and Tanzania 
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in Africa, French colonies in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Ghana, Mauritania, 
Upper Volta and Dahomey and Portuguese colonies in Angola, Mozambique, and 
Guinea Bissau. Besikci (2004:18) goes on to say ‗[t]he establishment of such economic, 
political, social, cultural, and even religious institutions in colonies, in the service of 
colonial powers, called for a native staff‘. He points out this staff were trained and 
brought up to defend and protect the interest of the metropolitan country. Therefore, 
they were the extension of colonial policies. (Besikci (2004:18). Semi-colonies are 
societies which have a founded state, a traditional social order and they have a long 
history. China, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire were in the position of semi-colonies at 
one time. In the nineteenth century, faced with increasing pressure for expanding 
imperialist states, such countries (semi-colonies) felt the need to train their own 
administrative cadres and recognise their economic, social, political, cultural, and 
military institutions. It is widely accepted that most people worldwide, have 
experienced Western values and polices during the nineteenth century through the 
process of colonialism. 
2.4 Decolonisation 
Decolonisation was experienced differently by the various colonies. Hall (1996) warns 
of the dangers of carelessly homogenising experiences as disparate as those of white 
settler colonies, such as Australia and Canada, the Latin American continent whose 
independence battles were fought in the nineteenth century, and countries such as India, 
Nigeria, or Algeria that emerged from very different colonial countries in the post-
World War Two era. Hall (1996:246) suggests that the concept of decolonisation may 
nonetheless help us ‗describe or characterise the shift in global relations which marks 
the (necessarily uneven) transition from the age of Empires to the post-independence 
and post-decolonisation moment‘.  
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The history of the place and the experience of colonisation and decolonisation played 
vital roles in the process of post-colonialism. Bush (2006:51) explains this and says 
‗[p]ost colonialism, then, is not contained by tidy categories of historical periods or 
dates, although it remains firmly bound up with historical experiences‘. There are 
debates about when the postcolonial period began. This has been pushed back to the 
American Revolution, the decolonisation of Latin America and the founding of 
Australia. The following sections address the explanation of decolonisation.  
2.4.1 The nationalist explanation 
The superpowers and colonisers have always been challenged with the vision of 
independence. The idea of independence was born at the early stages of colonisation. 
Occupation and hegemony have always been parallel with the struggle for liberation and 
independence. There is a fundamental link between imperialism and emancipation and 
power and liberation, operating at both a global and local level. The process of 
enlightenment and its consequences have had significant role in inspiring many 
nationalist movements and liberation theorists. In this respect, the European revolutions 
such as the French inspired many people across the world to liberate themselves from 
the foreign powers and to end subordination. Kramer (1997:534) argues ‗[T]he French 
revolutionary ideas of the 1790s spread to the Caribbean and stimulated major slave 
revolts that made a contribution to the ending of slavery equal to, if not greater than, 
that of European abolitions‘. Wesseling (1997:119) points out that within the colonised 
societies ‗[t]he new elite came to the conclusion that they had more to gain by resistance 
than by collaboration and they managed to install these sentiments into a large section 
of the population. Here we are confronted with a crucial problem in the history of 
colonisation‘. Nationalism played a vital role in the process of decolonisation, 
especially after the Second World War. Wesseling (1997:122) argues ‗England, France, 
and the Netherlands were all three confronted with a new, powerful nationalism in their 
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colonies after 1945. England conceded to the Indian wish for independence. France and 
the Netherlands, in Indochina and in Indonesia, respectively, followed another course, 
that of resistance‘. Nationalism, nation state and modernity are interlinked. Kramer 
(1997:536) argues ‗[C]laims to independence are themselves linked to Western, 
Enlightenment conceptions of progress, so that the definitions of a ―new nation‖ such as 
India necessarily depend on both the existence and effacement of an ―other‖ that never 
disappears‘. Nationalism as a political movement became a challenge for colonial 
domination.  
   Nationalist movements also played a vital role in the process of decolonisation. 
Intellectuals and narratives have fuelled the process of creation national identity or 
unity. Media played a role in escalating the process of decolonisation. Resistance 
existed in earlier empires but intensified in the twentieth-century age of mass media and 
communications. In the Roman Empire communities remained relatively isolated and 
Roman imperialism had a less transformative impact on local cultures. The anti-
colonialism process has been strengthened since the beginning of twentieth century. 
Stimulated by uncertain economic conditions, anti-colonial resistance gained its 
strength after 1918. A new sense of race-consciousness strengthened anti-imperialism.  
   The impacts of colonisation have varied and it depends on the experiences of the 
colonisers and colonised countries. The history of decolonisation has always been 
turbulent. Colonial history cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy of canonicalisation 
and decolonisation, submission or freedom. It is a history of collaboration and 
resistance. While colonial administrators who earned their wages from the coloniser 
wanted to maintain the status quo, the intellectuals and revolutionaries wanted to change 
things. Decolonisation was a transition to a different stage of power. Wesseling 
(1997:121) argues ‗[D]ecolonisation was always considered to be a possibility for the 
future‘. In a sense, every modern nation state is a product of colonisation.  
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The collapse of the European empires left a legacy in this region. Weiner (1992:335) 
argues ‗[t]he reconfiguration of the world's largest empire is sure to have profound 
consequences for international relations, as well as for the types of regime or regimes 
that emerge, and for their subsequent economic, social and cultural development‘. The 
World War Two is the beginning to the collapse of the era of empire.   
2.4.2 Decolonisation since World War Two 
The end of World War Two considerably affected the process of formal decolonisation. 
Springhall (2001:1) argues ‗[O]ne of the most momentous changes to take place in the 
post-1945 world has been the dismemberment and almost complete removal of the 
European colonial or maritime empires set up in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, the 
Pacific, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. When the Second World War broke out 
in 1939, roughly a third of the world‘s entire population lived under imperial or colonial 
rule; today less than 0.1 per cent of the global population lives in dependent territories‘. 
   Post-colonialism has taken different directions since 1945. Decolonisation signifies 
the surrender of external political sovereignty, largely Western European, over 
colonised non-European peoples, plus the emergence of independent territories where 
once the West had ruled, or the transfer of power from empire to nation-state. The 
historical process that this overarching term draws the attention to has not yet acquired a 
fixed definition among historians. Decolonisation usually means the taking of measures 
by indigenous peoples and/ or their white overlords to end external control over 
overseas colonial territories and the attempt to replace formal political rule by some new 
kind of relationship. Nation-states have been central to most peoples across the world 
since post-World War Two. Springhall (2001:3) states ‗[C]itizens of the new nation-
states, and their admirers, often prefer to speak of ‗national liberation‘ rather than use 
the term ‗decolonisation‘ generally favoured by Western scholars. This reflects different 
views (push out versus pull out) of what actually took place. ‗Decolonisation‘ would, 
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perhaps, be a more neutral academic term‘. Moreover, 1945 was a turning point in the 
world politics. Post-1945 decolonisation effectively demolished the old international 
system- economic, geographic, and cultural- by which the developed or urban-industrial 
Western nations had once dominated the rest of the world.  
   Neo-colonialism emerged since 1945. The former colonisers started exercising their 
power and domination in different forms and through various means. The nationalist 
explanation is compatible with understanding the process of decolonisation since 1945. 
Springhall (2001:9) states in the post-1945 period ‗[b]y increasing the productive 
capacity of their colonies, the European powers created the very conditions which 
encouraged the colonised peoples to challenge imperial rule: rapid urbanisation, plus 
social and political mobilisation behind the ideology of anti-colonial nationalism‘. The 
economic development of the colonies and acceleration in world economic growth 
created the structural conditions throughout the colonial world in which indigenous 
nationalism could flourish. Hence, a combination of political and economic pressures on 
the European decision-makers reinforced existing international pressures for retreat or 
withdrawal.  
   The establishment of the United Nations led to the emergence of a new political 
system in the world which affected the relationship between colonisers and colonised 
countries. The United Nations, established at San Francisco in October 1945, with its 
firmer conditions for trusteeship as compared with the old League mandates, reflected a 
stronger bias in favour of advancing the colonial territories to independence. 
International pressures increased with the admission of new independent states such as 
India, Ceylon and Indonesia to the UN. These states skilfully used the UN as a platform 
to isolate and embarrass the old colonial powers. In 1960, alongside the entry of many 
new African states, the UN General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which typified colonial rule as a denial 
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of fundamental human rights and as contrary to the UN Charter. With this, the post-
colonial period has gradually started and power relations between colonies and 
colonised took a different direction.  Post-colonialism is mainly about the balance of 
power and the relationship between race, gender, sexuality and imperialism have been 
reshaped since then.  
2.5 The collapse of Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the new Middle East  
Many mighty and multiracial empires have collapsed throughout history. Mansfield 
(2003:27) points out that Ottoman Empire, which lasted from 1299 to 1922 and at the 
height of its power spanned over three continents, was far more extensive and enduring 
‗than the powerful states that had been established by other warrior nomads from central 
Asia- the Seljuks, Mongols and Tartars‘. The author (2003:28) goes on to argue the 
empire‘s decline started halfway through its life and ‗from then on the decadence was 
virtually unremitting‘.  
   Failing to take Vienna in 1683 was probably a major blow to the Empire. Similarly 
with the death of Sultan Abdul-Majid in 1886, the Ottomans handed over Cyprus to 
Britain in 1878. In 1878 the Treaty of Berlin was signed in which Turkey lost 4/5 of its 
territory, in Europe had considerable affect on weakening of the Ottoman Empire. In the 
final stages efforts made to reform and revive the empire in the 1920s contributed to its 
break-up and decline.  
   Modern Middle East emerged as a result of the Ottoman Empire‘s disintegration in 
the wake of World War One. Owen (2004:6) points out that this disintegration began 
just before 1914 because ‗[a] series of Balkan wars led to the loss of most of the 
empire‘s remaining possessions in Europe, while the Italians took advantage of 
Ottoman weakness to make a sustained attack on the region around Tripoli in North 
Africa‘. Meanwhile, the Young Turks‘ Revolution of 1908 had brought to power a 
group of officers and officials. This group were dedicated not only to the accelerated 
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reform of Ottoman institutions but also to an incipient Turkish nationalism. This 
threatened to drive a wedge between the Turks who controlled the empire and the Arabs 
who had previously been regarded as their main partners. There were significant reasons 
behind the collapse of the empire. Catherwood (2004:15) states  
In 1918, following the fatal decision of the Ottomans to ally themselves with 
Germany against France and Britain in World War One, their once-great 
empire was defeated and utterly shattered. The same year saw imperial collapse 
on a previously unimaginable scale, with the downfall of the Austro-
Hungarian, Russian, and German empires as well. The end of empires is often 
the result of great tides of economic fluctuation and of ideological passions- in 
the case of the empires that fall in 1918, a wave of nationalism and the 
corresponding desire of subject peoples to rule themselves.  
 
On the political nature of the Ottoman Empire, in the first place the empire was a huge 
military organisation. It was also highly centralised, in the sense that virtually all land 
within the empire belonged to the Ottoman state. It was feudal in so far as much of the 
best land was allocated as fiefs to the Ottoman military aristocracy; but only in rare 
cases could this land be inherited, and thus the empire never developed a European kind 
of feudal nobility to balance the power of the monarch. Mansfield (2003:29) on the 
treatment of indigenous peoples of the empire states ‗[T]he Muslim Arabs who formed 
the great majority in the empire‘s Middle Eastern and North African provinces were not 
treated as second-class citizens in this institutionalised manner, but in Syria/ Palestine 
and Iraq an Ottoman ruling class of governors and administrators was imposed upon 
them‘.  
   In terms of the Turkish monopoly of the Ottoman Empire, that there was no Turkish 
colonisation of the land. Officials were frequently moved to other provinces of the 
empire, which might not be Arabic-speaking, and they normally expected to retire to the 
Turkish heartland. There was also no attempt to Turkify the non-Turkish Muslims who 
were Ottoman subjects. On the attitude of the Ottoman leaders towards modern life, 
Mansfield (2003:33) notes ‗[a]s the empire weakened and declined, its leaders- sultans, 
pashas, generals and men of religion- turned in upon themselves to become increasingly 
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hostile and outwardly contemptuous towards innovation, originality and external 
influences of all kinds‘.  
   The collapse of the empire was a complicated process and it involved different 
factors. Kamrava (2005:28) argues death of ‗[t]he Ottomans was a slow and painful 
process. The Empire reluctantly entered the war on Germany‘s side at the beginning of 
the war. The allies, as a consequence, decided to chip away at the empire‘s Middle 
Eastern provinces. Russian advances in Anatolia were halted only after 1917 communist 
revolution. That same year Britain captured Baghdad, and Jerusalem fell a year later. A 
rebellion calling for independence also broke out among the Arab population of the 
Hejaz‘. The Ottoman Empire was being systematically dismembered.  
   Wimmer (2002:2) argues nationalism and ethnicity played a role in the weakening of 
the Ottoman Empire ‗[p]re-modern empires integrated ethnic differences under the 
umbrella of a hierarchical, yet universalistic and genuinely non-ethnic political order, in 
which every group had its properly defined place. This pyramidal mosaic was broken up 
when societies underwent nationalisation and ethnic membership became a question of 
central importance in determining political loyalty and disloyalty towards the state‘. The 
political structure of the peoples of the Ottoman Empire dramatically changed and new 
groups and ethnicities emerged. Millets such as Maronites, Shias, Sunnis, Druze, 
Christians were turned into ethno-national groups, and the leaders of semi-independent 
tribal confederacies or emirates tried to forge nations out of their former subjects and 
allies.  Kamarava (2005:65) points out ‗[T]he end of the Ottoman era brought with it a 
fundamental redrawing of the map of the Middle East, resulting in the creation of a host 
of new national entities. But the termination of Istanbul‘s imperial control did not 
necessarily mean that indigenous, national forces could now assert themselves, at least 
not for another twenty years or so‘. Even before the end of the Ottomans, Britain and 
France had begun a contest for the spoils of the Middle East, carving it up into 
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respective protectorates with little regard for or understanding of what the locals 
wanted. The slow death of the Ottoman Empire and its collapse left a power vacuum. 
New politicians and leaders amongst the peoples of the empire emerged. Kamrava 
(2005:28) maintains:  
The war raised the fortunes of one Ottoman general, a certain Mustafa Kemal, 
whose strategic genius had spared his forces from defeat in all the military 
campaigns in which they were involved. As the war was drawing to a close in 
1918, the Young Turk government in Istanbul went into hiding and Kemal took 
over the reins of power. For the next three years he fought a series of 
successful military campaigns against the Armenian republic in the Caucasus, 
the French in Cilicia, and the Greeks in central Anatolia, as well as Ottoman 
troops remaining loyal to the sultan. Emerging victorious, in 1921 he 
established a Grand National Assembly in the interior city of Ankara and 
promulgated a new, republican constitution the following year.  
 
The Turkish republic was proclaimed on October 29, 1923. That same year the 
independence of Turkey was recognised within its present boundaries through the 
Treaty of Lausanne. Mustafa Kemal was declared president. In the coming decades, 
Kemal and his successors methodically set out to dismantle the political, socio-cultural, 
and religious vestiges of the Ottoman rule. The era of the Ottomans and everything they 
stood for: the caliphate, Turko-Islamic tradition, social and cultural conservation, rule 
over disparate millets religious communities came to a dramatic end, and a new era of 
Kemalist republicanism began. The French and British as major colonisers in the 
beginning of the twentieth century played a vital role in deciding the destiny of the 
peoples of the region. Owen (2004:7) elaborates that despite local resistance the British 
and French were masters of the Middle East by the mid-1920s. They were the ones who 
determined the new boundaries, decided what form of government should be 
established, and chose their favourites to rule in the region. The author (2004:8) states it 
was the British and the French in association with the Americans who ‗had a major say 
in how access to the region‘s natural resources should be allocated‘. In other words the 
winning allies played a major role in shaping the modern Middle East. The modern 
Middle East status, to large extent is the outcome of post-colonial process.   
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Kandiyoti (2002:279) argues the term ‗post-colonial‘ is relatively new in the social 
science terminology ‗[a]lthough discussions about the effects of colonial and imperial 
domination are by no means new, the various meanings attached to different 
understandings of what characterises the post-colonial continue to make this term a 
controversial one‘. For the purpose of analysing the Middle Eastern political systems of 
the post-First World War period, a useful starting point may be to note that there existed 
a particular pattern of control known as the ―colonial state‖. Wimmer (2002:3) states 
after the collapse of the colonial states notions such as democracy, citizenship, and 
national self-determination ‗became the indivisible trinity of the world order of nation-
state‘. Nation-states can have a variety of forms depending on the circumstances and the 
nature of the state.  
   Identities of the communities were nationalised and ethicised as a result of the First 
World War. Kings and caliphs were replaced by representatives of the nation. Wimmer 
(2002:9) argues nation-states are ‗[t]he product of four closely interconnected processes 
of institutional closure; a political one (democracy tied to national self determination), a 
legal one (citizenship tied to nationality), a military one (universal conscription tied to 
national citizenship), and a social one (the institutions of the welfare state linked to the 
control of the immigration of foreigners)‘. The colonial event lies between these two 
moments; that of the old experience of a difference and that of a racially determined 
conflict. Ethnic identity and the role of elites played a vital role in the process of 
independence. 
2.6  Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has addressed colonialism, decolonisation and related themes to both 
processes. It concludes colonisation has been strongly linked to hegemony and 
imperialism. Imagining ‗othernesses and the theories of Orientalism have had an impact 
on the relationship between colonies and colonised. On the other hand, the rise of 
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nationalism in the colonies, the French revolution and enlightenment played a 
significant role in the process of decolonisation. Formal colonialism has ended in many 
parts of the world, but there are still cases of indirect rule or informal colonialism. In 
other words, the processes of colonialism and decolonisation exist in different forms in 
the twenty-first century.  
   The collapse of the Ottoman Empire is a vital point while addressing the current status 
of the Middle East. The emerging new Middle Eastern states following the end of First 
World War is a starting point to analyse post-colonial states in the Middle East. 
Therefore, understanding components of the states of this region, studying the 
beginning of establishment of these states is significant. In terms of the geographical 
and cultural definitions of Middle East, there is not a consensus amongst scholars and 
researchers. This is not the interest of the current thesis what is more relevant to this 
study, it is widely accepted that the four examined countries (Iraq, Turkey, Iran and 





3 Chapter three: Modern Middle East and an overview of the four countries 
covered    
In light of the above political developments, the chapter addresses the new geographic 
structure of the Middle East and the four examined countries (Iraq, Turkey, Iran and 
Syria). Regarding the borders of the Middle East, Mansfield (2006:240) points out that, 
generally speaking, international borders are never completely just. There are, the 
author argues, degrees of justice in this regard and this depends on whether people were 
forcibly put together or divided. He then goes on to say that not having any choice in 
how the borders were drawn makes the difference between ‗freedom and oppression, 
tolerance and atrocity, the rule of law and terrorism, or even peace and war‘. Mansfield 
(2003:1) states:  
―The Middle East‖ is a modern English term for the most ancient region of 
human civilization. Before and during the First World War, ―the Near East‖, 
which comprised Turkey and the Balkans, the Levant and Egypt, was the term 
in more common use. The Middle East, if employed at all, referred to Arabia, 
the Gulf, Persia (Iran)/ Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Afghanistan. After the First 
World War Allies had destroyed the Ottoman Turkish Empire and established 
their hegemony over its former Arab provinces, the Middle East gradually 
came to encompass both areas.  
 
Mansfield (2003:6) argues, it was centuries for the Middle East and North African 
regions to become Arabised. The most arbitrary and distorted borders in the world were 
drawn in Africa and the Middle East. Driven by self-interest the Europeans (who have 
had sufficient trouble defining their own frontiers) drew Africa‘s borders. Catherhood 
(2004:14) states ‗[a] great number of Africa‘s borders were created by European 
conquerors in the nineteenth-century era of colonial expansion; the sole concern of the 
officials who drew them was often to apportion how much land would go to each of the 
competing companies‘. The arbitrary choices made by Europeans continue to cause 
tensions of local inhabitants.    
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Similarly the borders of the Middle East, which were created at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, continue to cause problems. The peoples of the region are currently 
ruled and governed by authorities whose legitimacy is disputed. Catherwood (2004:14) 
argues ‗[T]he ethnic problems that the peacemakers could not solve after the First 
World War did not end with the Allied victory in the Second. In the twenty-first 
century, we still live in a world created early in the twentieth by Wilson, Lloyd George, 
Clemenceau and Orlando‘. The borders in the Middle East generate more trouble that 
can be consumed locally. Jordan, Iraq, and Syria, owe their existence as separate entities 
to the European dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Syria witnessed various forms of French rule. The rest 
of the region, apart from Italian Libya and the Spanish possessions in Morocco, came 
under British control. The complex diplomatic history which accounts for these 
outcomes is an indication of the complexity of state formation in the region, but the 
process actually began in most of the Middle East well before the Europeans set the 
region's internal boundaries. The boundaries of the new states were rarely congruent 
with indigenous social formations or economic systems. The often arbitrary borders 
bequeathed to the newly independent states by the Europeans left many of the states 
with heterogeneous and partial social structures and economies. Tribes, such as those in 
Jordan, were deprived of their markets. Geographical and ethnic units, such as the 
Kurds, were often divided among the new states. This meant that for some countries the 
further development of state capacity required simultaneous reorientations in economic 
links, social relations, and political loyalties. Because of the novelty and, in some cases, 
the weakness of many of the states of the Middle East, their legitimacy is often 
correspondingly low.  
   The notions of citizenship, patriotism, and love of country which undergird loyalty to 
the modem state frequently face competing conceptions of identity, loyalty, and 
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legitimacy. Indeed, even state elites often find themselves better served by non-state 
ideologies: the pan-Arab nationalism of the ruling Ba'th in Iraq and Syria, the 
international vocation of the Libyan revolution, and the Islamic republic in Iran all 
constitute efforts to inspire loyalty based on ethnicity, ideology, and religion, all of 
which deny the primacy of the state as an object of loyalty. In part this is a consequence 
of the historical development of political identity in the Middle East. The reforms of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries were justified by a variety of ideological positions- 
the defence of the empires and of Islam, for example, or the revival of the language and 
culture of Arabs, Turks, Persians- which were espoused by social classes and groups 
whose ties extended throughout the region.    
   Anderson (1987:12) states ‗With the exceptions of Iran, Morocco, and the periphery 
of the Arabian peninsula, all of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa are 
successors of the Ottoman Empire. Apart from Iran, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, and 
Turkey, all the countries of the region experienced decades of European rule during this 
century‘. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of European 
colonialisation played an important role in shaping the geography, politics and status of 
the states in this region. Owen (2004:7) argues the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 
the early 1920s led to the introduction of European colonialism which last until the 
1940s. He states: 
European colonialism took place under historical circumstances radically 
different from those that had existed during Ottoman rule. Nevertheless, the 
basic pattern of relationship between the colonial states and their subject 
societies-one of detachment, minimal contact, and top-down flow of power-
remained largely the same. The emergence of sovereign, independent states in 
the Middle East in the 1940s and 1950s dramatically altered domestic power 
equations and the traditional foundations for state-society relations in each 
Middle Eastern country.  
 
Countries of the Middle East had different experiences and structures. In addition the 
uniting factors of ethnicity, language, and religion are the curse and the blessings of a 
common historical heritage. Much of the Middle East, with the exception of Iran and 
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Morocco, experienced centuries of Ottoman rule, generally from the mid-sixteenth 
century up until the waning years of the nineteenth century. The Ottomans‘ hold on the 
Middle East was often tenuous and frequently interrupted. Over the centuries, however, 
for better or for worse, from their capital in Istanbul the Ottomans managed to leave 
their mark on far-off places such as Cairo, Tripoli, and Tunis.  
   The Ottoman power‘s disintegration had an unmistakable pattern: superiority in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, parity in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, and steady decline thereafter, so that the Ottoman Empire eventually became 
the Sick man of Europe. Because of the conditions in which they had obtained power, 
the rulers of the newly independent Middle Eastern states faced many of the same 
problems as their colonial predecessors. It was one thing to create a nationalist coalition 
against the retreating imperial power, quite another to obtain the allegiance of all its 
new citizens. Just as the First World War had created the conditions that led to the grant 
of formal independence to Egypt in 1922, so too did the Second World War pave the 
way for the end of colonial domination in many other parts of the Middle East. Iran had 
remained outside the Ottoman‘s control. In 1501, a militant Shia Sufi named Ismail, at 
the time only thirteen years old, rose to prominence and established the Safavid dynasty. 
The status of Safavid was different from Ottoman one. The former was Shia sect of 
Islam dominated while the latter was Sunni sect of Islam dominated. In addition, the 
Ottoman Empire was under the influence of the European empire more than the Safavid. 
The following section explains this.  
   Inspired by the political ideals prevalent in Europe and dazzled by the industrial 
accomplishments of Britain, yet remaining committed to their Islamic religion and 
Ottoman heritage, the Ottomans sought to reform the system from within. With their 
attempts at turning the dynasty into constitutional parliamentary system, presumably 
along the Westminster model, they gave rise to a number of different, competing 
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factions. By the early years of the twentieth century, the idea of multinational, 
multireligious, empire had become increasingly untenable, and the birth of competing 
local identities and loyalties was tearing the empire part. This problem was not unique 
to the Ottoman Empire. At about roughly the same time, the two other dynasties 
bordering the Ottomans, the Hapsburgs to the west and the Qajars to the east, also faced 
crises that threatened their very survival, eventually leading to their collapse. Though 
the specific causes of the crises facing the imperial household were different in each 
case, the Ottomans and the Hapsburg shared similar challenges in ruling over vast, 
multinational territories. In terms of the nature of the region, Serberny (2006:188) 
states:  
The Middle East is an extraordinary region. It is not continental. It is 
geographically leaky. The name itself is a geopolitical label given to the region 
by western powers after the First World War. The region is now most usually 
referred to by international organizations such as the World Bank as MENA, 
the Middle East and North Africa. It is a highly differentiated region, along 
many different kinds of social variables. There are the mixed legacies of the 
Ottoman empire and English and French colonisation, and enduring territorial 
disputes traceable to the arbitrary lines in the sand by which European powers 
used to demarcate some national boundaries after 1918. A number of the 
region‘s peoples (Palestinians, Kurds, and Armenians) remain proto-states.  
 
In relation to the political changes, the region has experienced moments of 
constitutional reform (the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905); westernised 
modernisation (Turkey under Ataturk, Iran under Pahlavi) and republican revolutions in 
the 1950s (Iraq, Egypt, Syria), some of which remain highly centralised mobilising 
regimes. Regarding the ruling of the region in the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Kamrava (2005:50) observes that after the end of Ottoman rule there was a republican 
system in Turkey and the rest of the region was dominated by Britain and France:  
Britain and France became the region‘s dominant powers, each having 
mandates of its own: Palestine and Iraq for Britain, Syria and Lebanon for 
France. Egypt and the Emirate of Transjordan existed in a state of precarious 
independence, with Britain remaining the true master of their destinies. The 
Maghreb had already fallen to the French in the closing decades of the 1800s, 
and Libya was under Italian control in 1911. Finally, Iran and the Kingdom of 




By October 1916, Britain and France had finalised the Sykes-Picot Agreement, in the 
form of eleven letters exchanged between the two sides. In this agreement they divided 
the Ottoman provinces into different spheres of influence. The treaties that shaped the 
borders in this region and national designations of areas are of historic importance 
including: the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916), the Balfour Declaration (November 
1917), the conference of San Remo (April 1920), and the Treaty of Sevres (August 
1920). Accordingly, countries were carved out of former Ottoman territories: Turkey, 
Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.  
   Perhaps the biggest remains of the British rule, aside from the drawing of artificial 
national borders, was the institution of monarchy, which they secured in almost all the 
lands they ruled in Egypt, Jordon, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. The French colonial 
inheritance was less political and more cultural. Nevertheless, the powerful unifying 
forces in the Middle East-religion, ethnicity, and language – have at times also been 
source of division and conflict. In many historical episodes subtle differences in dialect 
or ethnic identity have served as powerful catalysts for the articulation of national or sub 
national loyalties and even for political mobilisation. In short, the Middle East is far 
from monolithic and homogenous.  The following sections gives an overview of the 
four countries covered and the Kurds who are the case study of the present thesis.  
3.1 Creating the state of Iraq  
Iraq as a new political entity was established in 1921 and it was administrated by Britain 
until its independence in 1932. Stansfield (2006:3) explains the centralised structure of 
Iraq was only rationalised by and useful to the British ‗[c]hairing the Cairo conference 
in March 1921, Churchill‘s main concern was to secure Mesopotamia from any threat 
from Turkey or Russia‘. The British Empire was determined to create a united Iraq out 
of the three disparate provinces under the Ottoman Empire, namely Baghdad, Basra and 
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Mosul. Ironically, Iraq has been a fragile country since then. Initially, when the 
monarchy was established in 1921, its shape was still in dispute because the republic of 
Turkey laid claim to the Mousel vilayet (Rubin, 2005:5). Kreyenbroek (1990:48) 
explains, despite the fact that the majority of the people in northern Iraq are Kurds there 
is a significant Turkish (Turkmen) minority. This is why the status of the Mosul 
province, whether it should be part of Iraq, part of Turkey or become independent, was 
undecided until 1926 when it became part of Iraq. However, the author (1990:49) points 
out ‗Turkish nationalist circles have not yet resigned themselves to the loss of this 
region‘. Annexing the Kurds, ‗the province of Mosul‘, to the new state was a defective 
decision. Anderson (2004:6) argues one of the reasons for incorporating the Mosul 
province into Iraq was ‗[T]o help reduce the numerical dominance of the Shia‘. The 
author goes on to point out, that practically this was a bad decision which would have 
large repercussions because ‗[t]he Kurds of northern Iraq have never accepted central 
rule‘.  Similarly, when speaking about the status of the Kurds in Iraq O‘Leary (2009:12) 
states:  
The British invented modern Iraq by attempting to solder part of historic 
Kurdistan to al-Iraq al-Arabia. They broke their promise to create an 
autonomous Kurdistan and invented a deeply dysfunctional and divided polity. 
A Sunni Arabian Hashemite monarchy, despite intermittent good intentions, re-
entrenched the Ottoman hierarchy of Sunni over Shia and a new racial and 
ethnic hierarchy of Arab over Kurd.  
 
Iraq consists of three major groups: Sunni Kurds in the North, Sunni Arabs in the centre 
and Shia Arabs in the south. There are various statistics about the population of Iraq. 
According to Rangwala (2005:4) ‗[A]bout 80% of Iraq‘s population is Arab- 75% of 
them Shia, the rest Sunni Muslims. The Kurds make up another 15% of the total 
population. Other significant minorities include are 400,000 Assyro-Chaldaean 
Christians, 400,000 Turkmens, 70,000 Shabaks, 500,000 Feili Kurds, 18,000 Armenians 
and less than 5,000 Mandaeans‘.  Henri Barkey (2009), on the other hand, relies on 
different demographics. According to the July 2008 estimate the total population of Iraq 
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is 28,221,181. The various ethnic groups comprise the following percentages in Iraq: 
The Arabs 75%-80%, The Kurds 15%-20%, and Turcoman, Assyrian, or other 5%. The 
following map shows the geographical region of each component of the Iraqi 
population.  
 
Radio Free Europe (2009) 
 
There is no consensus on the exact number of the Kurds and other minorities in Iraq. 
For example: the head of the committee of census of Kurdistan Regional Government, 
Dr Jamal Rasul Mohammed Amin (2008:4) states ‗[D]despite the fact that in the Iraqi 
budget the Kurds are %17, according to the assessment and census, the population of 
Kurdistan is %18.5 of the whole population of Iraq‘.  Other minorities in Iraq include 
the Christians, the Turkmens who have strong cultural and historical links with Turkey, 
and the Yazidi Kurds whose faith combines elements of Zoroastrianism with the major 
monotheist creeds. Until the 1950s a large Jewish population also lived in Iraq, but the 
majority migrated to Israel. Thereby, Iraq is a complex state.   
   The Monarchy in Iraq lasted from 1921 until 1958. King Faisal I was appointed by the 
British Empire. There was an extensive conflict between the Iraqi people‘s desire for 
  
60 
independence and the British policy to run Iraq under its administration. Speaking of 
Iraq‘s independence Rangwala (2005:2) states ‗[i]n 1920, the San Remo Conference of 
Allied Powers granted Britain a mandate over Iraq, on the understanding that 
independence would be given in time. Iraq finally achieved independence in 1932, but 
Britain, and later the US, retained considerable control until the revolution of 1958‘.      
Notwithstanding the attempted coup in 1941 which was led by Rashid Ali, the period of 
1921-1958 was the most stable time in the history of Iraq. The popularity of King Faisal 
played a major role in that period of stability. Anderson and Stansfield (2004:6) note 
‗[A] decade of political chaos (1958-1968) gave way to rule by Saddam Hussein‘s Ba‘th 
Party and from 1979 onward, to a totalitarian dictatorship under the direct (and violent) 
control of the ―Great Leader‖ himself. Throughout, this period, Iraq has maintained its 
territorial integrity. What it has never succeeded in becoming is a nation‘. It other words 
Iraq has lived through violence and instability since 1958. 
3.2 Emerging of Turkey 
This section addresses the early years of Turkey emerging as one of the successors of 
the Ottoman caliph and as an independent state.  Then, the socio-political structure of 
the country is examined.  
   Unlike Iraq and Syria, Turkey was not always an independent state. It came into 
existence just before the beginning of the twentieth century. Regarding the 
establishment of Turkey, Kamrava (2005:56) argues ‗[t]he establishment of a republic 
in Turkey on October 29, 1923, had served as an inspiration to political modernisers in 
much of the Middle East, and circulated in Iran of establishing a similar system in 
preference over the archaic monarchy of the Qajars‘. Determined to create a new 
Turkey and a Turkish national identity, Kemal Ataturk went about his task in 
incremental steps. First, in 1922, he abolished the Ottoman Sultanate literally ‗family 
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dynasty‘. He allowed one of the Ottoman princes to remain as the caliph, thus appeasing 
the religious sensibilities of his associates and the masses at large.  
   Following the war of independence and the establishment of the republic in 1923, 
Turkish officials embarked on a project of what Watts (1999:647) calls ‗authoritarian 
high-modernism‘, in which progressive but non-democratic elites attempted to re-map 
the new country using ‗radically simplified designs for social organisation‘. (Watts 
1999:647).  In 1924, when his powers had become more secure, Kemal Ataturk 
abolished the caliphate as well. The cultural and ideological underpinnings of this new 
social organisation were Turkish nationalism, which strongly emphasised the country's 
Turkish culture and ethnic roots, downplaying and even suppressing religious or ethnic 
groups who voiced alternative sources of community. The Turkish mother tongue either 
assimilated into or joined the Turkish national project faced little formal discrimination. 
‗[C]onversely, open demonstrations of a Kurdish (or other minority) identity, such as 
speaking Kurdish or celebrating traditional Kurdish holidays, were strongly discouraged 
under the new principles of nationalism‘ (Zurche 1993:189).  
   This fearful attitude toward ethnic minorities is common to new states presiding over 
invented nations, but ethnic exclusivity was not an inevitable outcome of the formation 
of the republic. Kurds had freely represented themselves in the 1920-22 Turkish Grand 
National assembly as Kurdish tribal leaders, and Article 88 of the 1924 constitution had 
laid the groundwork for a potentially inclusive understanding of national identity by 
acknowledging the existence of ethnic variety. Watts (1999:647) points out ‗[E]veryone 
in Turkey is called a Turk without discrimination on the basis of religion or race‘. A 
potential evolution toward civic nationalism was halted by the Kurdish-led Sheikh Said 
Rebellion of 1925 and the measures used to suppress it. The rebellion fuelled fears of a 
division of the republic along the lines of the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which promised 
Kurds a separate state, and therefore encouraged the institutionalisation of authoritarian 
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nationalism, as Robert Olson (1989:220) argues. After the rebellion, notions of a civic 
understanding of Turkish nationalism were superseded-in fact if not in constitutional 
edict-by the notion that the territorial integrity of the republic needed to be protected 
through ethnic commonality Turkish leaders saw the presence of a "Kurdish people" 
within Turkey's border as a clear territorial threat. 
   A brief sketch of the history of the democratic ideal in Turkish government indicates 
that democratic principles have been previously and now remain an important 
component of the ideology of the state. The democratic provisions of the 1924 
constitution remained mostly on paper, it was important simply that they were there, 
and more, that the basis for sustained one-party rule was not. ‗During the authoritarian 
rule of the Republican People's Party (RPP), both constitutionally and electorally, a 
democratic facade was carefully maintained, so much so that the transition to multiparty 
in 1946 required not a single change in the Constitution and only relatively minor 
changes in other laws‘ (Ozbudun 1981:92). Between the election of the Democratic 
Party (DP) in 1950 and the coup of 1971, dramatic demographic and social changes 
such as urban migration and increased university enrolment embedded state agencies in 
a new social landscape shaped as much by student activists and populist leaders as by 
Kemalist elites. Although the DP was forcibly removed from office by a military coup 
in 1960, the years following the coup and the return of civilian government were some 
of the more liberal in Turkey's history.  The 1961 constitution, structured closely along 
the lines of the European Convention on Human Rights, introduced proportional 
representation and a bill of civil rights, and a variety of student and political 
associations flourished. For the first time, the ideological supremacy of Turkish 
nationalism faced a substantial challenge from political demands for pluralist 
democratisation. However after the "coup by memorandum" of 1971, Turkish officials 
backed away from full democratisation, in particular by limiting freedom of speech.  
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 In the decades following, official policies toward public expressions of Kurdish identity 
were largely subsumed within the imperatives of Turkish nationalism. In official 
discourse, democracy became something that could survive in Turkey only within 
carefully prescribed limits. As General Kenan Evren's speech to the nation on 12 
September 1980 expresses ‗[t]he goal of the operation that has been undertaken ... is to 
re-establish the authority and existence of the state and to do away with the causes that 
are preventing the democratic order from functioning‘ (Watts 1999:647).  The 1982 
constitution granted the state extensive powers to restrain democratic expression if 
national unity was perceived to be threatened. Article 13 stipulates ‗[f]undamental rights 
and freedoms may be restricted by law, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the republic‘ 
(Dodd 200:1990).  
   In a departure from previous legislation, Turkish language was now declared the 
mother tongue (as opposed to the official language) of all citizens of Turkey, and certain 
languages, including Kurdish, were restricted through a new set of laws. In this 
atmosphere, general use of the word "Kurd," let alone "Kurdistan," might well be 
viewed as constituting treason. The emergency rule laws were used by the Turkish 
authorities throughout the 1980s in the southeast, which bolstered the activities of 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).   
3.2.1 Ethnic structure and the Kurds of Turkey  
According to Andrew (2007: 47) ‗there are 47 different ethnic groups in Turkey‘. He 
states ‗[t]he main religious, linguistic and ethnic groups in Turkey are: Kurds, Jews, 
Greeks, Armenians, Syriacs, Alevis, Yazidis, Albanians, Georgians, Circassians, 
Bulgarians, Laz, Arabs and Roma‘. Regarding the population structure of Turkey, 
Barkey (2009) states ‗Population: 71,892,807 (July 2008 est.), Ethnic groups: Turkish 
80%, Kurdish 20% (estimated)‘. The estimated number of Kurds in Turkey is 
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approximately 15 million and they represent 20 percent of Turkey‘s population. They 
predominantly live in the southeast of Turkey but as a result of migration, currently a 
significant proportion of Kurds live in the western cities of Turkey. A majority of Kurds 
are Sunni-Muslim and there are large numbers of Kurds from the Alevi religion. They 
speak two dialects of Kurdish, Kurmanji and Zazaki.  Kurds have been seen by the 
Turkish authorities as a potential threat to the integrity of the state since the foundation 
of the Republic of Turkey. Turkey‘s policy has been shaped on the basis of this fear and 
Kurds have faced human rights violations and a policy of assimilation.  
 
The Kurds Today (KHRP 2008:10)  
Regarding the other minorities, David (1995:20) states ‗Alevis are the second largest 
religious group (after Sunnis) in Turkey and their estimated number is between 12 and 
15 million. They belong to different ethnic groups i.e. Turks, Kurds, Arabs or Azeris. 
They consider themselves to be part of the Shia sector movement who revere Ali 
(Muhammad‘s cousin and son-in-law) and the Twelve Imams of his house‘. Alevis are 
not officially recognised as a minority, thus, they cannot practice their religious rights 
effectively. Armenian Orthodox Christians, Greek Orthodox Christians and Jews are the 
only officially recognised religious minority groups in Turkey. ‗There are around 
60,000 Armenians, 26,000 Jews and, according to estimates, 5,000 Greeks in Turkey. 
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They are recognised by their religion but not by their ethnic identity. Most of these three 
religious groups live in Istanbul but there are important Jewish communities living in 
Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Çanakkale, Iskenderun, and Kirklareli‘ (IHF 1995:12). Roma is 
another minority in Turkey, registered on Ottoman territories for the first time in 1475 
primarily for taxation purposes. ‗According to official records they are over 500,000 
and they live throughout Turkey. They are either Muslim or Christian and they speak 
the Romani language which is influenced by Turkish, Kurdish and Greek languages‘ 
(IHF 1995).  
   To recapitulate, it is clear social discrimination from an ethnic or religious point of 
view; political pursuits by direct or structured force, not guarantying equal citizenship 
and lack of basic freedom are the major obstacles of integration in Turkey. In the 
following sections, examples will be mentioned.  Throughout its history the Turkish 
state has not given equal citizenship to the Kurds who are non-Turkish and to the 
Syriacs who are a non-Muslim minority. Following a long procedure, Turkey has 
entered the membership negotiations phase with the European Union. During these 
negotiations the rights of non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities‘ people should be 
considered under the Copenhagen Criteria.   
3.3 The state of Iran and its ethnic structure  
This section addresses the history of the state of Iran and its ethnic structure. Persia was 
renamed Iran in 1925, Owen (2004:80) argues ‗Iran was occupied during the Second 
World War by British, American and Soviet forces, who deposed Reza Shah in 1941 
and replaced him with his son, Mohammed Reza‘. On the whole, as compared to 
Turkey, Iran was ethnically and tribally more divided, economically and industrially 
less developed, and had a more powerful, conservative clerical establishment with 
which the modernising state had to contend. Regarding the state of Iran, Lisa Anderson 
(1987:15) argues:  
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 With the exceptions of Iran, Morocco, and the periphery of the Arabian 
Peninsula, all of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa are 
successors of the Ottoman Empire. Apart from Iran, Saudi Arabia, North 
Yemen, and Turkey, all the countries of the region experienced decades of 
European rule during this century.  
 
World War I leading to the overthrow of the Qajar regime and replacement by Reza 
Shah was pivotal in the history of modern Iran. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-
09 aimed to abolish the arbitrary regime and bring in a modern constitution and 
parliament.  Iran was on the brink of disintegration, modernisation had failed, and 
growing frustration and pressure from the disillusioned middle classes, intelligentsia 
and urban population, set the stage for centralisation of power under Reza Shah. 
Resistance to foreign occupation and the establishment of a new order in Iran also owed 
much to the efforts of one man, this time Colonel Reza Khan, who took advantage of 
the political crisis of the early 1920s to manoeuvre himself into such a position of 
personal dominance that he was able to have a constituent assembly depose the previous 
Kajar ruler and the imperial throne in December 1925.  (Anderson 1987:19).  
   Iran is the remnant of an empire, ‗[o]ver 3000 sq km of Iran were seceded from it 
in18th and 19th centuries in wars with Russia and Britain after Shiaism alienated 
millions of Sunnis‘.  (Hosseinborr 2007:71).  Afghanistan and a large part of Pakistan 
were separated from Iran when Sunni Afghans and Baloch refused to convert to 
Shiaism. Hosseinborr (2007:72) argues:   
The Sunni and Christian in republics of central Asia were adequately alienated 
by the Shia regime of Iran before Iran-Russian wars started. They preferred to 
accept a Russia that did not force them to abandon their religion. Afghanistan 
and Tajikistan are Farsi speaking nations that were separated from Iran. The 
Arabs are separated from the Arabs of Gulf. The Baloch are separated from 
Baluchistan, Pakistan. The Kurds are separated from Kurds of Turkey, Iraq and 
Syria. The Azeri Turks are separated from Azerbaijan. Turkmen have also 
separated from Turkmenistan.  
 
The struggle of minorities in Iran to decentralise the ruling system has taken a long 
time. Iran was called the United States of Iran (Mamalek-e Mahrooseh Iran with a 
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decentralised system / Anjoman-haye Eyalati-va-Velayati).  Iran has 30 provinces, 20 of 
them are dominated by minorities such as; Arabs, Baluchs, Kurds, Lur & Bakhtiyari, 
Azeri Turks, Turkmen, Mazendarani, Gilakis and Taleshis. Hosseinborr (2007:34) states 
‗[t]he others are mixed. For example: About 65% of the population of Tehran is from 
Iranian minorities (none-Persian). There are 11 provinces which have Sunni minority. 
These Provinces include: Kurdistan, Baluchistan, West Azerbaijan, Northern Khorasan, 
Southern Khorasan, Golestan, Bushehr, Khuzistan, Kermanshah, Gilan (Talyshis areas) 
and Ilam‘.   
   Programmes of nationalisation and of a large-scale industrialisation provided the state 
with further opportunities for expansion and control. Everywhere else, the creation of an 
industrial base was seen as the essential component of economic modernity, expanding 
state involvement in the economy and the policy of carrot and stick to monopolise the 
society. Regarding the ethnic structure of Iran, Aghajanian (1983:219) states:  
Iran is a country of diverse ethnic and linguistic communities. There are Kurds 
in the west and northwest, Baluchis in the east, Turks in the north and 
northwest, and Arabs in the south. Persians are situated today in the central 
areas. Through the history of Iran these various ethnic groups have lived in 
geographically distinct regions and provinces. Along with this residential 
separation, social and economic distance has long persisted and still continues 
among ethnic communities. Yet, regrettably, there is very little known about 
these inequalities in the contemporary history of Iran. 
 
It is clear that ethnic diversity goes back to pre-Islamic times. Iran has always been 
predominantly populated by groups of people of distinct linguistic and cultural 
identities. Today there are five major ethnic groups in Iran, each organised around 
distinct familial and cultural patterns and has its own religion, language, and Iranian 
nationality. There has been some internal migration and movement of people to and 
from various ethnic communities, but the majority of the people still live where their 
ancestors lived. Owing to the polices of the Iranian authorities, knowledge of the 
minorities of Iran is limited. Aghajanian (1983:219) states ‗[t]here is not much known 
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about the exact population figures for each ethnic community. The Iranian censuses in 
the last two decades have not considered the question of ethnicity‘.  
   Iran is a very large country. It is three times the size of France (Iran is 632,457, France 
is 210,026 square miles). (Shekofteh 2008:20). Therefore, from north to south, and east 
to west, there is vast variation in climate and terrain, as well as ethnic groups and 
languages.
  
According to research of March 2008, there are 11 main ethno-linguistic 
groups in Iran, which are as follows: 1- Persian [(Fars or Pars), 34.5%], 2- Azeri Turks 
(25.7%), 3- Kurds (12%), 4- Lur & Bakhtiyari (8%), 5- Arab (4.8%), 6- Mazendarani 
(4.4%),7- Gilaks (3.2%),  8- Baloch (3%), 9- Turkmen (1.2%), 10- Talyshi (1%), 11- 
Ghashghayi [(Qashqayi), (0.8%)], 12- Others (1.5%) .(Shekofteh 2008:8). There may be 
some disputes about population size and problems with the reliability of these 
population statistics. All of these ethnic minorities have their own languages, cultures, 
and often literature. However their languages, traditions and cultures are banned. In 
addition they suffer poor legal status at the hands of the Iranian government and 
judiciary. Their differences usually emerge as political ambitions and demands, 
Shekofteh (2008:10) argues:  
Minorities of Iran are not homogenous, most of them are from different 
nationalities; they face further oppression and marginalization due to religious, 
cultural & linguistics, illiteracy, politic affairs, poverty, gender and some other 
factors. Government has also implemented a systematic and organised policy 
of integration of all minorities, and assimilation of their culture and languages. 
Minorities in Iran are the poorest and most marginalised people in the society. 
They lack access to political power, with no political parties and no cultural 
forums, face discrimination and severe human rights abuses, and there is 
development policies imposed upon them.  
 
The common language and script of the Iranian people is Persian or Farsi; however 
Azeri, Kurdi, Luri, Arabic and Baluchi dialects or languages are also spoken by the 
linguistic minorities. The official texts and documents, correspondence and textbooks 
must be in the Persian language and script. The Shia sect of Islam is the dominant 
religion of the Turks of Iran. Turkmens hold to Sunni beliefs. The Baluchi language is 
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linguistically close to Pashtu, the language spoken in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Baluchis are Sunni. The Arabs speak Arabic as their mother language and adhere to 
Sunni Islam, which further separates them from other Iranians. (Anderson 1987:15).  
   A full examination of the historical development of the Kurds in Iran is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. The Kurds, who speak Kurdish, generally belong to the Sunni sect 
of Islam. There are a number of Kurds in Kermanshah who adhere to Shiaism.  The 
Iranian Kurds, who mainly inhabit the province of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Llam and 
the south-west of the Western Azerbaijan province, have been dwelling in Iran since 
ancient times. The minorities of Iran face further oppression and marginalisation due to 
religious, cultural and linguistic differences, illiteracy, political affairs, poverty, gender 
and some other factors. The government of Iran has implemented a systematic and 
organised policy of to assimilate of their culture and languages.   
   Minorities lack access to political power, with no political parties and no cultural 
forums. They face discrimination, human rights abuses, and low legal status. It is clear 
that recognition of minority and indigenous peoples' rights is crucial to establishing and 
maintaining justice, stability and peaceful societies.  
  In addition to the population statistics as outlined above from research in March 2008, 
according to the World Fact Book (2008:33), ethnic structure differs and is as follows: 
Population: 65,875,223 (July 2008 est.), Ethnic groups: Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki 
and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%, 
4,611,265 Kurds DOS Background Notes (retrieved September 26) Population (2007 
est.): 70.5 million, Ethnic groups: Persians 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 
8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%, 4,935,000 Kurds. 
Barkey (2009:24) states ‗[t]he term Persia was adopted by the West through the Greeks 
and was used as an official name for Iran until 1935‘.  
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Therefore, Iran's history, will label many non-Persian Iranian‘s as Persians. Historically 
the use of the term "Persian" has included all the various regional languages of Iran, 
which is also debatable, because other main ethno-linguistic minority groups are not 
Persian.  The Persian people‘s language is called Farsi (Parsi or Persi), which is used as 
an official language and also in the academic curricula currently, (all other languages 
are totally banned in schools and academia) in Iran. Hamidi (1990:78) argues:  
Persian people mainly live in some of the State‘s central Provinces such as 
Isfahan (about 3.7 million), Kerman (about 2.5 million), Qom (about 0.5 
million), central province (about 1.3 million), Fars Province (about 3.7 
million), Razavi & southern Khorasan Province (about 3.5 million), Semnan 
Province (about 0.6 million), Yazd Province (about 1 million) and also in 
Tehran (5 million, about 36% of Tehran‘s population is Persian), and about 3 to 
4 million are scattered in other provinces across the state. All of the borders‘ 
provinces of Iran are not Persian.  
 
Farsi hugely dominates all other languages, as the central government has got an 
organised and systematic policy of promoting the language and, spends a lot of money 
on this. it. The minority‘s revenue and their natural resources income are used against 
them by an ultra centralised government. All cultural and civil activities across the state 
must be in Farsi; this discrimination is marginalising minorities‘ talents and squandering 
minorities‘ cultures, languages and traditions. 
   Accurate population censuses are difficult to come by and there are speculations 
available ‗[t]here are a considerable number of Kurds that estimates approximately 1.5 -
2 million who are living in Major cities in Iran, such as: Tehran (about 7% of Tehran & 
Karaj‘s population is Kurds), Varamin and Firoozkoh, Mazendaran Province 
(countryside of Cities such as: Daylaman, Sari, Kurdkoy and Noor), Gilan Province 
(Cities such as: Kalardasht, Roodbar, Manjil, Hashtpar and Assalem regions), and 




Kurdish inhabited regions of Iran. (The Columbia Encyclopaedia 2005:57) 
There are also about 1.5 million Kurds who are living in Khorasan Province in the 
north-east of Iran. These are descendents of the Kurds who were forcefully resettled 
there approximately 400 years ago by the Iranian government of the time.  (The 
Columbia Encyclopaedia 2005:57). The total population of Kurds all over the state of 
Iran is estimated between 8.5 to 9 million, which is about 12% of the total population of 
Iran. Cameron and Danesh (2008:32) state ‗[t]he Kurds are one of Iran‘s largest ethnic 
minorities. There are about 6.5 million Kurds in Iran, constituting between 7-9% of the 
total population and living primarily in the west and northwest of the country‘. The 
above different figures show that there is no consensus about the population of the 
Kurds in Iran.  
   There has never been any census on the number of Iran‘s ethnic groups. In the 
national census of 1986 there was a box asking people about the language spoken at 
home. But later, the officials changed their mind and asked people not to check that 
box. But now it seems it is necessary to have a census to find out the number of Azeri 
Turks, Kurds, Baluchis, Persian, Arab, Talyshis, Gilakis, Mazendaranis, Lur & 
Bakhtiyari, and Turkmen people in order to determine accurately Iran‘s ethnic diversity. 
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(Cameron, G and Danesh, T 2008:71).  The United Nations has 191 member countries. 
About 179 of them are multi-ethnic countries. At the top of the multinational countries 
is India with 1300 nationalities. Only 12 countries have nearly one nationality. Iran is 
among the top ten multinational countries of the world with about eleven distinct major 
minorities / nationalities and a few others. ‗[i]n 1948, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaimed that 
all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Sadly, for all minorities 
and indigenous peoples in Iran, this inspirational text, with its emphasis on equality and 
non-discrimination, remains a dream, not a reality‘. (Cameron and Danesh, 2008:73). 
The mosaic of peoples living in Iran reflects the geographical situation of the country 
throughout history. One of the major internal policy challenges during the centuries up 
until now for most or all Iranian governments has been to find the appropriate and 
balanced approach to the difficulties and opportunities caused by this diversity. To 
illustrate this, the following section examines the policy framework of the current state 
of Iran.  
3.4 Ethnic groups and languages in Syria  
This section addresses the ethnic structure of Syria with emphasis on the demographic 
status of the Syrian Kurds. Syria as an independent country was formed in 1920. The 
Syrian Arab Republic (its official name) is an Arab country in southwest Asia, 
bordering Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea to the west, Israel to the south-west, 
Jordan to the south, Iraq to the east, and Turkey to the north. ‗The modern state of Syria 
was formerly a French mandate, but can trace its roots to the Eblan civilization in the 
third millennium BC. Its capital city, Damascus, was the seat of the Umayyad Empire 
and a provincial capital of the Mamluk Empire‘ (The Columbia Encyclopaedia 
2007:27). Syria is a complex country and the population is made up of different 
religious and ethnic groups with various languages. The population is mainly Muslim, 
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of various schools and branches, but with a significant Christian minority. Kurdish 
Human Rights Project (KHRP 2004:10) describes the ethno-religious structure and 
ethnic groups of Syria as follows. The ‗ethnicities‘ are; Arabs 80%, Kurds 15%, 
Armenians and Syriacs 5%. The religions are; Sunni Muslim 74%, Alawi, Druze, and 
other Muslim sects.  Ethno-religious minorities are; Christian (various sects) 10%, 
Yezidi (Ezidi) Kurds under 1%, and Jewish (25,000 in tiny communities in Damascus, 
Qamishli, and Aleppo), mostly elderly. The languages are; Arabic (the official 
language), Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian (widely understood), English and 
French (somewhat understood). 
   Syrians are commonly categorised as an Arab people (as are most of the other now 
Arabic-speaking people in the Arab world) by virtue of their modern-day language and 
bonds to Arab culture and history. They are in fact largely a blend of the various groups 
indigenous to the region who were at one time largely Christian and Aramaic speaking 
but who became ‗Arabised‘ and the large majority converted to Islam, following the 
Muslim conquest of Syria. Syrians today, whether Muslim or Christian, are a 
thoroughly Arabised people. In relation to the culture and languages of Syria, the CIA 
World Fact Book (2007:39) states:  
Together, Syrian Arabs (including some 400,000 Palestinians) make up over 
90% of the population. Syria also hosts non-Arabised ethnic minorities. Most 
Kurds reside in the north-eastern corner of Syria and many still speak the 
Kurdish language. Sizeable Kurdish communities live in most major Syrian 
cities as well. The majority of Syrian Turkmen live in Aleppo, Damascus and 
Latakia. Assyrian/Syriacs Christians are a significant minority that live in the 
north and northeast (al-Qamishli, al-Hasakah) and number around 700,000 in 
Syria, although their numbers have been boosted by many Iraqi refugees 
since the Iraq War. The Assyrian Democratic Organization is also banned in 
Syria by the current Syrian government. Armenians number approximately 
190,000. Syria holds the 7th largest Armenian population in the world. In 
addition, approximately 1,300,000 Iraqi refugees were estimated to live in 
Syria in 2007. Roughly %50 of these refugees were Sunni Arab Muslims, 24 




Arabic is the official and most widely spoken language. Kurdish is widely spoken in the 
Kurdish regions of Syria. Many educated Syrians also speak English and French. 
Armenian and Turkish are spoken among the Armenian and Turkmen minorities. 
Aramaic, the lingua franca of the region before the advent of Islam and Arabic. As 
Syriac, it is used as the liturgical language of various Syriac denominations; modern 
Aramaic (particularly the Turoyo language and Assyrian Neo-Aramaic) is spoken in the 
Jazeera. Tejel (2009:42) states:  
Syrianisation and Arabisation of the minorities such as Druzes and Alawites 
have been undertaken by the regime and Syrian authorities. The general 
population became the target of nationalist political projects which claimed 
that the state and the nation were indivisible. Thus, in 1953, Armenian 
associations were subject to a first wave of restrictions aiming to discourage 
all activities based on denominational or racial solidarity. At the time of the 
United Arab Republic, emphasis was placed on the pan-Arab discourse of the 
state, and spaces of autonomy for culturally diverse groups were further 
restricted.  
 
The perception that the minorities are tools of foreign powers aiming to destabilise their 
internal affairs has become pervasive in the new states of the Middle East. There is no 
consensus on the statistics for the ethnic and religious minorities of Syria – different 
sources state different figures. According to the CIA World Fact Book (2007:47), the 
structure and figures of the Syrian population are as follows. The national population is 
19,747,586. In addition, about 40,000 people live in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights; 
20,000 Arabs (18,000 Druze and 2,000 Alawites) and about 20,000 Israeli settlers (as 
estimated in July 2008). The ethnic groups are; Arab 90.3%, Kurds, Armenians and 
others 9.7%, of which 1,777,282 are Kurds (DOS Background Notes, updated May 
2007).  According to current estimates, ‗[t]here are nearly 1.5 million Kurds in Syria or 
approximately 9 percent of a total population of 22 million, making them the largest 
non-Arab minority in the country‘ (Minority Rights Group 2009:51). The above sources 
states diffident figures about the population of the Syrian Kurds. This shows an official 
figure and a consensus do not exist on this matter.  
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The Kurds are concentrated primarily in the north and northeast of the country, in the 
Jazeera, Efrin, and Ain al-Arab regions. A substantial Kurdish population also lives in 
Hasakah province in the northeast, and a smaller number live in Damascus. The 
majority of Syrian Kurds speak the Kurdish language and identify with Sunni Islam. 
The Kurds‘ status as a stateless minority in the region has its roots in the post-World 
War I period, when the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 left the Kurds of the Middle 
East divided among the four new states of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. The 
disenfranchisement of the Syrian Kurds can be traced to 1958, with Syria‘s official 
adoption of Arab nationalism and a backlash against non-Arab ethnic minorities, which 
included the Kurds. This adoption has consequences in the coming years. According to 
Lynch and Ali (2006:32):  
In October 1962, Syrian authorities issued a so-called special census in 
Hasakah province, the north-eastern Syrian province in which the majority of 
Kurds have their origins. The authorities then produced statistical reports on 
the pretext of discovering people who may have crossed illegally from 
Turkey to Syria. As many as 120,000 Kurds – nearly 20 percent of Syria‘s 
Kurdish population – were denationalized as a result, losing all rights of 
citizenship, including the right to vote and participate in public life, the right 
to travel outside the country, the right to private ownership, and the right to 
employment in the public sector 
 
Thereafter, the Kurds experienced a lack of political representation, poor economic 
development, and reduced social services. Important elements of Kurdish cultural 
identity, such as language, music, and publications, were banned. Political parties were 
forbidden and their members incarcerated. The Syrian government also began to replace 
the names of Kurdish villages and sites with Arabic names. In addition, the government 
mandated transfers of population to weaken the concentration of Kurds in sensitive 
areas. For example, in 1973, the Ba‘thist government instituted the so-called ‗Arab Belt 
draft‘, under which Arab families from the areas of Aleppo and al-Raqqa were forced to 
migrate to 40 Kurdish villages throughout Jazeera province, covering an area 365 
kilometres long and 10–15 kilometres, across that bordered with Turkey and Iraq. This 
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severely disturbed the region‘s social balance, especially in Jazeera province, to such a 
point that social and civic disputes there remain a source of persistent local tension. 
Many of Syria‘s denationalised Kurds live in Hasakah province, especially in Malkia 
and the cities of Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Over the years, a small number of 
denationalised Kurds from this region have emigrated to Damascus and other large 
cities throughout Syria. (Lynch and Ali 2006:37).  
   Kurds classified as foreigners carry red identity cards that permit them to be recorded 
as aliens in official records. They cannot, however, obtain a passport or leave the 
country. ‗Concealed‘ Kurds carry only a yellow definition certificate, or residence bond, 
issued by a local mukhtar (chieftain) and used purely to identify the holder whenever 
the authorities find it necessary to do so. The Syrian authorities issue the certificates; 
official Syrian institutions do not accept them, so for all intents and purposes the holders 
of yellow documents have no official status in Syria at all. The practices above can 
clearly be seen to contradict the theory of equal citizenship. 
3.5 An overview of the Kurds  
The Kurds are one of the national and ethnic minorities in the Middle East. Minorities 
are defined to be ‗[e]thnic, religious and linguistic communities, who may not 
necessarily be numerical minorities but their rights, are denied by state rulers and they 
are non-dominant. Those indigenous people, tribal, and migrant nomadic people 
(Ashayer), who do not wish to be classified as minorities for various reasons‘ 
(minorityrights.org 2008:13). 
   The Kurds are largely acknowledged as ‗the world‘s largest nation without a state‘ 
(Galbraith 2006:148). Encyclopaedia Britannica (2007) states the Kurds are an ethnic 
and linguistic group living in Iran, Iraq and Turkey. In actual fact, smaller numbers of 
Kurds also live in Syria and Caucuses. The majority of the Kurds speak in two major 
dialects of Kurdish, namely Kirmanji (spoken in Turkey, Syria and the Caucuses) and 
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Sorani (spoken in Iraq and Iran). There are other dialects such as Hawrami, Zaza and 
Lori which are spoken by smaller groups of Kurds.  
   Encyclopaedia Britannica (2007) describes Kurdish language as a West Iranian 
language which is related to Persian. It states the Kurds were traditionally nomadic and 
they were ‗forced into farming by the redrawing of state borders after World War I 
(1914–18)‘. The encyclopaedia then defines Kurdistan (the land of the Kurds) as a 
region ‗that roughly includes the mountain systems of the Zagros and the eastern 
extension of the Taurus. Since very early times the area has been the home of the 
Kurds.‘ The Kurds are said to have played an important role in the history of the region. 
The most important Kurdish dynasties were ‗the Shaddadids, ruling a predominantly 
Armenian population in the Ani and Ganja districts of Transcaucasia (951–1174); the 
Marwanids of Diyarbakir (990–1096); and the Hasanwayhids of Dinavar in the 
Kermanshah region (959–1015)‘ (Encyclopaedia Britannica: 2007). In more recent 
history the Kurds were prominent in the wars between the Ottoman and the Persian 
empires. Speaking of independent principalities the encyclopaedia states ‗Several 
Kurdish principalities developed and survived into the first half of the 19th century, 
notably those of Bohtan, Hakari, Bahdinan, Soran, and Baban in Turkey and of Mukri 
and Ardelan in Persia‘ (Encyclopaedia Britannica: 2007). 
   The characteristics of the empire are different to the state. Conditions and handling of 
minorities and the nature of governance during the Ottoman Empire were different from 
the nation-states which appeared from 1923 onwards. The Kurds experienced political 
challenges during the Ottoman Empire which were unlike the political treatment of the 
states that replaced the empire in the Middle East. Kurdistan was between two empires 
until the early of twentieth century, namely the Ottoman and the Persian empires. 
Bruinessen (1990:27) states both empires were ‗multi-ethnic states, in which there was 
no clearly dominant ethnic group. There was certainly discrimination among different 
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categories of citizens, but it was based on religion and education, not on ethnicity as 
such‘. Political environment started to change since the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Therefore, the status of Kurdish principalities and governance of Kurdistan 
changed drastically. Bruinessen (1990:28) explains how the administrative reforms of 
the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ‗led to the gradual 
reduction of the Kurdish principalities and the concomitant expansion of a centralised 
bureaucracy into the Kurdish districts. By the mid-nineteenth century, the last 
principalities had been abolished by military force. Kurdish society thus came in more 
direct contact with the state- and not just with the Ottoman or Persian states‘.  The 
following is a map that shows the geographical location of the Kurds and Kurdistan.  
 
                                                   (World History Archive 1986) 
Ethnicity became emphasised in the Middle East due to the weakening of the empires 
and the consolidation of the states in the region. Parallel with other ethnicities, the 
Kurds chose to pursue their ethnic rights and distinctive characteristics. The Kurds have 
long been recognised as a distinct people with their own language and a culture different 
from that of the Arabs to the South, the peoples of the Caucasus to the north and the 
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Persians to the east. Centuries of persecution and a hard mountain life have isolated 
them. Romano (2006:6) explains that the geo-political location of Kurdistan and states 
‗[i]t lies within and around the Zagros mountain range, and is currently divided between 
the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The Kurds roughly constitute twenty-three 
percent of Turkey‘s population, twenty-three percent of Iraq‘s, and ten percent of Iran‘s 
population‘.  
   According to McDowall (1997:8) ‗[i]t is doubtful whether the Kurds form an 
ethnically coherent whole in the sense of having a common ancestry‘. The majority of 
Kurds are probably descended from waves of Indo- European tribes moving westwards 
across Iran, probably in the middle of the second millennium BC. Bruinessen 
(1992:115) states ‗[t]he Kurds have disparate ethnic origins; the Medes are known to 
have comprised both nomadic and settled elements‘. Hardly any people consist solely of 
pastoral nomads, as nomads usually have frequent trading or raiding contacts with 
sedentary cultivators. ‗Kurdish is an Indo-European language, which together with 
Afghan and Persian constitutes the Iranian language group‘. (Kendal 1980a:11). There 
are three major Kurdish dialects: Kurmanji (spoken mainly in northern Kurdistan), 
Sorani (southern Kurdistan), and Kirmanshani-Leki (south western Kurdistan). 
Linguists disagree as to whether Zaza (Dêrsim area) and Gurani (south eastern 
Kurdistan) are dialects of Kurdish or separate languages (Pireh Babi 1999:53). 
3.6 Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has addressed modern Middle East and background of the four countries 
covered in this study. It also gave an overview of the Kurds. It can concludes, the 
modern Middle East and the structures of the four countries have been strongly linked 
to the legal status of the Kurds.  
The four examined countries have different history and political background. However, 
as the following chapters show, their constitutions and policies are not inclusive towards 
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the minorities including the Kurds. Therefore, understanding the components of each 
one of them is necessary.  
   The following chapters emphasise on the legal status of the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, 
Iran and Syria, all of which are complex states and have Kurdish populations. Except 
Iran, other three counties to large extend were part of the Ottoman territories and Sunni 
sect of Islam dominated to date. However, Iran was part of the Shia Safavid Empire and 
unlike other three countries (Iraq, Turkey and Syria), Iran was not the consequence of 
the First World War. As an independent state, Iran is older than other three countries. 
These differences have affected the cultural, political and legal status of the Kurds in 
Iran. These differences are addresses in the following chapters especially in the chapter 
five (Assimilation of the Kurds in Iran). The above chapter briefly addresses the 
demographic status of the Kurds, parallel with the legal status; the Kurdish inhabitants 
of each country are addressed properly in each chapter.  Despite that Kurdish 
inhabitants (as the above map shows) exist in the Soviet Union, the current thesis 
emphasises on the Kurdish inhabitants of the four countries already mentioned.   
4 Chapter four: Iraq: Past and Present 
4.1 The Kurds in Iraq  
To set the context, a brief overview of Iraq‘s recent history is necessary, with emphasis 
on the relationships between the country‘s three main parts: the Kurdish north, the 
Sunni Arab centre, and the Shia‘ Arab south. The relationship between the central 
government and the Kurds, who account for 15 - 20% of Iraq‘s 24 million populations 
and inhabit the mountainous northern part of the country, has historically been tense. 
Since the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in July 1958 the successive governments in 




Iraq‘s Kurds have repeatedly rebelled against the central governments. Fighting was 
particularly savage in the late 1980s, when the government of Saddam Hussein used 
poison gas against Kurdish villagers and forced the resettlement of thousands of Kurds 
in areas south of their traditional homeland. The regime‘s treatment of Shia‘ Kurds, 
known as Faylee Kurds, was particularly savage because of their perceived closeness to 
Iran (a Shia Islamic Republic) with which Iraq was at war from 1980-1988. Since the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein‘s regime in 2003 steps have been taken towards 
involving the Kurds in the country‘s central government.  
   Iraqi Kurds are often characterised by seeing themselves as victims. The Kurdish 
struggle for self-determination has been hampered by the bitter rivalry between 
competing Kurdish groups, some of whom have been used as pawns by regional powers 
as well as international powers like the United States. President Woodrow Wilson‘s 
Fourteen Points sparked the first Kurdish diplomatic ties with the United States, through 
a Kurdish delegation (consisting of local figures and intellectuals) to the Paris peace 
conference of 1919. One of President Wilson‘s fourteen points stipulated that the non-
Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be ‗assured of an absolute 
unmolested opportunity of autonomous development‘ (LaFeber 1994:110). Thus, 
Kurdish nationalists hoped for the establishment of a Kurdistani state.  
   Wilson pledged to support the creation of a Kurdish state within two years. This 
promise, however, was soon forgotten as Western powers (Britain and France) applied 
their own treaties and competed to control the region. When the borders of the Middle 
East were redrawn, the Kurds were left out. The 1920 Sevres Treaty clearly gave the 
Kurds the right to independence, Article 64 of the treaty states ‗If within one year from 
the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined 
in Article 62 (i.e. Turkey) shall address themselves to the council of the League of 
Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas 
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want independence from Turkey, and if the council then considers that these peoples are 
capable of such independent and recommends that is should granted to them, Turkey 
hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title 
over these areas‘ (Galbraith 2006:150).   
   One of Sevres‘s articles also mentions ‗No objection will be raised by the Principal 
Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the 
Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mousel 
valiyet‘ (Galbraith 2006:150). However, these articles were never ratified, and Severs 
was replaced by the treaty of Lausanne (1923), which made no mention of Kurdistan or 
of the Kurds. Thus, the opportunity to unify the Kurds in a nation of their own was lost. 
Kurdistan after the war was more fragmented than before, and various separatist 
movements arose among Kurdish groups. The Final stab to the Kurdish self-
determination movement was made when Iraq became independent in 1931, and no 
special arrangement was made for the Kurds. The Kurdish revolution started and 
continued in Iraq for the periods of 1931–1932 and 1944–1945. Although the pressure 
of the Kurds to assimilate was less intense in Iraq (where the Kurdish language and 
culture have been legally recognised), government repression has been extremely brutal. 
Therefore, armed rebellions occurred in, and a low-level armed insurgency took place 
throughout the 1960s under the command of Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the Iraqi 
Kurdish Democratic Party (IKDP), who had been an officer of the Republic of Mahabad 
in 1946.  
   The next significant diplomatic contact between the United States and the Kurds was 
in the 1960s, when the United States was pressuring the Shah of Iran, and began 
supporting the Kurds as a political tool in that effort. When Saddam began rising as a 
threat, Iraqi Kurds resisted and held out with assistance from Iran, Israel and the United 
States, which had sent CIA agents to arm and train the Peshmerga. Galbraith (2006:147) 
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states ‗[b]y 1975, Kissinger had secretly channelled $16 million of military aid to the 
Kurds, who believed that Washington was finally supporting their right to self-
determination. But these alliances proved to be fragile‘.  
   In 1975, Saddam agreed to settle a border dispute with Iran in return for the Shah‘s 
stopping his support for the Kurdish fighters. The Nixon administration, which had seen 
the Kurds as a buffer to both the Iraqis and the Soviets, also withdrew its aid. Saddam's 
army regained control of northern Iraq, continuing his campaign of ethnic cleansing and 
massive human rights abuses. A congressional report later concluded that the United 
States and the Shah had not wanted the Kurds to succeed. The Kurds were never aware 
that they were being used as pawns in a geopolitical game. Galbraith (2006:148) points 
out that ‗[e]ven in the context of covert operations, ours was a cynical enterprise‘. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was unremorseful about what many Kurds saw as 
betrayal. He is famously quoted to have said ‗Covert action should not be confused with 
missionary work‘ (Galbraith 2006:148). As Iraq wiped out the remaining rebels, the 
Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani sent a message to Kissinger stating ‗Our movement and 
people are being destroyed in an unbelievable way, with silence from everyone. We 
feel, your Excellency, that the United States has a moral and political responsibility 
towards our people, who have committed themselves to your country's policy‘. 
Kissinger, however, did not send a reply. Deeply disheartened, Mustafa Barzani (who 
had worked with the US and was then considered the leader of Kurdish independence 
and autonomy efforts) went into exile in the United States. Before his death in 1979, he 
wondered plaintively ‗Have the Kurdish people committed such crimes that every 
nation in the world should be against them?‘ (Galbraith 2006:147). A failed peace 
accord with the Iraqi government led to another outbreak of fighting in 1975, but the 
Algeria accord between Iraq and Iran led to a collapse of Kurdish resistance. Thousands 
of Kurds fled to Iran and Turkey. Low-intensity fighting followed. In the late 1970s, 
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Iraq's Ba‘th Party instituted a policy of settling Iraqi Arabs in parts of Kurdistan—
particularly around the oil-rich city of Kirkuk—and uprooting Kurds from those same 
regions. This policy accelerated in the 1980s, as large numbers of Kurds were forcibly 
relocated, particularly from areas along the Iranian border. The most brutal atrocities 
were conducted systematically by the Ba‘th regime during the gassing of Halabja and 
the Anfal campaign, but this does not mean other type of brutalities and human rights 
abuses did not occur. The regime and its terrifying intelligence agencies played a 
significant role in detaining and killing young Kurdish activists.  
   Despite these attacks and atrocities, the Kurds rebelled again following Iraq's defeat in 
the First Persian Gulf War (1990–1991). They were brutally suppressed once again, 
sparking another mass exodus. This time the Kurdish uprising started by attacking the 
Ba‘th Party‘s offices and headquarters in Rania, in the east, on March 6, 1991. The 
Peshmerga (the word literally means ‗those who face death‘ and is the name of Kurdish 
fighters) advanced forward until they controlled most of Kirkuk by March 14 1991, ‗the 
place some call Kurdistan‘s Jerusalem‘ (Galbraith 2006:149).  
This uprising was different from other revolutions and uprisings in that it controlled 
most of the Kurdistan region and made quite strong progress. Once again this revolt was 
crushed because the United States changed allies. The uprising had started because of 
encouragement from President Bush who ‗[O]n February 14, 1991, he claimed, ―And 
there is another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the 
Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the 
dictator, to step aside, and then comply with the United Nations resolutions and rejoin 
the family of peace-loving nations‘ (Galbraith 2006:147). This sparked uprisings all 
over Iraq, particularly because Kurds believed that the United States would support 
them overthrow Saddam‘s regime. Few weeks after the uprising, the Iraqi troops moved 
to Kurdistan, crushed the revolt, and Saddam gained control again.  
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After the war, the U.S. and Britain unilaterally established the No-Fly Zones in the 
north and south of Iraq, to protect the Kurds and the Shias. Another positive 
intervention by the United States during the 1990s, implemented by the Clinton 
administration this time, came with 1998 Washington agreement between KDP and 
PUK representatives. The Final episode in the Kurdish struggle came during the U.S. 
involvement with the Kurds in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where Kurdish peshmerga 
aided the U.S.-led invasion.  
4.2 The differences between the Kurds and Arabs 
The Kurds share a common culture and language as well as a history of oppression. A 
number of factors helped Kurds to discover their unique identity in the last few decades. 
The establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraqi Kurdistan has 
had a strong influence on the flourishing of Kurdish identity, including Kurdish culture 
and language. Hundreds of newspapers, periodicals and other publications and tens of 
thousands of books have been published since the KRG‘s establishment in 1992. 
Dozens of radio and television stations as well as fourteen satellite stations, established 
by different factions from different parts of Kurdistan, have also helped unite the Kurds 
from different parts of Kurdistan, strengthening Kurdish language and identity. The 
following sections explore a number of factors that have preserved and strengthened the 
differences between the Kurds and the other groups around them.   
   The Kurds are ethnically, linguistically, and culturally different from the Arabs. In a 
report about the Kurds Human Rights Watch (11 March 1991) states ‗[I]t is unfortunate 
that Kurds are described as non-Arab people, which shows the Westerns' lack of 
understanding of the Kurdish culture and ethnicity. Actually, Kurds do not share much 
with Arabs, except for long history of conflicts‘. There is a theory that the Kurds, who 
are considered Aryan, are racially different from the Arabs. Izady (1993:234) argues:  
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Kurdish people are Aryans in race, language and culture and thus are different 
sharply from Semitic Arabs. Kurdish geography, history, culture, psychology, 
traditions and values are different. Kurdish language is Indo-European and 
shares no common ground with Arabic language. Kurdish is close to Farsi 
(Persian) and is of the same family of European languages such as English, 
German and Spanish. There is also a move towards giving up the Arabic scripts 
and start Romanisation of the Kurdish language. In fact, the two Kurdish 
satellite stations, Kurdistan TV and Kurd Sat, have already started using 
Roman scripts in writing Kurdish. The contrast can be clearly seen now after 
18 years of de facto independence in three Kurdistan provinces.  
 
It is ethnicity, not religion, which is the unifying factor for the Kurds. They are not 
fundamentalist religious people. Not only are they different from the Shia Arabs, the 
Kurds are fundamentally different from Sunni Arabs. Historically they have adopted 
and evolved a different kind of Islam in order to escape the rule of Arabs/ Islam and to 
suit their own culture. For example, the Kurdish Islamic order of Qadiri is adopted/ 
evolved by Kurds living on the plains of Kurdistan, such as Kurds who inhabit 
Garmiyan. However, Naqishbandi Order has been adopted/ evolved by the Kurdish 
highlanders, such as Barzanis and Hawramis. Unlike the majority of the Muslims in the 
world the Kurds do not recognise "God" as "Allah". They still use their Kurdish name 
"Khwda". "Khwda is the combination of two Kurdish words "Kho" and "De", which 
gives the meaning of "Khoy De" i.e. "self-born", not born from anyone. The Kurds have 
been condemned for supporting the US-led coalition as well as for alleged links with the 
Israeli state. The Kurds are regarded by many Arabs as "traitors" and "infidels" for 
collaborating with the US forces in ousting the former Iraqi regime. Despite worldwide 
regional Islamic and Arab opposition, Kurds became the partner of the US-led collation 
and took proactive part in the "liberation" of Iraq and opening up the northern front for 
the coalition.   
   The Kurdish leadership has joined the West in order to bring about change in Iraq and 
to secure better rights and for themselves within the new Iraq. In recent years, and as a 
reaction to widespread oppression in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey and former Soviet Union, 
Kurdish nationalism has been on the rise. There is an increasing recognition of a 
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Kurdistani-wide identity, in particular since the establishment of sizable Kurdish 
Diaspora outside Kurdistan. The Kurds have come to realise that they can be more 
effective in pursuing and securing their rights if they unite and support each other. A 
number of factors assisted Kurds in discovering and utilising this pan-Kurdistan 
identity. First of all, the Kurdish partnership with the US-lead coalitions and their 
effective role in the war against the government of Saddam Hussein introduced Kurds to 
the world, in particular to the Americans. Secondly, Turkey‘s candidacy for EU 
membership has put the Kurdish at the heart of the international arena, in particular the 
European community. The kidnapping of the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK) leader in 
February 1999 and his public trial had a sound effect on politicising the Kurdish issue. 
Finally, the establishment of a sizable Kurdish Diaspora which consists of Kurds from 
all parts of Kurdistan has led to the production of literature and research on the Kurdish 
question. The diaspora has played a major role in lobbying and campaigning for 
Kurdish issues.  A search on the internet will provide thousands of articles and images 
that express a strong Kurdistan-wide identity. 
   Throughout Iraq‘s history friction has resulted from the oppression of the Kurds by 
consecutive central Arab governments, in particular during the former ruling Ba‘th 
Party. The Ba‘th government utilised ethnic and religious differences in Iraq in order to 
divide and rule the people and to use each group against the other. In this process the 
differences were enhanced and friction between the different groups reached its highest. 
Trust has been the major issue between Kurds and Arabs because of decades of 
domination and oppression. Currently there are major issues on which the Kurds do not 
agree with Iraqi Arabs. The Kurds demand a greater control on their affairs and on the 





4.3 The Ba‘th party and its influence on the Iraqi society 
It would be difficult to analyse the recent history of Iraq and its current political 
situation without understanding the history and functioning of the Ba‘th party. This 
section addresses a number of issues including the Ba‘th Party‘s establishment and 
ideology, its representation of a particular faith group, its tribal bases, and how it 
persecuted communities outside its own faith and tribe. Michael Aflaq was one of the 
founders of the Ba‘th Party and his book (For the sake of the Ba’th) has become a 
significant source for Ba‘thists. In his book, Aflaq strongly defends the idea of adapting 
cultural roots for the party‘s agenda. He maintains that the mission of the Arabs is 
sacred and all other non-Arab ethnic minorities who live on Arab soil should comply 
with the Arabs‘ way of life rather than their own.  
   The major policy of the Ba‘th party is pan-Arabism; this principle rejects the idea of 
independent Arab countries. It calls for one Arab world uniting all Arab entities and 
establishing one homeland for the entire Arab population. As a pan-Arab movement the 
party influenced every aspect of Iraqi people‘s lives including the processes of nation 
building and democratisation. Anderson (2004:7) argues ‗[B]y definition, pan-Arabism 
is inaccessible to the Kurdish minority. Those who have tried to construct an inclusive 
vision of nationhood have failed, and many have not even tried, preferring instead to 
exploit social divisions to preserve power and retain the perquisites of office‘. The 
party‘s agenda has no space for tolerance and pluralism. Speaking of the foundation and 
aims of the party John King (2006:17) states ‗[T]he Ba‘th party was founded in Syria in 
the 1940s by Michael Aflaq and Salaheddin Bitar. The Arabic word Ba‘th means 
―rebirth‖. The party‘s aim is to achieve freedom and unity for the Arabs. There are 
groups of Ba‘thists throughout the Arab world. The party believes in democracy in 
theory, all Ba‘thist rulers have been dictators‘.  
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In 1963 the Ba‘th Party coup overthrew Abdulkarim Qasim‘s government. Qasim 
himself had seized power in the 1958 coup against the monarchy. The Americans 
supported the Ba‘thist coup, fearing Qasim‘s support of communism. Zubaida 
(2006:120) points out that it was during this coup that the Ba‘thists showed their 
brutality and aggression when they massacred large numbers of people who were 
supporters of the government and the communist party. The author (2006:120) then 
talks about how this group were soon overthrown:  
They were to be displaced later that year by another military clique consisting of 
conservative nationalist and Islamist Sunni officers from Takrit and its neighbouring 
cities and constituent tribes, under the leadership of one General Arif (succeeded, after 
his accidental death, by a brother). This regime, lasting into 1968, was virulently 
sectarian and communalist, restoring Sunni ascendancy and reversing many of the 
previous reformist measures.  
 
 
Finally, on 17-30 July 1968 the successful Ba‘thist coup secured their power in Iraq 
until 2003. Ahmed Hassan Baker became the first Ba‘thist president. In 1979, after 
Baker‘s resignation Saddam Hussein became the president and he remained in power 
until March 2003 when his regime was overthrown by the coalition forces. In terms of 
Saddam‘s approach, Shiva Balaghi (2006:51) argues ‗[I]t is clear that Saddam sought to 
reshape Iraqi society by emphasizing the central and all-encompassing role of the Ba‘th 
party, a role that he hoped would eventually extend beyond Iraq‘s national borders‘. 
Saddam Hussein, the leader of the party and the president of Iraq, had significant tribal 
connections with his own al-Abu Nasser tribe and with citizens from the towns of 
Tikrit, Dur, Sharqat, Huwayja, Bayji, Samarra and Ramadi. These are located in what is 
known as the Sunni Arab Triangle. Other major Sunni tribes and families who have 
been loyal to the regime, and have played a key role in the intelligence and security 
forces include the Dilaim, the Jubur (mixed Shia/Sunni) and the Ubayd tribes. There 
were also loyalist factions in the Duri and Samarrai families. Many of these tribal 
elements now live in Iraqi cities. Hussein‘s regime revived and promoted this tribal 
structure in two ways. Firstly, Saddam built his regime structure involving a small, 
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albeit elite, group of tribes. These were mainly Sunni Arabs coming from around Tikrit, 
his birthplace. Secondly, he oppressed and controlled the society through families. The 
Iraqi regime promoted oppression on the basis of family connections. The Sunni tribes 
increased their influence under the former Iraqi government and persecuted the Kurds 
and Shia.  
   Saddam Hussein continuously appeared in the media to confirm that he is "Ebin Al-
Ashira – the son of the tribe". He was proud of his tribal heritage and promoted tribal 
culture. The Ba‘th Party itself ruled like a dominant tribe and faith. The party was an 
amalgamation of a number of tribes and individuals that came together for a united 
objective: getting power and privileges. The Ba‘th did not rule as a modern government 
which could take strength from the Iraqi society‘s diversity, rather it utilised the entire 
society‘s institutions to advance domination by himself, his family, his tribe, his allied 
tribes and his faith. It had some aspects of a Middle Eastern state but it also had all the 
characteristic of a tribe or a super tribe. In 2003 the Ba‘th government was overthrown 
by American and Britain. Nevertheless, its legacy and its culture are still effective and 
ongoing in Iraq. Shiva Balaghi (2006:115) comments ‗[W]hile an elaborate and ruthless 
security system was crucial to the maintenance of Saddam‘s brutal control; he carefully 
created an entire cultural apparatus of fear and power over the years‘. Iraqi society has 
been ruled by one of the most centralised regime for more than thirty years. Gibson 
(1988:5) argues ‗[T]otalitarianism undermines civil society by the atomisation of 
individual citizens‘. Saddam‘s government acted as totalitarian regime. It devastated 
and abused most of state institutions, civil society organisations, and social networks. 
Sami Zubaida (2006:129) assesses the Ba‘th regime and argues:  
[O]ne of the few positive elements about the Ba‘thist regime was its assault on 
traditional patriarchal relations and practises. In the 1970s and 1980s, regime 
polices favoured female education and wide participation in the labour market 
and professional occupations (but not in the echelons of government power). 
Reforms in family law, started by the Qasim regime, reversed by the Arifs in 
the 1960s under religious pressure, were then revived by the Ba‘thists in the 
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1970s. Many of these positive steps were reversed in the 1990s. Hussein‘s 
intention behind the education and participation of women, however, may be 
seen as another attempt by him to control the core of the families. The 
education system and all professional occupations were tightly controlled by 
the Ba‘th state. Only those could become teachers, for example, who were 
members of the Ba‘th Party. Promotion at workplace was also heavily 
dependent on party loyalty. Women were particularly important to the Ba‘thists 
because of their role as mothers passing on the values and norms to their 
children.  
 
The above section highlights the influence of the Ba‘th party in the political history of 
Iraq which played a clear role in failing of creating a nation state in the country. 
4.4 Iraq: A failed nation-state  
Iraq has had a fragile nation with neither liberal nor active constitution in the last eighty 
years. Stansfield (2006:4) points out that since Iraq was created by the British 
imperialism it has been described as an ―artificial state‖. There are two major reasons 
for the lack of success in building a nation-state in Iraq. The first reason is the creation 
of Iraq which was incompatible with the political context of the region and the second 
reason is the oppressive nature of the Ba‘th Party. Stansfield (2006:3) explains the first 
reason in the following manner:  
[I]n the aftermath of the first world war, the imposition in Iraq of a European-
style centralised state clashed with local habits, as elsewhere in the former 
Ottoman Empire. The empire is often seen as having fostered cosmopolitan, 
multi-ethnic societies. This is true, in the main, although Sunni-Shia tensions 
certainly existed in the old Iraq and Kurds remained isolated in their 
mountains. But the socio-political conditions that underlay the foundation of 
most European nation states could not be found in Ottoman Iraq- there was no 
dominant nation that came together to form a state.  
 
The Kurdish people were annexed to the state of Iraq against their wishes. While the 
1920 Treaty of Sevres promised the Kurds an independent state the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne superseded this promise (Robin 2005:6). Political movements in Kurdistan in 
the early 1920s were struggling for an independent state. Moreover, the British Empire 
was unwilling to resolve this political crisis and prevented the establishment of an 
independent country for the Kurds. In early the 1930s the Kurdish political party Hiwa- 
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Hope, announced the creation of an independent Kurdistan, but it did not succeed. The 
British cabinet believed that establishing a Kurdish state would not be viable. The 
Kurdish crisis and lack of recognition of Kurdish rights in the region have caused 
instability in the states of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Manafy (2005:27) argues the 
‗Kurds are the victims of a conservative world system that suffers from its own 
contradictions and the anachronous structural limitations‘. Moreover, political 
consensus has been absent in the region. Therefore, the unsolved Kurdish issue was the 
major reason behind the failure of the nation-state in Iraq.   
   The second reason for the failure of the concept of nation-state in Iraq was the Ba‘th 
party. The party‘s agenda was oppressive. Its ideology was a combination of Islamic, 
nationalistic and Marxist. The policies of the Ba‘thists have led to the fragmentation of 
the Iraqi state. Nothing caused more damage to Iraq‘s unity than the Ba‘th party. The 
Ba‘th party was failing to represent an Arab nation as it had claimed. The party 
represented a tiny minority of Sunni Arabs, which accounts for about 20% of the Iraqi 
population. The rights of the Shia majority were violated by Ba‘thists. They established 
a state in Iraq that was excluding the majority of Iraq‘s population. Moreover, the party 
failed to create a culture of inclusiveness and, more importantly, it miscarriages the 
process of democratisation. In the final decade of Saddam‘s governing period, the Ba‘th 
party was not even representing the Sunni minority. Instead, a small tribe dominated the 
government and the party. From 1958 to 2003, the rulers of Iraq have done nothing 
towards creating a democratic and welfare state. Iraq is a geographic entity without 
much sense of nationhood. This is obviously a crisis for both the current and the future 
generations. In the meantime, having failed as a nation-state, Iraq has not been 
modernised yet. The pre-modern culture dominates Iraqi society and Iraqi politics. 
The regime of Saddam Hussein, which spanned over four decades, was a source of 
instability for the region, as well as the international community. Despite its brutality 
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against various ethnic and religious groups within Iraq, it was assisted during these 
decades by the international community and regional powers. Saddam, like other 
regional powers, perceived the Kurds as the source of this instability. The Ba‘th regime 
dealt with the Kurdish cause as a security issue rather than the rights of indigenous 
population of the state of Iraq. 
 
4.5 Post-2003 invasion: The opportunity to take a new direction  
After the Kurds gained control of parts of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991, and after a period of 
civil war between the Kurdish factions (1994- 1998), they introduced and maintained 
stability in the region. The Kurdistan Region became a buffer zone preventing Islamic 
fundamentalism and terrorists from spilling over into Turkey. The regional powers, in 
particular Turkey and Iran, insist that the Kurds are creating chaos in the region and 
under different pretexts, they have been trying to destabilise the KRG to prove their 
point. The bombardments of Kurdistan‘s border regions by Turkey and Iran, the 
continuous negative media coverage to demonise the Kurds, and the extensive 
intimidation of ordinary Kurds travelling via regional powers are only a few examples 
of how far these neighbouring countries will go to destabilise Iraqi Kurdistan. However, 
the post-Saddam Hussein era has underlined the fact that the Kurdish controlled region 
is the only stable part of Iraq. 
   Iraqi Kurdistan has the opportunity to bring together all the different elements of its 
society and to let them feed into the decision making process. This would be a good 
example to show the rest of Iraq that diversity is strength, not a weakness. Iraqi 
Kurdistan has the potential to lead the region by evolving a society that is based on 
equal opportunity and not by imposing the ideology of the leading political, ethnic, or 
religious group.  
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   Iraqi Kurdistan has a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society and therefore it may be 
inappropriate to make Islam the official religion of the region. It is true that the majority 
of Kurdistan‘s population today, which is mainly three governorates, Slemani, Erbil and 
Duhok, are Muslims of Sunni faith, but the constitution of Kurdistan should see beyond 
today‘s borders of KRG.  A high number of Kurdistan‘s population, who are non-
Muslim and non-Kurdish, reside outside the current borders of the KRG. If KRG is 
planning to incorporate these communities (which are mainly Yezidis, Shia, Kakeyis, 
Sabis and Christians) Islam cannot be imposed as the official religion of the KRG. Why 
should, for example, over a million Yezids vote to join the Kurdistan administration, 
where their religion would become the second class religion?  By making Islam the 
official religion of the society, the constitution faces another problem; it will contradict 
itself. Equality cannot be achieved, if one faith, Sunni Muslim, is imposed over the 
society. Any constitution for a Middle Eastern society needs to put measures in place to 
eliminate: political and religious groupings, the rule of tribes over socio-political life, 
and all forms of corruption and nepotism. This is because the region has a history of not 
delivering equal citizenship.   
   The Iraqi Kurdistan‘s constitution needs to prevent political groups controlling all 
aspects of the society. This control extends to media outlets, judicial system, education 
system, financial activities, civil organisations and non-governmental organisations. The 
draft constitution has given absolute power to the ―president of the Kurdistan Region‖. 
His power undermines the role of Kurdistan parliament and the government. The 
constitution should put measures in place to eliminate political leaders‘ control over 
public affairs, creating transparency. The ―Kurdistani‖ dimension of Iraqi Kurds, i.e. 
their being part of a greater Kurdish nation, is not addressed in the constitution. The 
division of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people over Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Syria and former 
Soviet Union has been accomplished by superpowers against the will of the Kurdish 
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people. The Constitution complies with the articles that are given in the Iraqi 
constitution. However, the constitution ignores the international aspects of the Kurdish 
society. The constitution needs to acknowledge and comply with the relevant 
international laws, conventions, treaties and norms such as those that address the human 
rights, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, and the rights of women and 
children.  
4.6 An overview of the new Iraqi constitution 
To illustrate the political agenda of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, it is worth mentioning two 
statements by the two major and influential Kurdish leaders in Iraq. ‗We (Kurds) had a 
prime role in the negotiation between the Sunnis and the Shiites‘ Massoud Barzani, 
President of the Kurdistan Regional Government and leader of the KDP, 29 August 
2005 ‗Kurds were the first force which struggled for the unity of Iraq. Without a doubt, 
some dreaming Kurdish youths demand an independent Kurdish state‘. Jalal Talabani, 
The President of Iraq and the leader of PUK, 04 September 2005. Perhaps it was 
symbolic when the President of the Kurdistan Region, voted "Yes" for the Iraqi 
constitution by putting his vote into a ballet box marked in Arabic ―Muhafazat Arbil‖, 
or "The governorate of Arbil." In so doing, he put the future of Kurdistan in the hands 
of Arabs. Fatah Zaxoyi, the former minister of culture in Sulemani, voted against the 
constitution and in so doing he may have become its first victim. For voting ―no‖, 
Zaxoyi lost his ministerial position.  
   The Kurdish political leadership presented the Iraqi constitution to the Kurdish people 
as a ―historic milestone‖ and a ―historic achievement". This section refutes this claim 
and instead argues that the constitution marks a new chapter in the history of Kurdish 
oppression.  The Constitution of 2005, ratified by four out of five voters in an UN-
validated referendum, restructured British-made Iraq as a voluntary union of its 
constituent peoples. It proclaims, on paper, a pluralist federation, maps the path toward 
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different and flexible forms of decentralisation, and creates multiple incentives for 
power sharing within a deliberately weak federal government. It remade Iraq as a 
parliamentary democracy— enabling its Shia Arab majority to express itself as such, 
though subject to constitutional restraints, the most important of which lie in the formal 
strengthening of regions or provinces (governorates) at the expense of what until 2003 
had been a series of despotisms in Baghdad. The Constitution was made by the leading 
lights of SCIRI (now ISCI, the Iraqi Supreme Council of Islam) among the Shia Arabs, 
together with the Kurdish leadership. These victims of Saddam agreed that a 
recentralised Iraq would be a threat to the liberties of Iraq‘s nationalities, religious 
communities, and citizens— and to Iraq‘s neighbours. They built into the Constitution 
the recognition of Kurdistan‘s autonomy, including its right to have its own army, and 
granted any future regions the right to opt for the same powers as Kurdistan.  
   The Constitution enables any existing provinces-barring Baghdad and Kirkuk-to join 
with other provinces to form larger regions. Baghdad may become a region in its own 
right. Provinces not organised in regions have extensive rights of self-government if 
they choose to exercise them. Special provisions (not yet implemented) enable Kirkuk 
and other disputed territories to unify with Kurdistan—after the expulsions, 
gerrymandering, and settler infusion policies of the Ba‘thists is undone. The 
Constitution, in short, permits either a symmetrical federation, in which other regions 
are built with the same powers as Kurdistan, or an asymmetrical federation, in which 
the existing provinces of Arab-majority Iraq, by comparison with Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG), choose to grant greater authority to the Baghdad government. 
The Iraqi constitution does not describe Iraq as a voluntary union between two people, 
Kurds and Arabs, yet, according to the President of Kurdistan, the constitution does 
describe ―Iraq as a voluntary union is equal to self-determination rights‖. This is a 
wrong interpretation. Another example is: The ―Kurdish language‖ is mentioned in 
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Article 4 and the ―Kurdistan Region‖ in Articles 5, 114 and 137. But Kurds, as a distinct 
people, have not been mentioned anywhere in the Iraqi Constitution. Ironically, 
Turkmens, Assyrians and Chaldeans are mentioned in Article 122 as distinct people. 
Article 1 stipulates ‗The ruling system in Iraq is a parliamentarian, democratic and 
united‘. But it does not clearly state the parties involved in this union. Later, Article 3 
that ‗Iraq is a multi- ethnic, multi-religion, multi-sect country and it is part of the 
Islamic world‘. Article 133, while placed at the end of the constitution, is the most 
promising. Article 113 states ‗The union system in Iraq is composed of the capital, the 
Regions and the decentralised Governorates (Muhafazat) and the Regional authorities‘.  
If we describe this ―Union‖ as ―federalism‖ - without forgetting that federalism and 
unions are two different concepts - Iraq is re-established on the basis of ‗administrative 
federalism‘ and not geographical, ethnic or historical regional distinctions. Similarly, 
Article 114 part 2 supports the establishment of other administrative regions, stating 
‗This constitution will recognise other regions which might be formed according to the 
constitution‘.  
   This constitution's federal system or union system is vague, and the powers of the 
regional governments are very limited. Chapter 5, Articles 113 to 123, explain 
authorities of regional governments cannot be compared to the authorities of the 
dominant central government. Additionally, Article 118 states regional governments 
cannot interfere with the agendas of the central government. Regional constitutions and 
laws must not contradict the central constitution as described in article 13. The regional 
constitutions therefore must shadow the central government‘s constitution (Articles 13 
and 118). According to the constitution, the role of the Kurdistan Parliament will be to 
reflect on and interpret the decrees and decisions made in Baghdad. The role of the 
parliament will be similar to the role of a ―Council‖ for the region, and will not have the 
power of a regional parliament in a federation.  The constitution grants the Prime 
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Minister sweeping powers (Article 78), which may be perilous in a country where 
democracy has no roots and has just come out of a dictatorship. The Federal Court, if it 
is ruled by simple majority, would be controlled by Arabs; hence the influence of Kurds 
and non Arabs - Assyrians, Turkmen – is almost eliminated. The Constitution 
establishes yet another strong central government in Iraq.  
   The United States and Britain have exercised considerable influence in shaping the 
draft constitution working to appease neighbouring governments, particularly Turkey 
and Arab states. As a result, Kurdish self-determination is denied. The idea of 
federalism has been diluted to a very simple form of federation, which is not helpful to 
Kurdish people. The federation does not recognise the ethnic, historic and geographical 
reality of a Kurdish homeland. Unlike the case in Sudan, the federation does not lead to 
the right of self-determination in the future. In Sudan, according to the constitution, the 
South can attain independence, if their people are not satisfied with the central 
government after four years of the accord. In a referendum which took place on 09 
January 2011 to 15 January 2011 ‗Nearly 99% from the south voted for independence‘. 
(Smith 2011:1). Different Sunni Arab leaders are opposed to federal arrangement for the 
Kurds. Other prominent Arab organisations and individuals outside Iraq have also 
expressed fears over the Arab identity of Iraq, including Umro Mousa, the President of 
the League of Arab States. 
   A version of Article 3 of the constitution gave the impression that there may be other 
people in Iraq, apart from Arabs. This article stated ‗The Arab people of Iraq are part of 
Arab nation‘. This has been replaced by ‗Iraq is the founding and active member of the 
League of Arab States and is bound by all its decrees‘. Considering that the very first 
Article 1 states ‗The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab 
States‘. It is clear that Iraq has an Arab identity at the expense of Kurds and other ethnic 
and religious groups, which only enhance the mosaic of Iraq. As proven by Iraqi 
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history, a nation denying the existence of its historical diversity cannot build a 
democratic civil society which justly follows the rule-of-law and delivering equal 
citizenship.   
   Since his intervention in the Iraqi constitution, Umro Mousa was welcomed to the 
Kurdistan Parliament. He told all 111 Kurdish MPs that Kurdistan is part of the Arab 
nation and overtly they all accepted his claim. The constitution also deprives Kurdish 
religious groups from their rights. For example, the constitution specifically gives 
freedom to the Arab Hussiyniye tribes, but it does not identify some half a million 
Kurdish Kakeyis who have their own faith and have been gravely oppressed under the 
former government. Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution has still not been implemented. 
There is supposed to be a referendum where the people of the areas can freely decide 
whether their areas shall belong to Kurdistan Regional Government or to the central 
government in Baghdad. This is the only way of overcoming the consequences of the 
policy of forcible Arabicisation of the Ba‘th regime. Iraq can only continue to exist in 
its present boundaries if equal citizenship is guaranteed for the Kurds and other 
minorities.  
   In general the constitution fails to recognise crimes against humanity committed 
against Kurds during consecutive Arab rules of Iraq, such as the Anfal campaign, 
Arabisation and deportation. For example, even the term ―Peshmerga‖, which has a 
historic context and is sacred to Kurds, has been changed to ―Regional Guards‖. The 
process by which the constitution was produced was Arab Shia dominated. The question 
is why the first draft constitution was produced only by the Shia bloc, when Kurdish 
groups claim that they are sharing the government and parliament in Baghdad. Through 
the media, government and social institutions, Kurdish political groups pressured the 
Kurdish people to vote in favour of the constitution. Yet the options that were presented 
to the Kurds by such party propaganda machines were sanctioned by a Shia Arab 
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government. In addition to Kurds, the rights of all other ethnic and religious groups in 
Iraq are also at stake in the new constitution. The language used in the Constitution is 
very elusive and can be subject to different, even opposing, interpretations. For 
example, the constitution defines Iraq as ―Islamic‖ and ―democratic‖. There are no 
universal agreements on the meaning of these two totally different, even contradicting, 
concepts. No law can be legislated based on such concepts. This illusive language does 
not only disadvantage Kurds, but it restricts the civil, democratic and human rights of 
the entire Iraqi populations.  
   The constitution is a definition of an Islamic state; it clearly states that Iraq is Islamic. 
While the Shia has the majority and ruling Iraq, they would find it easy to legislate 
Islamic laws and decrees only, in particular when they will be controlling the ‗Federal 
Court‘ the backbone of a political system and Ayatollah Sistani issuing daily fatwas 
(religious orders). The beginning of this has already been noticed. 
4.7 Implications of the new constitution for the current situation in Iraq 
            Iraq, as it is currently ruled by a Shia majority and the Iraqi constitution clearly 
stipulates the Islamic identity of the state of Iraq. It also makes Islam a source of 
legislation. The Iraqi constitution has reinforced the Islamic identity of Iraq via a 
number of articles, in particular Article Two ‗First: Islam is the official religion of the 
State and it is a fundamental source of legislation. A. No law that contradicts the 
established provisions of Islam may be established. B.   No law that contradicts the 
principles of democracy may be established. C.  No law that contradicts the rights and 
basic freedoms stipulated in this constitution may be established. Second: This 
Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and 
guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and 
practice such as Christians, Yazedis, and Mandi Sabeans‘. This section summarises the 
implications of the constitution and identify the constitution's flaws: The constitution is 
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a mixture of contradictory concepts and terms, which makes it very difficult to legislate. 
There are no articles concerning the de-Arabisation of Kurdistan, a repressive policy 
carried out by Saddam‘s regime and associated with genocide. Arabs are identified as a 
nation, but Kurds are not. The constitution does not identify Kirkuk and Kurdistan areas 
outside the KRG as part of Kurdistan. The right of Kurdish self-determination is 
nonexistent. Minorities in general are not granted enough rights and instead are 
subordinated to various cultural and legal restrictions. The Prime Minister is granted 
sweeping powers, which may be perilous in a country where democracy has no roots. In 
the Federal Court, the voice of Kurds and other non Arabs is quite weak. The borders of 
the Kurdistan Region are inherited from Saddam Hussein and over 40% of Kurdish 
territory is left outside Kurdish administration. The Iraqi constitution is a manifestation 
of ambiguous political agenda of the Iraqi leaders and elites. The constitution challenges 
the US-led claims of promoting democratisation in the Middle East. Hence, 
shortcomings in the new constitution would be obstacles in establishing a new Iraq 
where the Kurds and other minorities are well treated.   
4.8 Democratisation of Iraq  
Iraq in post-2003 era is in the process of democratisation. Owing to that fact that, there 
is a strong link between delivering equal citizenship for the Iraqi Kurds and the process 
of democratisation; this section examines the status of democracy and democratisation 
in Iraq. Democracy in a wider sense means the rule of law, respect for individual 
liberties, representative and responsible government and the promotion of civil society. 
The new generations of Iraqis who love their country can prevent barbarism. Barbarism 
currently seems to be powerful. Democracy should be part of the process of building a 
new Iraq for future generations. Inglehart (2005:300) notices ‗[I]t is painfully evident 
that progress and human development are not inevitable. But they are possible, and they 
are worth striving for‘. Defeating Nazism in World War II was a prerequisite to creating 
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a democratic system in Germany and sped up the process of stability and 
democratisation in the whole of Europe. Therefore, there is a great chance to 
democratise Iraq and bring prosperity to the region after overthrowing Ba‘thism. The 
level of literacy is high in Iraq; this is a strong basis for the process of democratisation. 
Iraqis are under the threat of ethnic, sectarian and religious war. Nevertheless, ethnic 
cooperation has made huge progress since 2003.  
   In the past a centralised government has caused considerable political, social and 
economic suffering. Notably, overwhelming Iraqis support devolution of power and the 
establishment of a transparent central government. Economic progress, which has 
already begun, would lead to the transformation of recourses from the public sector to 
private one. Thus, dependency on the government would be lessened which prevents 
despotism. Potter (1997:362) argues ‗[T]he idea is that processes of economic 
development involving significant industrialisation lead to a more diverse and a more 
complex class structure, which becomes increasingly difficult for authoritarian regimes 
to control‘. It is highly unlikely that another authoritarian regime would get power in the 
new Iraq.  
   One of the major difficulties is an inefficient democratic culture but overcoming this 
issue is not impossible. Julio Faundez (2005:618) explains ‗[I]n the 1960s and early 
1970s, theories of political and economic modernisation raised doubts as to whether 
democracy could take root in countries that did not have well-established market 
systems, strong civil societies, efficient civil services, and legal institutions that could 
be effectively deployed both to regulate and defend basic civil and political rights. The 
current wave of democracy has exposed the shortcomings of these theories‘.   In terms 
of the difficulties in creating a federal state, Iraqis used to practice a form of federalism 
prior to the collapse of Ottoman Empire. Baghdad was in the centre, Mosul was in the 
north and Basra was in the south. Rubin (2005:5) comments that Saddam‘s efforts to 
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undermine this Arab-Kurdish federalism while at the same time consolidating the Ba‘th 
party‘s control caused ‗low-intensity civil war.‘ The author goes on to say that despite 
Saddam‘s efforts ‗the willingness of the Iraqi government to embrace federalism has 
had a lasting impact on Iraq‘s collective memory‘. The Iraqi people can find an 
acceptable form of federalism amongst themselves. 
   Throughout the history of Iraq, institutions have been abused. Cook (2005:96) argues 
the promotions of civil society, economic development and sanctions have not brought 
about political reform in the Arab world because the real obstacle to change is ‗flawed 
institutions.‘ The future challenge for the people of Iraq would be to reform their 
institutions and prevent abuse by corrupt leaders, religious clerics and ethnic and 
sectarian divisions.  
   The collective mentality in the post-Saddam era can establish different forms of 
institutions, because the political context is completely different from Saddam‘s time. A 
significant asset that helps a democratic culture is that Iraqis are familiar with 
institutions. Karen Dawisha (2003:36) notices that ‗[D]espite Saddam‘s long repression, 
democratic institutions are not entirely alien to the country. Under the Hashemite 
monarchy, which ruled from 1921 until 1958, Iraq adopted a parliamentary system 
modelled on that of its colonial master, the United Kingdom. Political parties existed, 
even in the opposition, and dissent and disagreement were generally tolerated‘. The 
important point that all Iraqis need to consider is that the consensual model of 
democracy is applicable to Iraq, rather than the majoritarian model. Iraq consists of 
many ethnic communities and does not have a mature judicial system.  
Despite cultural differences amongst Iraqis, Germans and Japanese, Rubin (2005:11) 
argues democracy need not be a foreign concept in the Arab world ‗Culturally, Arabs 
are as capable of democracy as were Germans, Japanese and Koreans‘. In terms of the 
US policy there are few signals of change and acknowledgements which would help 
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build a democracy and encourage political reconciliation. Stephen Zunes (2006:5) 
mentions that ‗[I]n the face of growing criticism over its Iraq policies, the current 
administration has acknowledged mistakes such as inaccurate pre-war claims of 
Saddam‘s military capability and inadequate policies to address post-invasion 
stabilization‘. It is thought that the international environment would help the process of 
democratization in the world including Iraq. Comparing the current situations in Iraq 
with the theory of Fukuyama which made of four levels (2004) there is a general belief 
in democracy. Furthermore, democracy is an essential part of agendas of political 
parties at least in theory. However, the people either are not committed to the details of 
democracy or do not implement it. In terms of second level (institutional level), Iraq has 
considerable institutions and has its constitutions. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether 
these institutions operate democratically or not. Luttwak (2005:30) mentions that ‗[T]he 
plain fact is that there are not enough aspiring democrats in Iraq to sustain democratic 
institutions‘. The third level, civil society has just set up and a great desire for active 
organizations can be noticed. The fourth level of democracy (political culture: family 
structure, religion and ethnic groups) is weak. It is strongly believed that there is a great 
opportunity for all four levels to be promoted and consolidated; nevertheless this 
process will take many years.  
   Political openness is an essential requirement for the process of democratisation. It 
has made huge progress and Iraqi people embraced the idea of political openness. Thus, 
many signs show that democracy is no longer a utopia in Iraq.  In terms of cultural 
impediments, it is believed that democracy crosses cultural differences and is a global 
phenomenon. Chris (2003:40) argues ‗[D]emocracy is a universal aspiration that defies 
economic conditions or phony cultural distinctions‘. The culture would not be a 
perpetual impediment for the process of democratisation.  
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   Iraq would be a unique experiment of democratisation in the world. It is a complex 
country in a complex region. The democratic transition parallels with the process of 
nation building and even state building. Thus, the country faces the threat of becoming a 
theocratic authoritarian regime, where there will be civil war, and eventually partition. 
Notably, the chances of a consensus model of democracy or acceptable frameworks of 
federalism are feasible. This thesis argues that Iraq lacks two major pillars of 
democracy: trust and national identity. Fractions do not trust each other. For instance, 
the Sunnis are scared of Shia reprisals. The Kurds live in fear of the rule of majority. 
Political leaders work together with suspicion. National identity suffers from 
considerable fragmentation. It is highly unlikely to establish a democratic system 
without a strong loyalty to the state of Iraq and a developed trust among people. The 
important point is that there is a real chance for Iraqis to rule their country and decide 
on their future. It is thought that the people of Iraq have suffered enough from 
oppression and inhumane systems. There is a great chance to strengthen moderating 
elements.  
   The Iraqis have democratically managed and addressed considerable conflicts and 
ethnic tensions in the post-Saddam era. If they continue to preserve and develop the 
route of national reconciliation and national healing, it would be highly likely to build a 
democratic system. Significantly, power sharing has helped the processes of 
transparency and accountability and has restrained the domination of a single ethnic 
group or political party.  
Despite several shortcomings of democracy, such as: majority of people are governed 
not govern in the democratic system, this study insists that there is no better system 
which can replace democracy in the present time, especially in a developing country 
such as Iraq. For democracy to take root, a democratic culture should consolidate from 
within the Iraqi society. Thus, ‗democracy template‘ is not viable in the world, 
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especially in a religiously and ethnically mixed society. Firstly, the chances of going 
back to an authoritarianism regime are weak. Secondly, the highest religious institution 
amongst the Shi‘its is Hawza, which is not in favour of establishing an Islamic state. 
Thirdly, it is thought that the threat of a full-scale civil war seems highly unlikely, 
because of the presence of occupation forces and also because each of the factions 
(Shia, Sunnis and Kurds) is certain that they cannot win the civil war. For instance, the 
Kurds realize that none of neighbours‘ of Iraq would support them. The Sunnis are 
aware that the Shias are the majority and Iran would support them if civil war occurs. 
The Shia understand that majority of Arab Sunnis in the Arab world would support the 
Sunnis. None of the political leaders are in favour of civil war. Thus, a full scale civil 
war, as one of the greatest threats to democracy, can be prevented.  
   There is an opportunity that human experiences of tragedy and suffering will lead to 
the establishment of a peaceful life. The Iraqis can learn from the unpleasant history of 
their own country and of other experiments across the world. The people of Iraq are able 
to build a new country which is based on modern values such as democracy, secularism, 
the rule of law and principles of human rights(which the equal citizenship for the Kurds 
could be guaranteed), rather than backing religious orders or adopting ethno-
nationalism.  
4.9 Concluding Remarks  
Despite many challenges such as instability, lack of integration amongst Iraqi people, 
and a mainstream discourse against democracy in the region the democratisation of Iraq 
is not impossible. Anderson (2004:188) argues ‗[t]he complex and traumatic legacy of 
80 years of Iraqi history will prove difficult to overcome‘. The location of the country is 
not a perpetual impediment. David Potter has argued that ‗the alleged exceptionalism of 
the Middle East may be better understood as one of degree rather than as one of kind. 
Perhaps the process of democratisation is just slower and more uneven in the Middle 
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East than elsewhere‘ (Potter 1997:328). In other words time is a crucial factor for 
change.  
   Iraq made a declaration, on gaining independence and joining the League of Nations 
in 1932 that it would protect the rights of minorities and it was the first non-European 
state to declare this. With the formation of the United Nations after the Second World 
War, the international community recognised the particular vulnerability of minorities 
around the world to human rights abuses. In December 1948 the UN General Assembly 
adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention: 1951). The Convention was followed by others firmly 
establishing the rights of minorities in international law. In 1971, Iraq was one of the 
first countries in the world to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966). Article 26 of the Covenant prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, 
religion, and language, and article 27 is specifically dedicated to the rights of minorities 
‗In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language‘. Iraq has assumed the obligation to take action to 
protect minority rights through other notable UN conventions, such as the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD: 1966) 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC: 1989). The latter specifically 
requires the education of a child to be directed to the ‗development of ... his or her own 
cultural identity, language and values‘ and gives a child of a religious minority the right 
‗to enjoy his or her own culture, [and] to profess and practise his or her own religion‘.  
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has passed declarations that articulate 
best practices and human rights standards for the protection of minorities. According to 
the UNGA‘s Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
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Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1993), states are obliged to protect minorities by 
taking ‗measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to 
minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, 
religion, traditions and customs‘.  The declaration also states that states must protect the 
identity of minorities within their respective territories by encouraging ‗conditions for 
the promotion of that identity‘ and measures allowing minority members to ‗participate 
fully in the economic progress and development in their country‘. It states that 
minorities have the right to establish and maintain their own associations. Minorities 
also have ‗the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where 
appropriate, regional level concerning the minority‘.    
   The protection of minority rights is further incorporated into international law through 
regional instruments, such as the Council of Europe‘s Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Minority Languages, 
and the Arab Charter on Human Rights. (Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities: 1998). The Arab Charter, adopted by the Council of the League of 
Arab States in 2004, states ‗minorities shall not be deprived of their right to enjoy their 
culture or to follow the teachings of their religions‘. (Arab Charter: Article25). Further, 
the Arab Charter prohibits denying an individual‘s rights because of his or her ‗race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status and without any discrimination between men and women‘. Iraq is a 
founding member of the League of Arab States. Therefore, ratifying the above 
conventions by the Iraqi state obliges it to guarantee the equal citizenship for its 
minorities and the Kurds in particular as the largest ethnic minority of the country.  The 
forthcoming KRG constitution needs to guarantee the rights of other minorities in the 
territory of KRG and stipulate those rights of the Kurds which are not guaranteed for the 
Kurds in the Iraqi constitution.  
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5 Chapter five: Monoculturism and division of distinct ethnicity in Turkey 
This chapter examines the process of handling the Kurds in Turkey, it analyses the early 
constitution of Turkey with emphasis on how it has treated the Kurds. The 
consequences of this treatment on the Kurds in Turkey at the present time will be 
examined extensively. The integration of Turkish minority in Bulgaria in the 1990s is 
touched in this chapter as an example for Turkey to take lessons in delivering equal 
citizenship for the Kurds. The chapter concludes with by its findings in light of the 
theory of equal and constitutional citizenship which has been outlined in the first 
chapter.   
5.1 Handling the Kurds in Turkey  
With the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 the Millet system was abolished. 
Accordingly, the rights of the various ethnic groups, especially the rights of the non-
Muslims were determined by the Treaty of Lausanne. In articles 37-44 of the Treaty of 
Lausanne, a number of rights were to be given to the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. 
‗[P]reventing the development of an ethnic Kurdish cultural and political movement has 
been a priority of the Turkish state since the Kurdish-led Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925. 
Nevertheless, beginning around 1959 this effort was steadily if slowly undermined, and 
events of the past ten years suggest that it has indeed failed‘ (Watts 1999:652).  As a 
result of the population shifts in the 1920s, Turkey had become home to a largely 
Turkish, yet multi-ethnic, Muslim majority. In this population, the Kurds were the 
largest population of non-Turkish ethnic group. Hence, as a nation-state, Kemalist 
Turkey was bound to deal with the country‘s lingering heterogeneity. Cagaptay 
(2006:66) argues ‘[a]s the Ottoman Turkish-Muslims poured into the country; Turkey 
needed legislation to cope with the influx. The first resettlement law was adopted on 31 
May 1926. This law began with a definition of how one could qualify as an immigrant, 
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stating in its second article ‗‗those people who do not share the Turkish culture …will 
not be admitted as immigrants‘‘ ‘. A prohibition on non-Muslims immigrating to 
Turkey was implemented. This policy was demonstrated in the population exchange 
with Greece, domestic population issues and displacing Kurds and resettling them 
amongst the Turkish population. They used the word nomadic tribes to describe the 
Kurds and settled them somewhere else. In the 1920s, in addition to the Kurds, other 
groups such as the Armenians also were subjected to limited resettlement. Cagaptay 
(2006:70) states ‗[a] 1939 amendment to the Resettlement Law stated in reference to the 
Kurds ―people who are not of Turkish origin and who do not share the Turkish culture 
were banned from resettling in Zone 1‖ ‘.   
   The government did resort to the resettlement of the Kurds during the 1930s. In 
accordance with this, in 1932, security forces stormed various areas of unrest and 
forcibly resettled the Kurdish inhabitants of these regions to the Turkish provinces in 
western Turkey. The Turkish culture isolates Jews, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, 
Greeks, Bulgarians and other Christians.  The Nomadic culture discourages the Kurds, 
Roma, Arabs, Assyrians, Circassians and other Muslims of the Caucasus from coming 
to Turkey. Turkisation of the Ottoman Empire helped the consolidation process of 
Turkisation by non-Turkish Muslims. An article from the resettlement law says that 
‗[w]hose mother tongue is not Turkish might not establish towns, villages, and worker 
or artisan units‘ (Cagaptay 2006:75). Ethnicity and Turkish culture were main elements 
of resettlement law of 1920s and 1930s. Non-Turkish speaking Muslims were not to 
receive naturalisation certificates or immigrant papers. The Republic was especially 
careful towards the Kurds, the second largest and the least assimilated ethnic group in 
Turkey. To arrest the growth of its own Kurdish community, Turkey banned Kurds 
from immigrating to Turkey.  The state of affairs in Turkey during the 1930s was not 
unique to that country. Other former Ottoman states such as Greece also adhered to 
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ethno-religious nationalism during this time. As a result of the salience of the millet 
system and ethno-religious identities in the former Ottoman lands, religion became a 
marker of nationality in the former Ottoman states in the Balkans, as well as Turkey.  
   Within less than two decades, those who still hoped to retain the empire in its 
sixteenth-and seventeenth-century form had all hopes dashed by the advent of the Great 
War in 1914. The Young Turk movement, meanwhile, had given rise to the Committee 
for Union and Progress (CUP), which was resolutely secular and a firm believer in the 
idea of ‗Turkish nationalism‘ as compared to ‗Ottomanism‘. Backed by modernist 
elements within the military, the CUP assumed power in 1912, keeping the sultan as a 
titular head. Until the end of its rule in 1918, the CUP governed by decree, embarking, 
among other things, on a rapid program of secularising schools and the judicial system, 
repressing Christian minorities and the Muslim ulama, and seeking to Turkify the 
various Arab provinces. Given the highly politicised atmosphere in Turkey in the 1970s, 
and the fact that it resulted in yet another military intervention in 1980, it is probably 
inevitable that analysts tend to offer a whole range of different explanations for the lack 
of firm government, the politicisation of most parts of the state administration and the 
growing political violence. Words with a distinct Kurdish origin were wiped out and 
replaced.  
   The Turkish constitution does not recognise Kurds in Turkey, the country deals with 
the Kurdish cause as a security concern rather than a matter of a minority seeking 
recognition and equal citizenship. Turkey uses the threat to its ―national security‖, 
―territorial integrity‖ and ―sovereignty‖, by ―separatists/terrorists‖. Amnesty 
International (2007:22) states ‗[t]he death toll of Kurds killed in Turkish military 
operations increased to over 40,000‘. According to the figures published by Turkey‘s 
own Parliament, 6,000 Kurdish villages were systematically evacuated of all inhabitants 
and 3,000,000 Kurds have been displaced. (Amnesty International 2007:22)  This may 
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be seen as aiming to eliminate a culture and a homeland. The methods by which Turkey 
has sought to oppress the Kurdish people are similar to those used by Saddam Hussein‘s 
polices of the 1980s including the destruction of Kurdish land, mass evacuation and 
deportation. In some other areas, Turkey has used more harsh methods to achieve its 
aims in dealing with the Kurdish issue. The mistreatment and denying equal citizenship 
of Kurdish people within Turkey can be defined as discrimination in various ways; 
cultural, linguistic and physical all play a part in assimilation of Kurdish ethnicity from 
Turkey itself, and are still embraced by the Turkish constitution.  The creation of a 
Turkish nation denied the existence of Kurds, and forced them to assimilate into 
Turkishness. This has caused a continuous struggle between the official state ideology, 
Kemalism, and Kurds who form 20% of Turkey‘s whole population. Because of this 
reason the issue of Kurdish identity and the war against Kurdish people in Turkey are 
key challenges to hegemonic constructions of Turkish national identity as well as the 
functioning of the Turkish state, both an internal and foreign policy issues for Turkey. 
In 1985, as the war between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish 
government became more severe, and the Turkish state made a decision to burn and 
destroys Kurdish towns and villages for ―security reasons‖. Cohen and Deng (199:200) 
argue ‗3,500 Kurdish villages and towns have been burned, destroyed by  the Turkish 
state between 1984 and 1999 and  as a result displaced around four million Kurds which 
is (according to NGOs) one of the world‘s largest IDP populations. Hundreds of 
thousands have crowded into shanty towns outside major cities without access to proper 
sanitation, health care or educational facilities, and without stable employment 
prospects‘. Discrimination and police harassment is a part of everyday life of Internal 
Displacement Persons (IDPs) Kurdish people in Turkey. ‗The only local humanitarian 
NGO allowed to operate in the southeast has been shut down. No international NGO has 
been permitted entry. Even ICRC has been unable to operate in Turkey. The request of 
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the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, 
Francis Deng, to visit the country has received no response‘ (Cohen and Deng 1998:22). 
This section has shown that the policies of the Turkish authorities towards its Kurdish 
population have not delivered equal citizenship and the Kurds are mishandled in the 
country.  
5.2 Turkey‘s official policy towards the Kurds   
Turkish official policy on minorities is based on the Lausanne Treaty.  The Lausanne 
Treaty provides protection only for non-Muslim minorities. Turkey has always 
recognised the Armenian Orthodox Christians, the Greek Orthodox Christians, and the 
Jews as minorities, although there are other non-Muslim groups in Turkey such as 
Protestants, Catholic Christians and Syriac Orthodox Christians etc that are not 
recognised. Other religious (Muslim), linguistic and ethnic groups have also been 
excluded from formal recognition. The Republic of Turkey‘s minority policy has 
always been one of denying the existence of minorities, including the Kurds, and 
depriving them of their rights since its foundation in 1923.  
   At the initial stage of the founding of the Republic state the policy towards minorities 
was different. For example, Mustafa Kemal promised the Kurds their national rights in 
order to gain their support during this initial period. Sedat (1995:50) points out ‗[t]he 
1921 Constitution was drafted in such a way as to represent the mosaic of peoples living 
in Turkey. It did not contain the word ―Turkish‖ or the phrase ―Turkish nation‖ ‘. After 
Kemalists had gained power they changed their policy and developed an assimilation 
policy towards ethnic, religious and linguistic minority groups. ‗This policy was started 
after the Treaty of Lausanne and was based on a ―Turkification‖ policy that failed to 
recognise individuals‘ rights to ethnic, national, and religious self-identification and that 
aims at forced assimilation with a Turkish identity‘ (IHF 2006). The official policy of 
the state has become one of glorifying the Turkish nation, and ethnic, ideological, 
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religious and economic differentiations were considered an obstacle to the unity of the 
State. Multiculturalism was rejected and Turkish nationalism was imposed on a multi-
ethnic society in the sense that all Muslim ethnic groups were expected to identify 
themselves as Turkish. Natalie (2005:78) notices ‗Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), the founder 
of Turkey, attempted to bring the country‘s diverse populations together by creating a 
unified ―secular and modern official state nationalism‖‘. In 1924, Ataturk banned all 
other identities except Turkish, saying ‗[e]veryone living within the borders of the 
Turkish Republic who considers themselves Turkish is Turkish. His republicanism had 
one brand: assimilation of all minorities into the homogeneity of the republic. 
Minorities‘ rights ceased to exist‘ (Bruinessen 1995:32). The Kurds in particular were 
targeted by this assimilation policy. It was claimed by the Turkish Governments for a 
long time that Kurds do not exist and they were called ―Mountain Turks‖. Their culture, 
music, language, place names and even the use of Kurdish names for children were 
banned under the policy of ―Turkification‖. Some of these bans are still in force.  
   The same policy was followed by other subsequent rulers of Turkey. In 1925, when he 
was expressing his opinion on the Kurds, Ismet Inonu (the second president of Turkey) 
publicly states ‗[w]e are openly nationalist. Nationalism is the only cause that keeps us 
together. Besides the Turkish majority, no other (ethnic) element shall have any impact. 
We shall at any price, Turkicise those who live in our country, and destroy those who 
rise up against the Turks and Turkishness‘ (Mizell 27:2005). Although the Prime 
Minister in 1991, Suleyman Demirel, made few steps in recognising the Kurdish issue 
(Mizell 2005:27). Several other leaders of Turkey have made similar points; this has 
never turned into real recognition. 
The desire to join the EU has forced Turkey to change its traditional policy towards the 
Kurds. During the accession process Turkey has made dramatic and unexpected changes 
in cultural and linguistic rights as well as democratic, constitutional, legislative reforms 
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to bolster human rights in general. Accepting other identities apart from Turkish is still 
seen as a threat to the unitary, secular state and Turkey has refused to recognise the 
existence of minorities including the Kurds or to identify them as minorities, and has 
failed to provide them with minority rights as required by international norms. In this 
way Turkey has failed to uphold the principle of equal citizenship for the Kurds and 
other minorities.  
5.3 Denial of the Kurds by the Turkish constitution: Turkey‘s legislative approach to 
the recognition of the Kurds  
Turkey created some political concepts which are repackaging its past mistreatment 
towards other ethnic groups, in particular Kurds, under modern phrases to appeal to the 
democratic world such as ―national security‖, ―territorial integrity‖, ―sovereignty‖, 
―separatist‖ and links all these concepts to ―terrorism‖. These are translated in the 
Turkish legal system in reality as this: Anything that is not ―Turkish‖ is a ―separatist‖ 
and every ―separatist‖ by Turkish definition, can be associated with terrorism. The 
constitution also emphasises the ―integrity and sovereignty‖ of Turkey. If any actions 
are proved to have undermined the integrity and sovereignty of Turkey, heavy penalties 
are imposed. For example the constitution states ―integrity‖ 20 times and states 
―sovereignty‖ 10 times. This reminds Kurds that there is no such thing as Kurdish 
homeland or Kurdistan.  
   The Turkish constitution does not recognise Kurds in Turkey, and so often the 
constitution provides a convenient scapegoat for military uprisings and other political 
issues. It is believed that 20 percent of the Turkey‘s population is Kurdish and yet there 
is no mention of anything Kurdish in the Turkish Constitution. According to the Article 
66 of the Turkish Constitution ‗[e]veryone bound to the Turkish state through the bond 
of citizenship is a Turk‘ (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 2007). Kurds have 
a claim on southeast Turkey and they call it Kurdistan, as it is apparent from the name 
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of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers‘ Party). This can also explain why in Turkey 
―terrorists‖ and ―separatists‖ are synonyms.  
   Mentioning Kurds may be a Constitutional breach. For example Article 301 of the 
constitution (2001) stipulates: 1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the 
Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by 
imprisonment of between six months and three years.  2. A person who publicly 
denigrates the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the 
State, the military or security organizations shall be punishable by imprisonment of 
between six months and two years. 3. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is 
committed by a Turkish citizen in another country the punishment shall be increased by 
one third. 4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime. 
Article 301, on the denigration of Turkishness, the Republic, and the foundation and 
institutions of the State, was introduced with the legislative reforms of 1 June 2005 and 
replaced Article 159 of the old penal code. Article 301 has used in a number of cases 
where Kurds have been the subject. Article 301 has been used to bring charges against 
writer Orhan Pamuk for stating, in an interview with a Swiss magazine, that ‗Thirty 
thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were killed in these lands and nobody but me 
dares to talk about it‘ (Rainsford 2005). Stating that Turkey oppresses its Kurdish 
people is a crime in Turkey. Amnesty International (2006) states:  
Fatih Tas is a 26-year-old student of Communications and Journalism at 
Istanbul University and the owner of Aram publishing house. He is currently 
being tried under Article 301 because he published a Turkish translation of a 
book by the American academic John Tirman, entitled Savas Ganimetleri: 
Amerikan Silah Ticaretinin Insan Bedeli (Istanbul: Aram, 2005) (The Spoils of 
War: the Human Cost of America‘s Arms Trade), that reportedly includes a 
map depicting a large section of Turkey as traditionally Kurdish and alleges 
that the Turkish military perpetrated a number of human rights abuses in 
Kurdistan during the 1980s and 1990s. The prosecutor reportedly demanded 
that each ―insult‖ in the book should be tried as a separate charge and called for 
Fatih Tas to be given a prison sentence of ten and a half years. Fatih Tas also 
faces charges under Articles 1/1 and 2 of Law 5816, which prohibits publicly 




The president of the Bingöl branch of the Human Rights Association, Rıdvan Kızgın, 
faces charges under Article 301 for ―denigrating the state‖ following a letter he sent to 
the Turkish authorities which had on its letterhead the word ―Cewlik‖ (the Kurdish 
name for Bingöl). Since Rıdvan Kızgın has had over 47 cases opened against him since 
2001, it has been considered that this case is another form of judicial harassment 
against him, intended to hinder him in his work defending the human rights of others.  
Article 88 of the Turkish Constitution (2001) stipulates ‗[t]he People of Turkey, 
regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards Turkish citizenship‘. Ataturk 
declares ‗[t]he people of Turkey, who have established the Turkish state, are called the 
Turkish nation‘ (Cagaptay 2006:62). The policies to assimilate all the non-Turkish 
speakers to Turkish nation have been justified by the constitution.  The Turkish 
constitution does not mention the Kurdish language at all. Article 3 of the Turkish 
constitution states ‗[t]he Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible 
entity. Its language is Turkish‘. Article 42 elaborates on this further: No other language 
than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of 
training or education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of training and 
education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in 
a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties 
are reserved.  
   The education system, devoid of all hints of Kurds, forces children to learn and adapt 
to Turkish language and culture. The Turkish constitution prevents Kurds from having, 
pursuing or gaining any civil or ethnic rights. As it is evidence in the case of Orhan 
Pamuk and others, one cannot state that Kurds are oppressed or mention the Armenian 
Genocide in Turkey. One cannot even say that the Turkish army should withdraw from 
Cyprus. Articles 1/1 and 2 of the law numbered 5816 prohibit publicly insulting the 
memory of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and prescribe imprisonment from 1 year to 3 years. 
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If the crime is committed by means of the media, then the punishment is increased by a 
ratio of a half.  
   Kurds do not have to be violent to be persecuted by the Turkish state; they are being 
prevented from expressing their culture and using their language. The constitution 
diffused to all aspects of the Penal Code. For example, a Kurd is not only persecuted 
for speaking Kurdish, but using a Kurdish sound, such as ―W‖ (a sound that does not 
exist in the Turkish language). This law is not applied for every language. One can use 
English, French or Japanese sounds and their representations in writings without being 
persecuted. In this sense, the Turkish state is constitutionally ethinicised. This is a slow 
form of denying equal citizenship, which slowly makes Kurds assimilate or disappear 
as a people, language, culture and homeland. Kurds have been persecuted for using 
Kurdish ―letters‖. Reuters (2005) states: 
A Turkish court has fined 20 people for using the letters Q and W on placards 
at a Kurdish New Year celebration [Newroz], under a law that bans use of 
characters not in the Turkish alphabet, rights campaigners said. The court in the 
south-eastern city of Siirt fined each of the 20 people 100 new lira ($75.53) for 
holding up the placards, written in Kurdish, at the event last year. The letters Q 
and W do not exist in the Turkish alphabet  
 
One may even accept the fear of Turkey from Kurdish national movement, but one may 
find it difficult to accept changing the names of Kurdish and Armenian environment and 
natural life from Kurdish and Armenian to Turkish. BBC news item entitled ―Turkey 
renames 'divisive' animals‖ (BBC 2005:3) states: 
Turkey has said it is changing the names of three animals found on its territory 
to remove references to Kurdistan or Armenia. The environment ministry says 
the Latin names of the red fox, the wild sheep and the roe deer will be altered.  
The red fox for instance, known as Vulpes Vulpes Kurdistanica, will now be 
known as Vulpes Vulpes. Turkey has uneasy relations with neighbouring 
Armenia and opposes Kurdish separatists in Turkey. The ministry said the old 
names were contrary to Turkish unity. "Unfortunately there are many other 
species in Turkey which were named this way with ill intentions. This ill intent 
is so obvious that even species only found in our country were given names 
against Turkey's unity," a ministry statement quoted by Reuter‘s news agency 
said. Some Turkish officials say the names are being used to argue that 




This background explains why in ‗2005, there were 2302 applications lodged against 
the Republic of Turkey before the European Court of Human Rights and consequently 
290 judgments on the merits have been issued affirming 270 violations and 9 non-
violations‘ (www.coe.int 2005). Turkey recognises the Kurdish language but experts 
decry this recognition of the Kurdish language by Turkish authorities as a cosmetic 
operation. Kurdish education is provided through only a few private local courses. 
Kurds in Turkey are not equal to Turks and they are discriminated against in all aspects 
of life. Despite the fact that from the very beginning, citizenship had a deep underlying 
significance for the construction of the new Turkish society and state, social science 
literature seldom explicitly discussed the concept of citizenship in Turkey beyond its 
ideological implications regarding nationalist heritage. İçduygu (1999: 2002) states 
‗[a]t the present time, Turkey finds itself reacting to the naturalization policies and 
practices of migrant-receiving states, in which thousands of its emigrant citizens are in 
search of access to citizenship and citizenship rights in those states, and consequently 
'dual citizenship' has become an issue of increasing concern. On the other hand, it has to 
deal with the question of how the free expression of ethnic (Kurdish), religious 
(Islamic) and sectarian (Alevi) revivalism is possible under the unitary principles of the 
Turkish state and citizenship, and accordingly 'constitutional citizenship' is repeatedly 
pronounced‘. 
   The Constitution of Turkey and other related Turkish Laws are designed to conform 
to the official policy of the state with respect to the recognition of minorities. The 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey does not have any provisions referring to 
minorities. Similarly, the Turkish Constitution guarantees the rights of all individuals 
with a general provision. Article 10 provides that ‗[a]ll individuals are equal without 
any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political 
opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations‘ 
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(Constitution of the Republic of Turkey :2007). The Turkish Constitution does not 
provide any protection for the cultural rights of minorities and does not refer to 
minority languages including the Kurds. In direct contradiction, it is devoted to the sole 
protection of Turkish culture, language and values, thus the possibility of promoting 
any other cultures, languages and other characteristics of minority groups is ruled out. 
This is clearly explained in the preamble of the Constitution as it stipulates:  
The recognition that no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to 
Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of 
Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the 
nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Ataturk and that, as required 
by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by 
sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics…(Constitution of the 
Republic of Turkey: 2007).    
 
As will be explained in the next section in detail referring to the existence of minorities 
has also been interpreted as ―creating minorities‖ and this has been used as a reason for 
the dissolution and criminalisation of political parties. As regards international law, 
article 90 of the Constitution regulates the ratification of international treaties and states 
‗…[i]n the case of a conflict between international agreements in the area of 
fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into effect and the domestic laws due to 
differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements 
shall prevail‘. Turkey‘s entering reservations on the international treaties minorities are 
deprived of protection from international law and this provision remains almost 
completely ineffective concerning minority rights.  
   When signing and ratifying international treaties, Turkey generally puts reservations 
to the provisions of international treaties that specifically concern minorities. In this 
way minority groups including the Kurds are also deprived of the protection of 
international law regarding their interests. For example, Turkey has entered a 
reservation on article 27 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 13 of the ICESCR which are major sources 
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of international law concerning minorities. Turkey has also signed and ratified the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and placed a reservation on articles 17, 29 and 
30, which concern the rights of children who belong to an ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minority or indigenous population. Furthermore, Turkey has not signed the Council of 
Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities or the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Turkey has signed and ratified 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
protocols, but has put a reservation to Article 2 of Protocol no 1, which is related to the 
right of education.  
   This section shows that the Turkish constitution and the country‘s approach 
(reservations on articles) in ratifying the international conventions are the main obstacle 
of guarantying equal citizenship for the Kurds.  It is suggested that at the present time, 
the best approach to Kurdish identity and all other minority groups in Turkey is to make 
fundamental amendments to the Turkish constitution which would guarantee equal 
citizenship for non-Turkish speakers including the Kurds. 
5.4 The right to establish political parties 
Articles 68 and 69 of the Turkish Constitution deal with the formation of political 
parties and impose restrictions and sanctions regarding their activities. They are 
important for the establishing and maintaining of the political parties of the Kurds. 
Paragraph 4 of Article 68 shows how activities of political parties must conform to the 
principles of the constitution which are based on the non-acceptance of multi-ethnicity. 
It is stipulated ‗statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties 
shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with 
its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, 
sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they 
shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any 
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kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime‘ (Article 68, paragraph 4 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Turkey: 2007).  
   Paragraph 5 of article 69 provides sanctions when political parties act against these 
principles. It states ‗The permanent dissolution of a political party shall be decided 
when it is established that the statute and programme of the political party violate the 
provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 68‘ (Article 69, paragraph 5 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey: 2007). The Law on Political Parties (LPP) 
(No.2820, 22.04.1983) ensures the implementation of these principles. Article 78 of 
LPP imposes prohibitions on Political parties that have aims or are involved in any 
activity to change the democratic state order. Article 78 states:  
Political parties (a) shall not aim, strive or incite third parties to change: the 
republican form of Turkish state;  the…provisions concerning the absolute 
integrity of the Turkish State‘s territory, the absolute unity of its nation, its 
official language, its flag or its national anthem;….the principle that 
sovereignty resides unconditionally and unreservedly in the Turkish nation; 
…the provision that sovereign power cannot be transferred to an individual, a 
group or a social class…jeopardize the existence of the Turkish State and 
Republic, abolish fundamental rights and freedoms, introduce discrimination 
on grounds of language, race, colour, religion or membership of a religious 
sect, or establish, by any means, a system of government based on any such 
notion or concept… (Olgun 2005:380). 
  
Articles 80 and 81 of LPP impose other restrictions on political parties which derive 
from articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution. Article 80 states ‗[p]olitical parties shall not 
aim to change the principle of the unitary State on which the Turkish Republic is 
founded, nor carry on activities in pursuit of such an aim‘. Article 81(a) prevents 
political parties from claiming the existence of minorities as follows ‗[p]olitical parties 
shall not a) assert that there exist within the territory of the Turkish Republic any 
national minorities based on differences relating to national or religious culture, 
membership of a religious sect, race or language or (b) aim to destroy national unity by 
proposing, on the pretext of protecting, promoting or disseminating a non-Turkish 
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language or culture, to create minorities on the territory of the Turkish Republic or to 
engage in similar activities...‘.  
   These provisions have been used as justification for the repression and dissolution of 
political parties which addressed minority issues (particularly the Kurdish issue) in their 
programmes. ‗The activities of parties which are seen to be against the principle of 
secularism have also faced dissolution. Since 1992, 12 political parties have been 
dissolved by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of these provisions‘ (Olgun 
2005:380). The Constitutional Court has operated as a guardian for nationalism and 
secularism and to serve the official ideology rather than creating a way for the 
consolidation of democracy in Turkey. For example, in its judgment regarding the 
dissolution of the United Communist Party of Turkey, the Court states:  
The State was unitary, the country indivisible and that there was only one 
nation. It considered that national unity was achieved through the integration of 
communities and individuals who, irrespective of their ethnic origin and on an 
equal footing, formed the nation and founded the State. In Turkey there were 
no ―minorities‖ or ―national minorities‖, other than those referred to in the 
Treaty of Lausanne and the friendship treaty between Turkey and Bulgaria, and 
there were no constitutional or legislative provisions allowing distinctions to be 
made between citizens. Like all nationals of foreign descent, nationals of 
Kurdish origin could express their identity, but the Constitution and the law 
precluded them from forming a nation or a minority distinct from the Turkish 
nation. Consequently, objectives which, like those of the TBKP, encouraged 
separatism and the division of the Turkish nation were unacceptable and 
justified dissolving the party concerned (ECHR 2007: para.11).   
 
In its judgment on the Freedom and Democracy Party (FDP) the Constitutional Court 
decided dissolution of the party due to contraventions of articles 78 and 81 of LPP in its 
programme. (Olgun 2005:380). As can be seen from the judgments of the Constitutional 
Court one can freely express her/his identity, but cannot claim to be a member of a 
minority group that is seen as a danger to the unitary state and nation. Despite the 
European Court of Human Rights finding it was a violation of Article 11 of the 
Convention that these parties be dissolved; the Constitutional Court has not changed its 
approach. The use of minority languages during election campaigns and in the activities 
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of political parties is prohibited by article 81(c) of the Political Parties Law and article 
58 of the Election Law. Article 81(c) of the Political Parties Law states:  
Political parties ... (c) cannot use a language other than Turkish in writing and 
printing party statutes or programs, at congresses, indoors or outside; at 
demonstrations, and in propaganda; cannot use or distribute placards, pictures, 
phonograph records, voice and visual tapes, brochures and statements written 
in a language other than Turkish; cannot remain indifferent to these actions and 
acts committed by others. However, it is possible to translate party statutes and 
programs into foreign languages other than those forbidden by law (The Law 




Article 58 of the Election Law states ‗... It is forbidden to use any other language or 
script than Turkish in propaganda disseminated in radio or television as well as in other 
election propaganda‘ (Election Law: No. 2839). These provisions have been used 
particularly against pro-Kurdish parties, for instance ‗[t]he president of DEHAP 
(Democratic People‘s Party), Tuncer Bakirhan was investigated under article 81(c ) of 
the LPP for saying goodbye and thank you in Kurdish after a speech during the election 
in July 2004. Handan Caglayan was sentenced to seven months in prison and fined 513 
new Turkish lira (380 USD) for saying "My Dear Sisters" in Kurdish in the south-
eastern province of Sanliurfa during the March 23, 2004 local elections (Bianet 
2007:22).  Institute for Human Development (2007) states ‗[e]xecutives of HAK-PAR 
(Rights and Freedoms Party) were sentenced to terms of imprisonment for speaking in 
the Kurdish language at the first Ordinary Congress of the Party and sending invitations 
to the President of Turkey in Kurdish and Turkish‘. 
   The above examples show how the provisions of establishing political parties 
deliberately target pro-Kurdish parties and individuals. It is obvious that prohibition of 
free expression in a minority language in political activities and election campaigns are 
pervasive in Turkey.  It is also noticed that, these provisions inhibit those representing, 
or seeking to represent, minority and particularly Kurdish interests predominantly in the 
southeast of the country, from effective campaigning. It is clear that equality for all 
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political parties, regardless of their ethnicity of their leaders and members, does not 
exist in Turkey. This policy contributes to violate basic principles of equal citizenship 
for the Kurds.  
5.5 10 % cent threshold in the electoral system 
Turkey‘s electoral system is a proportional representation system with a 10 percent 
national threshold. In this system political parties must gain at least 10 percent of the 
total vote cast and must be registered in more than half of the provinces and present lists 
of candidates in all those provinces. Article 33 of the Election Law states ‗[i]n a general 
election parties may not win seats unless they obtain, nationally, more than 10 percent 
of the votes validly cast... An independent candidate standing for election on the list of a 
political party may be elected only if the list of the party concerned obtains sufficient 
votes to take it over the 10 percent national threshold‘ (The Election Law:2007). It is 
indisputable that a 10 percent threshold is high enough to prevent minority parties and 
small parties from entering parliament. It also raises the question that the high threshold 
is maintained by the Turkish government specifically to keep pro-Kurdish parties out of 
the parliament. For instance, DEHAP (Democratic People‘s Party) obtained more than 
45 percent of the vote in a number of Kurdish provinces and 6.2 percent of the total 
national vote in the November 2003 elections, but did not obtain any seats in 
parliament. Instead these votes went to AKP (Justice and Development Party) or to 
other independent candidates who gained less than 15 percent of votes in these 
provinces. 
   The OSCE (The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) states in 
several reports that the 10 percent threshold for political party representation is 
unusually high and remains the highest in the OSCE region. According to OSCE this 
leads to distortions, and concerns were expressed to the OSCE/ODIHR that it unfairly 
prejudices Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. In its judgment of Yumak and Sadak v. 
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Turkey the European Court of Human Rights (2007:3) notices ‗[t]he 10 percent 
threshold in Turkey is the highest in any Council of Europe member state and it must be 
lowered‘. Pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) and other small parties 
registered their candidates as independent candidates in the 22 July 2007 elections in 
order to overcome this hurdle and there were in total 604 candidates who stood in the 
elections as an independent.  Independent candidates do not need to exceed the 10 
percent national threshold and they can join a political party or form a political party 
after being elected.  
   The Turkish government attempted to create new barriers against Kurdish candidates 
to prevent them entering parliament. The ruling party AKP submitted a new proposal to 
parliament to amend the electoral law and to abolish independent candidates‘ right to 
have separate ballot papers, instead proposing their names be listed on the same ballot 
paper as the candidates of parties. All parties voted for this proposal unanimously and 
parliament passed this law with the highest number of votes (468 votes) in the history of 
the Turkish parliament. Taking into account the fact that the rate of illiteracy is high 
among the potential voters of pro-Kurdish independent candidates; the government 
hoped that this practice would create confusion among illiterate voters and that, 
consequently, the number of Kurdish deputies would be fewer than expected in the new 
parliament. The OSCE in its 2002 report, highlights this point ‗[a]s a means to avoid 
compromising the secrecy of the vote, the change may have the effect of making 
independent candidates less visible due to the issue of illiteracy, complexity and the 
length of a joint ballot paper‘ (OSCE 2002). Despite government efforts to limit the 
success of pro-Kurdish independent candidates the DTP launched a campaign to 
educate people in how to find the name of the candidate on the ballot paper in order to 
overcome this obstacle. Finally, after the elections on 22 July 2007, 21 pro-Kurdish 
candidates were elected and took their seats in the new Turkish Parliament. This is the 
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first time pro-Kurdish deputies have gained seats in parliament since they were ousted 
from parliament in 1994. Turkey‘s strong resistance to the acknowledgement of 
differences and its creation of obstacles for them in order to repress their voices gives 
rise to the question that perhaps only the presence of minority representatives in 
parliament can lead to effective political participation.   
 Kurds or members of other minority groups have been in the parliament since the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey, through denying their identity, there are no 
limitations to the political participation of those Kurds or members of other minority 
groups who decide to discard their own identity and enter the political arena as Turks. 
The highest ranks of Turkish politics, bureaucracy and military are open to Turkish 
citizens of minority descent, but on the condition of calling themselves a Turk. 
   The problem is not that Turkey refuses to accept Kurds as Turkish citizens. The 
problem is precisely its attempt to force Kurds to see themselves as Turks. There are 
today ethnic Kurds among the leading politicians in Turkey who have accepted this 
role. Turgut Ozal, the 8th President of Turkey, Erdal Inönü, the son of the second 
president of Turkey and deputy prime minister between 1991 and 1993 and Hikmet 
Cetin, the speaker of parliament between 1997 and 1999, were all of Kurdish descent. In 
1994 roughly sixty Turkish parliamentarians were of Kurdish origin. Furthermore, some 
ministers in the current parliament and most of the mentors of the Prime Minister are of 
Kurdish origin. However, they have never described themselves as Kurdish and have 
not attempted to defend the rights of Kurds, instead welcoming Turkish identity and 
serving the official policy.  Since pro-Kurdish candidates gained seats in parliament and 
formed a group under the pro-Kurdish party DTP, this situation has changed. The DTP 
group express themselves with their own identity and claim that they will seek peaceful 
solutions for the Kurdish issue through democratic means. The effect of refusing the 
Kurd‘s identity in politics has been continuing in different forms. There have been 
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efforts to reduce the number of DTP MPs in parliament and to counteract them. They 
have been ignored or threatened with judicial investigations in case of any remarks they 
make. For instance, Aysel Tuğluk and Ayla Akat, deputies of DTP, have been accused 
of "spreading propaganda for an illegal organization" and "aiding and abetting‖. Despite 
the fact that as MPs they have immunity, the Istanbul 9th Heavy Penal Court has 
decided to continue their trials instead of suspending their cases. 
   Another court continues to hear the case that has been brought against another DTP 
deputy, Sebahat Tuncel. These two Court decisions are based on interpretation of article 
14 of the Constitution which prohibits activities against the unity and indivisibility of 
the country, human rights and democracy. These decisions are unprecedented in 
Turkey‘s history and the laws have never interpreted in this way against other 
politicians. If the Courts decide to convict these three MPs, they will be deprived of 
their status as parliamentarians and ousted from parliament.  
   These examples illustrate how institutionalised discrimination against minorities has 
taken root in Turkey within its political, judicial and military institutions. The situation 
in Turkey explicitly proves that the acquisition of rights does not only involve voting in 
local, regional and national elections. The right to participation in political life is above 
and beyond voting rights or being elected. It also involves freedoms pertaining to, for 
instance, the practice of religious rituals that are not embraced by the majority of 
citizens; it involves the freedom to use one‘s native language in addition to the language 
used by the majority of citizens. In short, these are rights about being different. Rights 
pertaining to difference first and most importantly require the acknowledgement of 
difference. One important element of this acknowledgment is turning back the process 
of ―forgetting‖ that has long accompanied the formation of Turkish national identity and 
embracing all different religious, ethnic identities.  Equality in political participation is 
significant towards implementing equal citizenship for the Kurds in Turkey.  
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5.6 The legal and human rights status of Kurds in Turkey  
Two of the most important factors affecting the human rights standards in Turkey were 
‗[t]he European Union accession process and the resumption of the conflict between the 
Turkish military and the armed oppositionist Kurdistan Workers party after 1 June 
2004‘. (BBC 2004:2). The Centre of Social and Investigation of Rights (Tuhav) states 
‗[t]orture is conducted in Turkish prisons and 60 percent of torturees are Kurdish. A 
member of the centre Salim Oxlo states ‗70 to 80 thousand prisoners are in Turkey and 
they are ill-treated‘ (Sbeiy website 2008:1).  
   According to the observers within and outside the country, the pace of reform in the 
harmonisation process has long been slowed down despite the EU agreeing to open a 
new stage of membership talks with Turkey.  In March 2007, the EU states ‗[t]he 
European Union do not find that there has been significant progress in promoting the 
respect for fundamental rights in the country, especially with regards to the rights of 
minorities that includes the Kurdish population‘. (BBC 2007:2). The latest European 
Commission (2007) progress report on Turkish accession published on 06
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2007 states ‗[A]s regards fundamental rights, there has been limited progress in 
legislation and in practice. No major issue has been addressed and significant problems 
persist. Finally, the atmosphere in the country in particular as regards issues related to 
minorities and religion has not been conducive to the full respect of fundamental rights 
and might de facto restrict their exercise‘.     
   On the other hand, Turkey‘s domestic politics has become more polarised in 2007, 
first on the occasion of the presidential election and then more severely on the issue of 
Kurdish question and conflict between Turkey and the PKK. This polarization was also 
an element of the growing pressures over incursions into the Kurdistan region of Iraq, 
which was a move represented as an effective way to fight the PKK.  During this 
period, a nationalist sentiment, already very strong in the country, further bolstered and 
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exerted its influence on the public debate. Numerous attempts of lynching by ultra-
nationalist groups, followed by the targeting of intellectuals through the courts utilizing 
restrictive articles of the new supposedly-EU friendly penal code, paved the way for 
assaults on intellectuals and journalists. The assassination of Armenian-Turkish 
journalist Hrant Dink was an important landmark in the rise of this tension created by 
increasing ultra-nationalist sentiment. 
   Kurdish political parties, civil society organisations, and the Kurdish population itself 
was also one of the primary targets of ultra-nationalist attacks and suppression by the 
state in Turkey. The pressure against the pro-Kurdish DTP which is represented in the 
parliament comes along with criticism of the party by government members and 
military officials. In December, referring to the DTP, Military Chief of Staff Yasser 
Buyukanit, told press that ‗[t]he PKK has entered the National Assembly and became a 
political organization‘ (NTV 2007).  The Daily Radikal (2008) states  
The offices of the pro-Kurdish, Democratic Society Party (DTP), successor to 
the consecutively banned People‘s Labour Party (HEP), Democracy Party 
(DP), People‘s Democracy Party (HADEP) and Democratic People‘s Party 
(DEHAP) were attacked by mobs in several cities, including Istanbul, İzmir, 
Balıkesir, Eskişehir, Manisa, Osmaniye, Elazığ. Some of the attacks against the 
offices of the DTP which currently has 20 of its members in parliament, are 
carried out by armed persons, and fires were shot against the DTP headquarter 
in Ankara, offices in Istanbul among attacks in other places. What is more 
important than the attacks is the State‘s failure to prosecute the perpetrators of 
the attacks, including those who used firearms in their attack. In many cases, 
the perpetrators who are captured are released without further prosecution or 




DTP is not the only pro-Kurdish party that there have been legal moves to ban, ‗[c]hief 
Public Prosecutor of Ankara brought legal action against 13 members of the executive 
committee of HAK-PAR (Rights and Freedoms Party) on a charge of sending General 
Assembly Meeting invitations written in Kurdish and speaking at the meeting in 
Kurdish under Articles 81/C and 117 of the Law on Political Parties‘ (Daily Radikal 
2005). Concerns regarding the independence and the impartiality of the judiciary were 
also raised by outside observers. The case that is known as the Shemdinli case is a 
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primary example of the independence of judiciary with regards to the issue of when law 
enforcement officials participated in human rights violations. The influence of the 
military, on domestic and foreign policy issues and consequently on the judiciary is 
also observed by the European Commission in its latest Progress Report on Turkey‘s 
EU accession process. The source states:  
The armed forces continued to exercise significant political influence. Senior 
members of the armed forces have stepped up their public comments on 
domestic and foreign policy questions including Cyprus, secularism and 
Kurdish issues. On a number of occasions, the General Staff reacted publicly to 
government statements or decisions. The General Staff directly interfered with 
the April 2007 presidential election by publishing a memorandum on its 
website expressing concern at the alleged weakening of secularism in the 




Human rights groups often refer to the resumption of the armed conflict between the 
Turkish military and the PKK in the mainly Kurdish-populated eastern and south-
eastern provinces of Turkey as an important factor causing human rights to deteriorate 
for Kurdish people living in these regions.  As the level of armed conflict increased in 
Turkey, local and international human rights organizations claimed to observe more 
instances of killings of civilians by security forces, which often demonstrated a 
disproportionate use of force and in some cases amounted to extrajudicial executions. 
There are many other incidents of killings due to apparent disproportionate use of force 
that took place in the last couple of years, especially in the eastern and south eastern 
Anatolia, that has a Kurdish majority. There are instances of summary killings that took 
place in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Reporters Without Borders, in its 2006 report, 
believes that Kurdish journalists are held arbitrarily: 
The country‘s Kurdish and Armenian minorities remain under great pressure. 
Editor Hrant Dink, of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian weekly Agos, was given 
a six-month suspended prison sentence for ―insulting Turkishness‖ (article 301-
1 of the criminal code). Five journalists from pro-Kurdish media outlets were 
arrested in 2005 and four of them arbitrarily held for questioning in Gülec 
(eastern Anatolia), where they had gone to report on the release of a Turkish 





A substantial number of detainees are not charged. Those who are charged are likely to 
be charged with support of PKK. It seems to be common practice for such people to 
have been tortured sufficiently severely that they have signed a confession to 
membership of the PKK in order to avoid further mistreatment. By supporting PKK one 
declares oneself to be Kurdish, or supportive of recognition of Kurdish identity and 
rights. At the most basic level, therefore, PKK supporters are consequently more at risk 
of torture than those who do not claim to be Kurds. The Turkish Constitution does not 
allow any Kurdish parties to be established. Even mentioning the word ―Kurd‖ is a 
good reason for a party to be banned by the Turkish authorities.  
   The official state ideology of the state of Turkey is anyone lives within the borders of 
the Turkish Republic should consider him/herself as Turkish. The mention of anything 
in the name or a programme of any organisations that contradicts this ideology is 
regarded as separatist. For this specific reason Turkey has became the graveyard of pro-
Kurdish political groups.  It has closed down the HEP, DEP, OZDEP, DKO, DBP, 
HADEP and DEHAP. The gap between Kurds and Turks in Turkey is expanding and 
reaching a critical point. It is coming to a point that radical Turkish organisations 
started ―taking revenge‖ on Kurds. The revival of the Kurdish issue is claimed to bring 
back the military control in Turkey. According to the Turkish Daily News on 22 
October 2006: 
The military has resumed its former leading role in Ankara‘s decision-making 
process. This is due to the pressure from the PKK and the EU over Cyprus 
dispute. With Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt in office as chief of the Turkish general 
staff for less than two months, the military has resumed its former leading role 
in Ankara's decision-making process on key security and foreign policy 
matters. The Turkish military‘s traditionally dominant role on a number of key 
foreign policy matters had diminished during the four years under Gen. Hilmi 
Özkök, Büyükanıt's predecessor, as part of a political reform program aimed at 
harmonization with European Union standards. In recent weeks Büyükanıt has 




It is shown that the Kurds are being discriminated against by the legal and political 
structures of Turkey. Equal citizenship for the Kurds and other minorities is being 
blocked by the legal and judicial system of Turkey.  The Kurds in general can be 
persecuted by the Turkish authorities for a number of reasons, which may be related to 
their ethnicity, political beliefs and promoting their cultural rights and Kurdish 
language. Kurds in Turkey are being discriminated against and the Kurdish regions are 
economically kept backward. The Kurds lack the right to establish political parties and 
organisations in Turkey. Without intermediate organisations and groups, democracy is 
restricted to the relatively small circle of professional politics, leaving the population 
few opportunities for political participation. Such independent organisations and groups 
provide people with the opportunities to be active in society and political life, to become 
citizens, and to engage actively in public life.  
5.7 The impact of Kurdish entity in Iraq on the status of the Kurds in Turkey  
Current developments on the issue have widened the gap between Kurdish and Turkish 
ethnicity in Turkey and even in Europe. The recent development of Iraq where Kurds 
have established an autonomous region should be taken into account. The Iraqi Kurds 
have forced a federal solution on the Iraqi state and ignored continuous pressure by 
Turkey to eliminate the PKK who are stationed in Qandil Mount on the Iraqi Kurdistan 
soil. Turks also accuse Kurds of influencing the EU, which in turn pressurises Turkey 
to reform and accelerate reforms. A Kurdish political entity is established in Iraqi 
Kurdistan (northern Iraq), which is not de facto anymore. It is recognised in the Iraqi 
constitution which is voted upon by the Iraqi people with all its diverse social 
structures. On the international level Kurds have achieved a great deal. The president of 
Iraq, the foreign minister, and the deputy Prime Minister of Iraq are all Kurds. Turkey 
makes a considerable noise about this Kurdish political entity, but it cannot destroy it as 
it is recognised by the Iraqi state and Iraq is a sovereign state. Although this Kurdish 
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political entity is not in Turkey, it has a great impact on legitimising the Kurdish issue, 
when Turkey up until recently refused to recognise that it has Kurds let alone a Kurdish 
issue. A great number of Kurds and Kurdish intellectuals are now pursuing a ―great 
Kurdistan‖, which, as they claim, is their divided homeland between Iraq, Iran Syria 
and Turkey, and they dream of uniting it as one country. Maps of this country are all 
over Internet, and the proposed country contains part of what is now Turkey. 
   Turkey regards itself as part of the problem or the solution of Iraq. Land Forces 
Commander Ilker Basbug (The New Anatolian 2007:3) states ‗[t]he U.S. must 
understand that a solution reached without Turkey's support in Iraq will not be a lasting 
one‘. These developments impact on the situation of Kurds in Turkey and the Kurdish-
Turkish relationship. As the result Turkey has increased pressure on its own Kurds. 
Turkey is doing its best to undermine the Kurdistan Regional Government that has 
established in Iraq. For example, on 27 April 2006, rferl.org states: 
Iraq‘s Kurdish leaders have been critical of Turkish behaviour in recent 
months, and have raised speculation that Turkey aims to destabilize Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Relations between Ankara and Kurdistan had been tense since the 
overthrow of the Hussein regime, particularly because of Turkish support for 
Iraq‘s Turkmen population and its claims over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.  
 
Turkey believes that the area which is run by the autonomous administration of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government seems to be regarded as a main threat to Turkish unity. 
Basbug (The New Anatolian 2007:4) states ‗[i]t is a fact that the developments in north 
of Iraq has given political, legal, military and psychological strength to the Kurds living 
in the region as they have never had or experienced before in the past. We must be 
careful about the developments in north of Iraq as these may give some of our citizens a 
feeling of belonging to this region‘. This new development did not help the Kurds in 
Turkey. The pressure on Kurds in Turkey is increased and this thesis argues the Turkish 
socio-political system needs radical reform not a cosmetic one, treating Kurds as 
second class citizens inside Turkey and denying Kurds of Iraq is flawed policy. Kurds 
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in Turkey today have more awareness of their rights and, in return they experience 
discrimination and persecution. 
   The officials in Turkey have consistently argued that the minorities‘ policy of the 
Turkish government is strictly based on the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. 
Religious minorities therefore do exist in Turkey, but there are no ethnic or national 
minorities. The paramount concern of the Turkish authorities is to protect the integrity 
and indivisibility of the state and ‗nation‘. It appears that there is a prevalent feeling 
among official circles in Turkey that the granting of certain rights to an acknowledged 
ethnic or national minority would inevitably lead to further demands, including 
ultimately calls for secession in the name of self-determination. Turkish officials fear 
that the granting of certain rights to one ethnic group such as the Kurds could reawaken 
the consciousness of other ethnic groups such as the Laz and the Circassians. These 
fears would seem to account for the inclusion of certain key phrases in important 
Turkish laws. Article 3 of the Turkish constitution notes that the Turkish state, its 
territory and nation is an indivisible entity whose language is Turkish. Article 14 
prohibits activities which ‗violate the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory 
and nation‘. With reference to political parties, Article 68 declares that their states and 
programmes should ‗not be in conflict with the indivisible integrity of the state with its 
territory and nation…‘ Political party based solely on Kurdish ethnicity could thus be 
banned. Article 125 of the Turkish Penal Code states ‗any person who carries out any 
action intended to destroy the unity of the Turkish state or to separate any part of the 
territory from the control of the Turkish state shall be punished by death‘. And Article 8 
of the Anti-terror Law of April 1991 forbids propaganda, whether written or verbal, and 
all meetings, demonstrations or ‗other acts‘ which adversely affects the indivisible 
integrity of the territory and the nation of the Turkish Republic.   
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5.8 Democratic transformation in Bulgaria and its effects on the right to political 
participation: The example of the Turkish minority  
The Turks are the minority in Bulgaria; the ethnic minorities in Turkey including the 
Kurds are being discriminated by the majority Turks. In Bulgaria, the case is different. 
The process of compare and contrast between these two countries would be beneficial to 
improve the legal status of the Kurds in Turkey. The successful experiment of the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria would assist the policy and law makers in Turkey to 
improve the poor legal status of the Kurds. Bulgaria and Turkey have similar state 
formations in their constitutions which are based on the principle of a unitary state and 
homogenous nation. Unlike Turkey, Bulgaria recognises people whose mother tongue is 
different and gives them constitutional rights to protect and maintain their cultural, 
linguistic and religious practices. Despite the fact there is no explicit reference to 
minority groups in its Constitution; Bulgaria provides de facto recognition and 
protection to its minorities and a Turkish minority is one of Bulgaria‘s minorities. This 
protection is also secured by international law. Both countries (Turkey and Bulgaria) 
have followed assimilation policies towards their minorities, but this policy has been 
more systematic and long-term in Turkey. 
   Since 1989, Bulgaria has succeeded in maintaining peaceful ethnic relations and has 
witnessed a democratic transformation within its territory. Providing opportunities to 
the Turkish minority to be represented in parliament is one of the most important factors 
in this process of democratic transformation in Bulgaria. The Turkish Party Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in Bulgaria has taken advantage of this opportunity to 
improve ethnic relations and reduce tension among multi-ethnic populations in addition 
to ensuring the rights of the Turkish ethnic group, which has also affected other 
minorities. Turkey can follow Bulgaria‘s experiment in dealing with its Kurdish 
minority instead of continuing the policy of monoculturism and division of distinct 
ethnicity in Turkey. The EU membership negotiations and the adoption of European 
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norms have had a significant influence on changing this recognition process. It is worth 
noting that Bulgaria had started the policy of recognition before the EU membership 
process. In other words, their transition from communist rule to democracy was initiated 
of their own volition rather than with external pressure. It can be said that the EU 
process has accelerated this evaluation of democracy in Bulgaria. Moreover, 
democratization has also taken place within the institutions of the State, with the 
Constitutional Court of Bulgaria playing a particularly significant role as an initiator in 
establishing this culture with its decision on the legality of the MRF. Unlike Bulgaria, 
the democratization process in Turkey started with the desire to join the EU. The 
realisation of democratic transformation has never been initiated by domestic dynamics 
as in Bulgaria. 
   The democratisation process and the emergence of a political system on the pluralist 
model in Bulgaria began in the early 1990s after the collapse of the totalitarian 
communist system. At the beginning of this new process, political pluralism was 
restored as well as basic rights and freedoms resulting in the revival of civil society. 
Adoption of a new constitution was an important element for the establishment of 
democracy. The Constitution of 1991 laid the foundations of a parliamentary and rule-
of-law-based state, asserted the division of power and established a parliamentary form 
of government. A proportional electoral system was adopted with a 4-per cent threshold 
for parliamentary representation. Bulgaria is also a party to most international treaties 
related to minority rights, including the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities. Minority rights are given protection through international law in 
the Constitution. 
   The democratic transformation in Bulgaria has had a considerable effect on the right 
of effective participation for minorities in the country. In particular, the Turks of 
Bulgaria have been playing a significant role in the Bulgarian political structure since 
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the new era started after 1989. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms Party (Hak ve 
Özgürlükler Hareketi Partisi) (MRF) was established by Turks in 1990 and defends the 
interests of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Since the Constitution, the Law on 
Political Parties and the Election Law passed in 1990 had provisions banning the 
establishment of political parties on ethnic and religious grounds, the MRF was 
registered as an organisation for ‗rights‘. Since the 1990 Electoral Law allowed 
organisations and movements which were not political parties to participate in elections, 
the MRF entered parliament with 23 seats in the 1990 elections and 24 after the 1991 
elections (Vihrg 2009:5)  
   The process of inclusion of the Turkish minority in the political sphere was not easy. 
There were several attempts by nationalists to exclude the MRF from the elections and 
to prevent them taking seats in the parliament. The arguments used by the nationalists or 
other opponents were mainly based on Article 11(4) of the constitution, which bans the 
formation of political parties on ethnic and religious grounds. The opponents argued 
that the MRF was founded on ethnic and religious grounds, used the Turkish language 
and favoured a policy of ethnic assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims to the Turkish 
minority, thus promoting ethnic and religious confrontation within the population. They 
therefore requested that the Constitutional Court declare the MRF unconstitutional and 
its deputies in parliament illegitimate. The Constitutional Court rejected these claims on 
22 April 1992, in a historic decision for the parliamentary representation of minorities 
in Bulgaria. Since this decision, the MRF has continued to be one of the major 
components of the political structure in Bulgaria. In the 2005 elections, the MRF was 
the third party, with 13% of total votes, and acquired 34 seats in parliament, taking an 
important role in the government with four ministries (Vihrg 2009:5).  
   Despite the successful inclusion of Turks in its political life, Bulgaria has failed to 
provide equal opportunities for other minority groups. For instance, Bulgaria is still 
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refusing to register OMO Ilinden PIRIN (the Macedonian party) as a political party, 
thus preventing the party from participating in elections and gaining seats in parliament. 
Moreover, the 4-per cent threshold in the Election Law prevents the representation of 
small minority groups in parliament. The MRF is a very good example to demonstrate 
the mutual interaction between recognition and political participation. It is also 
important to see the consequences of this mutual interaction. As explained above, after a 
painful assimilation policy, the Turks of Bulgaria were finally recognised as having a 
distinct identity and this has led them to play a crucial role in decision-making as well 
as to enjoy their rights extensively. The MRF has also played an important role in 
achieving the recognition of a Turkish entity in Bulgarian politics. The MRF case also 
shows how the effective inclusion of minority groups in political life can help them to 
integrate with the society in which they live. This reduces tension and creates peaceful 
ethnic relations in a multi-ethnic society. The Turks of Bulgaria are very well integrated 
in the political, social and economic life of Bulgaria and they never consider any form 
of separation from their country. The representation of the Turkish minority is one of 
the most significant factors in Bulgaria‘s success in maintaining peaceful ethnic 
relations and this has provided the Bulgarian Turks with a chance to participate in 
decision making, and facilitated confidence building between ethnic Turks and ethnic 
Bulgarians in that the former have never called for territorial autonomy. Moreover, as a 
result of full integration and representation in political life, the MRF plays the role of 
political and social stabiliser through the influence it exercises over the Turkish 
minority and also minorities that have not been able to produce viable political 
organisations and gain representation, such as the Gypsies. 
   The decision of the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria declaring that the MRF was a 
legitimate party was of vital importance in establishing constitutional democracy in 
Bulgaria. Unlike the Constitutional Court and other judicial mechanisms in Turkey, as 
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will be examined below, the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria used its judicial 
independence and broad vision in favour of the creation of democratic culture rather 
than in support of official or majority opinion. Venelin Ganev explains the importance 
of the Court‘s approach and its impact on institutionalising democracy in post-
communist Bulgaria:  
The Court explored the implications of the fact that the future does not begin 
today and that future-oriented visions must therefore incorporate the tangible 
historical lessons still troubling collective memory. It was the Court that 
showed how ethno politics may be structured, not on the basis of simple 
interpretations of majority will, but in accordance with ‗justificational 
considerations‘: the constitutionality of states of affairs was assessed, not 
through an analysis of nationalist ‗original intent‘, but in light of their 
compatibility with the general principles undergirding the constitutional text of 
an aspiring liberal democracy. And it was the court that made clear to other 
political actors that contentious democratic politics may be a rule structured 
process unfolding in an accessible public sphere. In short, the institutionalised 
dynamic of judicial review, and not someone‘s ‗good will‘ ensured the 
constitutional affirmation of the momentous entry of ethnic minorities on the 
political scene in post communist Bulgaria. (Ganev 2004:77) 
 
The accession process of Bulgaria to the European Union also played a major role in the 
democratic consolidation of Bulgaria. EU membership was recognised as a national 
goal by all political parties and society and this aim triggered the democratic 
transformation. Bulgaria succeeded in achieving the Copenhagen criteria and became a 
member of the EU on 1 January 2007 (Vihrg 2009:5).  
   In this process Turkey might start to take Bulgaria as a role model and implement the 
same measures it wanted Bulgaria to grant to Turkish minorities. Claiming minority 
rights for Turks but depriving its own minorities of the same rights demonstrates starkly 
the paradoxical and ironic situation of Turkey. It is also ironic because minorities or 
indigenous people who do not have a homeland have always been left the mercy of the 
state they live in, to recognise or grant their rights. Article 8 of the Anti-terror Law will 
have to be replaced rather than merely revised before genuine freedom of expression 
can exist in Turkey.    
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The democratic experiment involving the Turkish minority in Bulgaria shows how the 
status of the Turkish minority was improved. This could be an ideal and practical 
inspiration and model the four countries studied here, especially Turkey, could follow in 
guaranteeing equal citizenship for their minorities, including the Kurds.  
5.9 Neo-Ottoman policy of the AKP  
Recep Tayyip Erdogan‘s Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, or Justice and 
Development Party), a party with roots in Islamic politics, swept to power in Turkey, a 
state renowned as secular by virtue of its founder, Kemal Ataturk, and his 
institutionalized Kemalist ideology. This great AKP victory was then solidified over 
determined military and Kemalist opposition in an even greater electoral victory in July 
2007. The AKP‘s Middle Eastern policies are focused on two factors, the Kurdish 
problem and Neo-Ottomanism. Michael Gunter (2009:4) argues: 
In the Kemalist vision the Kurds are an existential threat to the Turkish 
existence. This is in contrast with Neo-ottomanism that does not have a 
problem with Kurdish identity and is focused on economic growth and 
comfortable with Islamic/multiple identities without seeking imperialism. 
Since military means by Kemalism to repress Kurds, will not solve the problem 
by itself.  
 
Hakan Yavuz (2009:262) notes ‗a slow institutional and behavioural Islamisation 
process has been going on in Turkey since the mid-1980s and the AKP is an outcome 
of the transformation of liberal Islam, directed by four socio-political factors: the new 
Anatolian bourgeoisie, the expansion of the public sphere and the new Muslim 
intellectuals, the [EU‘s] Copenhagen criteria, and the February 28 soft coup‘. Yavuz 
imputes major importance to the unintended results of the military‘s silent coup of 
February 28, 1997 against Erbakan‘s Islamic-led coalition. The February 28 process 
fragmented Erbakan‘s Islamic movement into two competing groups, one of which 
emerged as today‘s moderate AKP. One of the chapter‘s of Yavuz‘s book (2009:280) 
deals with the Kurdish issue ‗[t]he most difficult challenge the country is facing today‘. 
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Yavuz offers another major insight by detailing the ‗Islamisation of the Kurdish 
question‘ and how this has complicated it, a situation hitherto little appreciated, at least 
among most Western observers. Given his Islamic mindset, however, ‗Erdogan does 
not grasp the origins and demands of the Kurdish problem because he has little sense of 
ethnic or civic nationalism. His dominant identity is Muslim and he thinks that Islamic 
identity will magically solve the Kurdish problem‘. (Yavuz 2009:190). Yavuz‘s analyse 
of the AKP policy towards the Kurds is not critical enough, because Yavuz‘s proposal 
for the Kurdish issue is going back the Ottoman empire model of dealing with the 
ethnic and religious minorities. Adapting the Ottoman empire approach to deal with the 
Kurdish issue is flawed and to end the poor legal status of the Kurds in Turkey, 
recognition of the Kurdish identity as a separate one and guarantying equal citizenship 
for the Kurds rather than Islamisation of the issue. The AKP government has failed to 
develop any coherent policy, the government‘s only solution has been to sweep the 
issue under the rug of complacency.  
   There have been persistent Turkish efforts to criminalise members of the pro-Kurdish 
party, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), and ongoing proceedings against it with the 
aim of banning it. It has recently threatened a 10 years prison term for the Kurdish 
politician and Sakharov prize winner Leyla Zana. Other relevant factors include, 
Turkey‘s continuing failure to meet the EU's Copenhagen accession criteria that serve 
to ensure ‗[s]tability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities‘ (Europe 2007); the refusal to 
respond to the ―peace process‖ and unilateral ceasefire of the PKK; continuing military 
operations into northern Iraq; the continuing pursuit of Turkey‘s dam 'development 
policy' that threatens to forcibly displace tens of thousands of Kurds; and Turkey‘s 
failure to meet her obligations under international customary law and her bilateral 
agreements with Iraq. There is an urgent need to address key concerns regarding the 
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Kurdish population of Turkey. Ending the gross violations of the democratic, linguistic 
and cultural rights of Kurds and other minorities would be a step in the right direction, 
both for the victims of Turkey‘s discriminatory policies, as well as Turkey‘s ambitions 
as a member of the European community. Turkey has signed many international treaties 
and made commitments to the entire world. But, Turkey does not fulfil its 
commitments.  
   The recent arrest of the DTP members following 29 March 2009 election shows that 
the AKP and the Turkish state policy has not changed. In a statement Fayik Yagizay, 
DTP representative in Europe (Yagizay 2009) states ‗Police started a large scaled 
operation against our party DTP in 13 provinces on 14th of April 2009. More than 300 
members, executives and activists including three vice presidents of our party were 
detained. A TV station and the centre of The Union of South-East Municipalities were 
also targeted by the police. The operation is still going on, and we do not know when it 
will stop‘. The current Turkish authority‘s responses to the peaceful approach of the 
DTP are non-democratic and oppose fundamental rights of political participation of the 
Kurds. The twenty-first century problems require recognition of the Kurdish identity 
and guaranteeing equal citizenship according to the international law rather than the 
AKP‘s approach which seems to be to revive the Ottoman Empire. On 12 September 
2010, Turks voted yes on a set of constitutional amendments proposed by the ruling 
Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power for eight years. Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, the prime minister, portraying the referendum as an opportunity to 
reject the military regime's legacy. Nevertheless, the constitutional amendments 
proposed by the ruling party did not touch the equal citizenship issue or improving 
legal status of the Kurds. Despite that the AKP‘s policy towards the Kurds is more open 
compare to the previous regimes of Turkey; nevertheless, the AKP has not been willing 
to solve the poor legal status of the Kurds in its constitutional amendments proposals. 
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This thesis argues that the roots of the poor legal status of the Kurds in Turkey are: 
discriminatory articles in the constitution and penal codes of the country, without 
making amendments of these articles, the discriminations and ill-treatment towards the 
Kurds continue.  
5.10 Concluding Remarks  
In Turkey, due to the positive effects of the EU accession process the existence of 
different groups has been accepted, but there is still resistance to recognising them as 
minorities either formally or de facto. It is difficult to describe Turkey‘s democratic 
transition as successful so far. It is a reality that Turkey has made significant changes in 
terms of democracy, human rights and minority rights during the EU negotiation 
process. Turkey is still reluctant to take the same steps in recognising the Kurds and 
providing them with the opportunity to be represented in parliament with their identity. 
Kurds or other members of minority groups do not face any discrimination as long as 
they happily accept Turkish identity and they can be businessmen, governors or even 
the president of the country with a Turkish identity. Both the legislation and political, 
judicial and other institutional practices of Turkey conform to this reality.  
   As explained above the pro-Kurdish party DTP managed to enter parliament on 22 
July 2007, despite all the legal and practical obstacles placed in its path. The 
government and other institutions have not changed their traditional approach and have 
started to prevent their voices being heard by ignoring them or by threatening them with 
criminal investigations.  
   The judicial mechanisms in Turkey have been acting as a follower of official policy, 
instead of having a significant role in transforming the country towards an actual 
consolidated democracy. The presence of the DTP in parliament would help this process 
if they are allowed to be heard. Turkey is a country that is still paying the economic, 
social and political price for the not delivering equal citizenship for the Kurds which has 
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resulted in a long-term and continuing domestic conflict. If Turkey really wants to be a 
peaceful, democratic and prosperous country, it should not miss the opportunity that the 
presence of the largest minority group‘s representatives (DTP) in parliament offers, and 
start to talk to them and listen to them.   
 In order to improve the efficiency of political participation, after recognition of its 
minorities, Turkey should grant their rights under domestic law. Within domestic law 
the 10 percent threshold for parliamentary representation should be lifted or lowered. 
Abolishing restrictions on the use of minority languages in election campaigns and 
political activities is necessary. Article 81 of the Political Parties Law which states ―the 
prevention of the creation of minorities‖ needs to be abolished. Article 8 of the Anti-
terror Law will have to be replaced rather than merely revised before genuine freedom 
of expression can exist in Turkey.    
   Improving the legal status of the Kurds in Turkey will require not only further 
changes in legislation, but a change in the ideology and mentality at all levels of 
Turkish society. From a state seeing the expression of Kurdish culture and language as a 
threat to its own existence, Turkey needs to become a state that recognises differences 
and sees cultural diversity and freedom as positive and necessary elements of a true 
democracy. The Kurdish issue should not be treated as a state security concern, but 
rather than as a matter of indigenous people whose rights and existence is denied. The 
―Village Guards‖ System is very common in Tur Abdin region. Even though the Village 
Guards are administered by the state, however they constantly harass and threaten the 
Kurds and they occupy their houses and lands by force.  
   The current constitution needs to be changed to solve the Kurdish issue. Without a fair 
constitution there is not a way for a peaceful solution. But only if there is the broadest 
understanding of equal citizenship in this constitution and removal of all the 
prohibitions Kurds currently face. There is also a need for a constitution that prohibits 
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all anti-democratic acts. ‗[i]n Greece military coups are a crime. All officers have to 
disobey superiors; in a case they order a military coup‘ (EUTCC 2009).  This Greek 
solution to military coups will solve the threat of a military take over in Turkey. It is 
worth mentioning, recent positive developments towards the Kurdish cause in Turkey 
which can be summarised as: The Ergenekon case, the apology to Armenians, TRT 6 
TV, Turkey is giving back the former Kurdish names of places and the most recent 
amendments of the constitution which aims to undermine the authority of the military. 
Turkey as a State has historically been reluctant to embrace its Kurdish population. 
However a recent report from Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty on 12 August 2009 
shows a progression: 
The government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has 
launched what it calls a comprehensive approach to ending Turkey's "Kurdish 
problem." The proposal is believed to include greater cultural rights for Kurds, 
some form of local autonomy, and incentives to PKK fighters to lay down 
arms. 
 
The 2007 European Commission progress report on Turkish accession finds ‗[n]o major 
issue has been addressed and significant problems persist‘ (EUTCC 2009), and joined 
with the Commission in urging Turkey to confront these problems; the 2008 European 
Commission progress report on Turkish accession takes a note of ‗[t]he process 
underway to prepare a new, civilian constitution; regards it as a key opportunity to place 
the protection of human rights and freedoms at the core of the constitution; reiterates 
that a system of checks and balances needs to be established, guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, social cohesion and the separation between religion and state; underlines 
the need for a broad involvement of civil society in this process…‘ (EUTCC 2009). The 
report also expresses concern about ‗[t]he hostility shown to minorities and about 
politically and religiously motivated violence; calls on the Turkish Government to make 
sustained efforts to create an environment conducive to full respect of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms‘ (EUTCC 2009). 
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Articles of the criminal code prosecute writers, journalists, intellectuals, lawyers and 
many other defenders of free speech, including articles 215 (praising an offence and 
offender), 216 (incitement to hatred), 217 (provocation to disobey the law), 220, Para. 8 
(making propaganda for a criminal organization), 288 (attempt to influence a fair trial) 
and 301 (insulting the Turkish nation, the State of the Republic of Turkey, Institutions 
and Bodies of the State) of the Turkish Penal Code; without removing restrictions on 
freedom of expression from their legal framework entirely, guaranteeing equal 
citizenship would not be achieved and subsequently the suffering of the Kurdish will 
continue. The EU pressure and Copenhagen criteria have led to few reforms in Turkey, 
Yavuz (2009:270) states  ‗[s]ince 1999, Turkish parliament has enacted seven major 
reform packages and a number of harmonization laws to fulfil the Copenhagen political 
criteria for EU membership‘. Hence, the continuation of the EU pressure should 
improve the legal status of the Kurds of Turkey. Amendments have been made to the 
constitution of Turkey in 1982 1995, twice in 1999, 2002, 2004 and 2010. No 
amendments have been made relevant to the legal status of the Kurds to date in neither 
the constitution nor the penal code of Turkey.  
   Turkey has faced the great problems and challenges in the 1980s and 1990s. These 
problems have occurred as previously excluded peripheral identities began to question 
the fabricated and imposed monolithic citizenship identity which was the product of the 
early Republican project of social engineering.  
   To sum up, the conventional framework of citizenship today can neither accommodate 
the past 75 years of socio-political change nor articulate the new model of pluralism. 
There have been difficulties in coping with the diversity of already established policies 
and the practice and outlook with regard to citizenship issues in various nation-states, 
the concept of constitutional citizenship seems to be a practical solution. Constitutional 
citizenship can be defined as a ‗[f]ormal legal status of the membership of a state, and if 
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this definition implies loyalty to state rather than nation‘ (İçduygu 1999: 182).  It will be 
possible, if not easy, to see that in a country like Turkey where identity-based conflicts 
endanger the sense of unity, that citizenship rights based on constitutional arrangements 
are important.  
   It is concluded that the past policies of coping with the Kurdish reality in Turkey are 
ultimately unsustainable, and that it may be difficult, if not impossible, to return to the 
climate of earlier years, when discussions of ethnic difference were suppressed, limited 




6 Chapter six: Assimilation of the Kurds in Iran 
 
This chapter examines the current legal status of the Kurds in Iran. It will be argued that 
ill-treatment of the Kurds and minorities by the Iranian authorities shows Iran does not 
handle its citizens equally. Examining equal citizenship (equal access to political, 
educational, social and economic institutions of the country) for the Iranian Kurds is the 
major focus of this chapter. This chapter raises three inter-related issues; the dominance 
of the Shia sect in political and judicial systems of Iran, the consequences of the 
Persian-Shia concept on the Kurds and the constitutional attempts in Iran to assimilate 
the Kurds into the framework of the Iranian nation. Articles of the Iranian constitution, 
legal structure of the country and the policies of the government will be addressed.  
   The challenge of equality in Iran is plainly illustrate in the experiences of religious 
minorities such as Baha‘is and ethnic minorities such as the Kurds. These groups face 
routine discrimination and persecution based on their identity. This chapter looks at the 
religious, legal and social obstacles faced by the Iranian Kurds. It evaluates the Iranian 
government‘s compliance with its own constitution and looks at how Iran‘s treatment of 
the Kurdish minority measures up to the international agreements it has signed. Iran‘s 
constitution declares ‗The abolition of all forms of unjust discrimination and the 
provision of equitable opportunities for all‘ (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
1989). The law is not applied equally.  This chapter   investigates how the Iranian Kurds 
face discrimination and intensifying persecution in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
addresses their legal status. Other studies have looked only at women or at the treatment 
of religious or ethnic minorities or have analysed the status of Kurdish nationalism in 
Iran. This chapter emphasises the need for equal citizenship for the Kurds in the current 
policies of the Iranian authorities and for their legal status to be improved.  
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The Kurds deserve attention because they face chronic persecution and discrimination 
by the current legal system in Iran. By investigating the status of the Kurds and their 
experiences, this chapter identifies systemic obstacles to equality that affect other 
groups and minorities in Iran. The sources of persecution relate to the people, 
institutions, and ideas that have governed Iran before and since the revolution. Iran‘s 
1979 constitution set up a highly centralised government. Cameron and Danesh 
(2008:14) state ‗[W]hile there is technically a separation of the legislature, judiciary and 
executive, the system is dominated by the figure of the Supreme Leader. Iran‘s 
government is defined by the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, or rule by the supreme jurist 
(a highly trained cleric)‘.  Mavani (2001:34) also argues ‗[t]his doctrine, developed by 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and is based on the relatively flexible structure of 
religious leadership in Twelve Jafari Shiasm‘. It has been a long practice among Twelve 
Shia Muslims for every believer to choose a high-ranking cleric – called a marja-e 
taqlid, or ‗source of emulation‘ and follows his teachings and judgments.  
   There are a limited number of marjas to follow, and when one passes away another is 
gradually recognised as occupying its place. From time to time, the marjas will 
recognise one of their own as a ‗source of emulation‘ and his sayings and writings. 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the father of the Islamic Republic, incorporated the principle of 
universal leadership on religious matters into a structure of government for a modern 
state. Velayat-e Faqih gives the office of the Supreme Leader extensive powers over all 
arms of government. The Supreme Leader appoints six members of the Guardian 
Council, four of whom may veto any legislation passed by the parliament (called the 
majlis). Because this arrangement led to legislative impasses, Khomeini created a new 
Expediency Council – whose members he appointed – which would resolve all disputes 
between the Guardian Council and the majlis. This Council is the highest legislative 
authority in Iran and it is ‗[o]ne of the most powerful centres of decision making‘. 
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(Cameron and Danesh 2008:14). By securing central control over the state, the doctrine 
of Velayat-e Faqih ensures the continued domination of the government and legislature 
by a small cadre of typically hard-line clerics led by the Supreme Leader. Kurds often 
face discrimination because the lack of clarity in policy allows widely held prejudices to 
be translated into state-sponsored actions with the tacit approval of senior members of 
government. The legal status of Kurds in Iran is in serious need of reform. Regarding 
the state of Iran, a source states:  
Iran‘s remarkable history shows that it is a country unafraid of progressive 
change. It is the birthplace of arguably the oldest and newest monotheistic 
world religions: Zoroastrianism (ca. 1000 BCE)‘ and the Baha‘i Faith (1844 
CE). Cyrus the Great, the Persian emperor from 559-529 BCE, is widely 
credited with producing the first known human rights charter and defending the 
rights of minorities. Between 1905 and 1911, Iran underwent a constitutional 
revolution that produced the first parliament in the Middle East. (Lincoln 
1991:71). 
 
The above quote shows that Iran in the past proved to be a country of modern 
institutions and defending the rights of minorities. The following sections address that 
the ethnic and religious minorities of Iran who currently suffer a discriminatory system 
where there is not equal citizenship for all Iranian citizens, particularly the Kurds.  
 
6.1 Policy framework in Iran 
In order to understand the policy framework of Iran, it is necessary to highlight the 
constitution of the country. Principle 26, of the  Iranian constitution (1989) asserts ‗The 
formation of parties, groups, and political and professional associations…is free, 
provided they do not harm the principles of freedom, sovereignty, national unity, 
Islamic standards and the foundation of Islamic republic‘. Just as importantly, the 
constitution created new supervisory bodies, like the twelve-men Council of Guardians 
that was charged with ensuring that all legislation was in conformity with-Islamic 
decrees (Principle 96 ). Other than the ruling religious group, namely Jaafari (Twelve) 
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Shiaism, religious and ethnic groups are under pressure from the authorities and have 
poor legal status.  
   The Iranian constitution is very clear about the recognised religions in Iran and there 
is no room for non believers or conversion. Article 13 of the constitution of Islamic 
republic of Iran (1989) stipulates ‗Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the 
only recognised religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to 
perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in 
matters of personal affairs and religious education‘. Information on faiths, other than 
that of the Shia faith, is very restricted by the Iranian authorities. A substantial number 
of institutions study Quran Sciences (Uloom-ul-Quran), deems and deeds of the Prophet 
(Hadith), Islamic Jurisprudence (Uloom-ul-Fiqhi Islami), life and acts of the Prophet 
(Seerat-un-Nabi), Islamic History (Uloom-e-Tarikh-ul-Islami), but there is not much 
study about other religions. The government restricts freedom of religion. The 
Constitution (1989) declares that the ‗Official religion of Iran is Islam and the doctrine 
followed is that of Jaafari (Twelve) Shiaism‘. By declaring one faith or sect as the 
religion of the state others such as the Iranian Kurds are marginalised. It also states 
‗other Islamic denominations are to be accorded full respect‘ and designates 
Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians as the only ‗recognised religious minorities‘. 
Although the Constitution states ‗the investigation of individuals' beliefs is forbidden‘ 
and that ‗no one may be taken to task simply for holding a certain belief‘ the adherents 
of religions not specifically protected under the Constitution do not enjoy freedom of 
activity.
 
Zadeh (2005:23) states ‗[t]he belief apartheid works in a similar manner. The 
Islamic Republic is in effect a Shia republic, as even non-Shia Moslems are denied 
certain political and religious rights. Then next in the hierarchy are ―people of the 
book‖, namely Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians who are given certain rights but are 
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regarded as second-class citizens‘. Discriminatory laws and practices continued to be 
the source of social and political unrest and failing of delivering equal citizenship.  
    The gozinesh, or ―selection‖ provisions serve to prohibit individuals from working 
for state bodies. In January 2005, gozinesh criteria were deployed by the Guardians‘ 
Council, which reviews laws and policies to ensure that they uphold Islamic tenets and 
the Constitution, in order to disqualify around 3,500 prospective candidates from 
standing in the February parliamentary elections. (Amnesty International 2007:10). The 
exclusion of around 80 incumbent parliamentarians attracted domestic and international 
condemnation. The gozinesh provided the legal basis for discriminatory laws and 
practice. Religious and ethnic groups which were not officially recognised – such as the 
Bahai‘s, Ahl-e Haq, Mandaeans (Sabaeans) and Evangelical Christians – were 
automatically subject to gozinesh provisions and faced discrimination in a range of 
areas, including access to education. The central feature of the country's Islamic 
republican system is rule by a ‗religious jurisconsult‘. The Supreme Leader of the 
Islamic Republic controls the most important levers of power; he is chosen by a group 
of 83 religious scholars. All acts of the Majles (legislative body) must be reviewed for 
conformity with Islamic law and principles by the Council of Guardians, which is 
composed of six clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader and six Muslim jurists (legal 
scholars) nominated by the Head of the Judiciary and elected by parliament. 
   Flexibility of the law gives the authorities more power to persecute. Both the Penal 
Code and Press Code do not specifically define what activities constitute an insult to 
religion and this has allowed the authorities to punish people for the expressing their 
own opinions. One of the characteristics that enable people to refer plausibly to the 
post-revolutionary Iranian state as Islamic is the fact that it is ruled by the clergy. In the 
name of Islam the new masters have annulled the sovereignty of the people, and in the 
name of the Islamic state they have annulled the Islamic ordinances.   
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The process of adapting the application of the constitution to the concept of absolute 
velayat-e faqih was accompanied by the progressive allocation of almost all leading 
government posts to the clergy and many other less important posts to their supporters 
or those related to them by family ties. This process began with the Revolutionary 
Council, the majority of whose members belonged to this ‗caste‘ and then extended to 
the three branches of government, the Assembly of Leadership Experts, the Guardian 
Council, the National Security Council, and the Assembly for Revising the Constitution. 
Discrimination against the ethnic minorities has primarily taken the form of preventing 
them from preserving their cultural particularities. Turks, Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, 
Armenians, Assyrians and other groups were not allowed to use their own languages as 
a means of instruction in schools. The constitution does not grant them this right. 
According to Article 15 of the constitution (1989) ‗local languages‘ may be used ‗in the 
press and in the mass media‘. Schools are only allowed to engage in teaching the 
literature of these languages. This official attitude stems from the tendency towards 
authoritarianism inherent in the hierocracy and strives to establish itself whenever it 
can. This same tendency lies behind the policy of not allowing the ethnic minorities the 
right to administer the territorial areas they inhabit. The government‘s preference, at 
least in the regions inhabited by Sunnis, is to assign the highest demonstrative posts to 
functions from outside the area and not to local people. In the case of religious 
minorities the violations take numerous forms. Firstly, the only religions that are 
recognised are the so-called religious of the Book (Zoroastrianism, Judaism and 
Christianity).  Members of other faiths are subjected to fully-fledged discrimination or, 
as in the case of the Baha‘is, active persecution.  
   The Islamicisation of the state implies, by definition, discrimination against non-
Muslim citizens. Non-Muslims are not only excluded from leading government posts, 
but are also deprived of the right to take an active part in decisions which determine the 
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form of the prevailing order. Although the Constitution of the Islamic Republic accords 
members of the recognised religious minorities the right to send their own 
representatives to parliament (Article 64), and although those representatives enjoy the 
same right as their Muslim colleagues to vote in parliament, none of this has any 
influence on the character of the state.  
   In many case the violation of human rights is written into the laws of the regime and 
justified by reference to the Shari‘a (Islamic law). The clearest example of this is the 
Islamicised penal code which, in certain conditions, imposes penalties such as stoning 
for adulterers, or execution for apostasy. The attempt to make the constitution conform 
in practice to the absolute velayat-e faqih and to suppress the sovereignty of the people 
entails a further extension of the restrictions its text already places upon democratic 
rights in the name of ‗Islamic principles‘. The requirements of the hierocracy were what 
defined ‗Islamic principles‘ both in passing laws and putting them into effect, and what 
determined the level of tolerance of fundamental rights.  
   The only function Khomeini attributes to parliament is planning. There is no question 
of parliament undertaking legislation which he believes is a matter for God and for 
jurists who guard over the Shari‘a.  In a speech delivered in 1985 to MPs, Khomeini 
described parliament as ‗[a] consultative Islamic assembly‘. (Martin 2007:33). But even 
in this capacity parliament‘s real role in the Islamic Republic is a subordinate one. 
Consultation over the most important issues takes place on other levels of state-in the 
Assembly Council, the Guardian Council, the Security Council, or on the level of 
councils which represent the most influential jurists. Schirazi (1997:110) argues:  
The contradiction between the constitution‘s Islamic legalist and non-Islamic 
secular elements which flows largely from the claim that a state set up on the 
basis of Shia law and ruled by Islamic jurists (foqaha). Is capable of offering 
solutions to all problems, not only in Iran, but throughout the world even 
though the constitution itself incorporates many non-Islamic and non-legalist 
elements. The second is the contradiction between its democratic and anti-
democratic elements, arising chiefly from the conflict between the notions of 
sovereignty embodied in the document: the sovereignty of the people on the 
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one hand and of the Islamic jurists on the other, a sovereignty the jurists 
exercise as God‘s deputies.   
 
The secularist and legalist components of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic have 
not been adapted to one another in a harmonious way, but appear in one and the same 
text as elements that contradict and exclude one another. The sovereignty of the Islamic 
jurists negates the sovereignty of the people, the Islamic community is set against the 
Iranian nation, Islamic regulations and principles limit the rights of the people, the 
Guardian Council deprives parliament of power, the leader suppresses the president, and 
the concept of velayat-e faqih reduces the idea of a republic to an absurdity.  
The Constitution has contradictory provisions regarding the functions and prerogatives 
of the Majlis. On the one hand, the Constitution clearly stipulates that the Majlis is to be 
an independent legislature. On the other hand, however, the Majlis‘s freedom to enact 
laws is subject to the will of another body, the Guardian Council. The members of this 
Council—six jurists and six high-ranking clerics—are appointed, either directly or 
indirectly, by the highest official in the executive branch, the Supreme Leader (currently 
Ali Khamenei). Kar (2003:37) argues  
Bills passed by the Majlis are not legally binding until the Guardian Council 
attests, first, that the presumptive law does not contradict the basic tenets and 
provisions of Islamic law and, second, that it does not contradict the basic 
principles of the Constitution. Strikingly, every single reform law that the 
Majlis has passed over the last two years has been stopped in its tracks by the 
Guardian Council. Once the Guardian Council rejects a particular law, it sends 
that law back to the Majlis with specific objections. The Majlis must then, on 
the basis of the directives given by the Council, revise and amend the law and 
send it back.  
 
  The tension between the Majlis and the Guardian Council is, in other words, paralysing 
Iran‘s legislative process. Thus, the Iranian Majlis is not a genuine parliament, given 
that it must by law accept the views of two other superior organs. Since the Supreme 
Leader has remained unwilling to change the composition of these two bodies by 
appointing to them individuals more amenable to the reformist movement that animates 
  
157 
the Majlis. The emergence of a reformist legislature would naturally lead toward 
democratic progress if it has actual power. But this has not happened in Iran, and 
improving the legal status of the Kurds will not happen simply by a continuation of the 
current process. To guaranty equal citizenship for the Kurds, the obstacles in the 
constitution and legal framework of Iran are simply too profound. Through a radical 
reform in the constitution and penal code of Iran, equal citizenship for the Kurds would 
be delivered.  
6.2 The Kurds of Iran and the obstacles in delivering equal citizenship    
This section addresses the legal status of the Kurds of Iran. In terms of the treatment of 
the Kurds in Iran, McDowall (2000:47) argues ‗[t]he Kurds are particularly vulnerable 
as a minority population in Iran for two main reasons: some Kurds have a long history 
of struggle for national autonomy in Iran and they are mostly Sunni Muslims (a 
minority in Shia Iran)‘. The border areas the Kurdish inhabits are relatively under 
developed and they have suffered from violent repression before and since the 
revolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran has continued a pattern established by previous 
regimes of creating a strong centralised state that is intolerant of ethnic dissidents. 
‗Kurdish human rights groups trace the suppression of Kurdish autonomy back to the 
Safavid Persian Empire, which began to promote state centralisation in the 1500s‘. 
(Yildiz & Taysi 2007:47). A Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids in 
1639 divided the Kurdish-inhabited regions between the two empires. Hassan (2007:27) 
argues ‗[t]he division has been maintained to the present day; about 12 million Kurds 
live in Turkey and around 6 million live in Iraq‘. The Kurds in Iran enjoyed a period of 
autonomy during the 1800s, when the Qajar state permitted the Kurdish regions to 
function as semi-autonomous principalities.   
   Kurdistan is a geographically homogenous land; politically it was first divided in the 
16
th
 century amongst the two powers of the time, the Safavi and the Ottomans Empires. 
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After the First World War, 400 years after its first division, Kurdistan was further 
divided by the Powers of the day (France and Britain) amongst the three newly 
established states of Turkey, Iraq and Syria. This was contrary to the agreement of 
Sever which recognised the formation of an independent state in Kurdistan. The 
division of Kurdistan into four parts was formalised in 1923 in the treaty of Luzon. 
‗Iran's Kurdish population of about 4.5 million, out of a total of nearly 69 million, is 
concentrated in the country's northwest regions particularly, in the provinces of Elam, 
Kermanshah, and Kurdistan as well as some areas in Western Azerbaijan‘.(Bayat 
2008:29). 
   During the Second World War, the Soviet Red Army occupied parts of Iran, under the 
protection of the Soviet Union, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was formed in 1946. 
The Republic of Mahabad lasted only 11 brief months. Following the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops later in the year, Iran restored its control of the region and continued to 
co-opt various Kurdish tribal leaders with political and financial rewards. Although 
Kurds‘ traditional leadership was undermined, the formation of the Republic led to the 
creation of a modern political party that remains influential today. The Kurdish 
Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) continues to promote its motto ‗Democracy for Iran, 
autonomy for Kurdistan‘. The KDPI supported the overthrow of the Shah and many 
Kurds participated in the 1979 revolution, but they were quickly marginalised by the 
new regime. When a popular referendum was held to vote on the creation of an Islamic 
Republic, most Kurds boycotted the vote. They objected to the draft constitution, which 
did not mention the Kurds or make provisions for regional autonomy. Shortly thereafter, 
the KDPI helped to organise a rebellion in the region. The uprising was met with brutal 
violence. Human Rights Watch (1997) reports ‗[m]ore than 271 Iranian Kurdish 
villages were destroyed and depopulated between 1980 and 1992‘. The Kurdish are 
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usually convicted of ‗enmity with God‘, a vague charge that is often used by the regime 
to silence its critics.  
   The current Iran's government bases itself on the Shia doctrine of the velayat-e faqih 
(Rule of the Supreme Jurist), which places ultimate temporal and spiritual power in the 
hands of the most qualified religious scholar as the Supreme Leader of the country 
(which has been Ali Khomeini since 1989). Articles 5 and 107 through to 112 of Iran's 
constitution set out the qualifications and duties of the supreme leader and the various 
bodies of religious experts that make up the leadership of the government. Since the 
1979 revolution, Sunni Iranians, about nine percent of Iran's population and the majority 
of Kurds, have rarely been included in powerful governmental positions. After the 
establishment of the constitutional monarchy in 1906, some of the demands of the 
nationalities of Iran, such as formation of regional assemblies were included in the 
constitution but have never been implemented, in this way Iran continues to repress 
Kurds and ethnic minorities and diminish their legal status.  
   Kurdish people along with other nationalities of Iran fully participated in the 
revolution of 1979, which resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy and establishment 
of a republic. They thought that this was an ideal opportunity to resolve all the problems 
with the new government and to put an end to decades of injustice. Now 30 years later, 
the Kurdish people in Iran are in crisis because of their poor legal status and Iran‘s 
minorities including the Kurds do not have equal access to political, economic and 
education resources. While government restrictions on freedom of association, 
assembly, and speech were a problem during President Khatami's two administrations 
(1997-2005), the Ahmadinejad government has intensified these restrictions in the name 
of security. The source states:  
The security crackdowns in Iran's Kurdish regions can be traced to July 9, 
2005, when students in the city of Mahabad held demonstrations in Esteghlal 
Square to mark the sixth anniversary of student protests in Tehran, which the 
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government had violently suppressed. In response to the July 2005 gathering in 
Mahabad, security forces arrived at Esteghlal Square to arrest Shawaneh 
Ghaderi, a prominent Kurdish activist. After Ghaderi resisted arrest by running 
away, security forces pursued and shot him, tied him to a car and dragged him 
through the streets until he died (BBC 2005:10).  
 
The event and photos of Ghaderi's body that circulated afterwards, sparked eight days of 
sometimes violent protests in Mahabad and other Kurdish cities.  Protestors expressed 
their anger at the killing and the lack of response by the government to calls for an 
investigation. ‗[A]ccording to local reporters who spoke with eyewitnesses, the 
demonstrations on July 9 2008 were peaceful until security forces violently disrupted 
the gatherings‘. (Kurdish News Agency 2008:3). The clashes led to rioting and the 
destruction of property such as banks and shops.  In response, the authorities arrested at 
least 50 protestors, according to local activists. The following sections analyse the 
major obstacles to deliver equal citizenship for the Kurds of Iran which embody in the 
religious, legal and social obstacles.  
6.2.1 Religious obstacles  
Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims in a country that is 80–90% Shia, and in which 
‗Twelve/Jafari Shia‘ Islam is the official state religion as Article 12 of the Iranian 
Constitution states.  As a result many Kurds, as both an ethnic and religious minority, 
find themselves marginalised and excluded, existing on the periphery of mainstream 
Iranian society. The treatment of Sunni Kurds mirrors that of many other Sunni 
Muslims in Iran. While Article 12 of the Iranian constitution explicitly defends the 
rights of non-Shia Muslims, in practice Kurds face religious discrimination in their 
community affairs and in access to public office. Very few Sunnis have positions in 
embassies, universities and other important public institutions. They are unable to 
achieve the highest-ranking positions in government or the judiciary.  In Kurdish areas 
where the majority are Sunnis there is a notable lack of Sunni representation in local 
authorities. The government appointed governor of the Kurdish region has usually been 
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a Shia and non-Kurdish. ‗[I]n September 2002, all six Kurdish members of parliament 
resigned in protest at not being consulted over the appointment of the new governor‘. 
(freedomhouse.org 2008:4).  As a report for the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights (2008:23) notes ‗[t]heir joint letter to the Interior Minister claimed that the 
legitimate rights of the Kurds, especially the Sunnis amongst them, was denied and their 
calls for justice on the political, economic, cultural and social levels had been 
neglected‘. Although the constitution protects the rights of Sunnis to administer their 
own religious affairs, religious leadership in Kurdish areas has usually been non-Sunni 
and non-Kurdish. The state appoints Shia clerics to run Friday prayers in Sunni 
mosques in Kurdish towns. Human Rights Watch (2008:12) reports an incident in which 
‗[a] Friday prayer leader in Sanandaj announced he would issue the call to prayer and 
carry out other religious rituals according to Shia traditions, despite the fact that he was 
serving a Sunni congregation‘. Such cases clearly violate the constitution and Iran‘s 
international obligations to ensure freedom of religion.  
   The dominance of Shiaism in Iran is reflected in Article 12 of the constitution (1989), 
which states the Sunnis may have religious rights, provided they do not infringe upon 
‗[t]he rights of the followers of other schools‘. This exception is used to deny Kurdish 
(and other) Sunnis basic religious rights that have a profound effect on community life. 
‗[a] Kurdish community that raised over a million rials (about seventy thousand pounds 
in 2008) to enlarge the Dar al-Ehsan mosque in Sanandaj was blocked from completing 
the project. Despite the fact that all the necessary building permits were obtained from 
local authorities, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance stepped in to block the new 
extension and confiscated the funds collected to carry out the project‘. (HRW 2008:23). 
As Sunnis; Kurds face intimidation and arbitrary detention for religious reasons. 
According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(2008:12) ‗Iranian Sunni leaders have reported widespread abuses and restrictions on 
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their religious practice, including detentions and torture of Sunni clerics . . . Sunni 
Muslim leaders are regularly intimidated and harassed by intelligence and security 
services and report widespread official discrimination‘.  
   In his report to the United Nation General Assembly, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 
(UNGA 2008:2) notes ‗[m]embers of the Kurdish community and Sunni community 
have reportedly been subjected to arbitrary arrests and torture, allegedly in connection 
with peaceful demonstrations for their rights, such as the right to speak their own 
language and to hold religious ceremonies‘. Anti-Sunni propaganda by the state adds to 
the social marginalisation of the Kurds. According to a State Department report 
(2004:20) ‗Sunnis claim the state broadcasting company Voice and Vision airs 
programmes that are insulting to Sunnis. In April 2004 it was reported that Sunni 
members of Parliament had petitioned the Supreme Leader to issue an order bringing an 
end to ‗anti-Sunni propaganda in the mass media, books, and publications; the measure 
would include the state-run media‘. The monopoly and the complication of Shiaism 
were noticed following few years of the Iranian revolution. For instance, Afshar (1985: 
238) states:   
After four years of Islamic government in Iran the deep contradictions of Shia 
ideology have remained unresolved. The revolution was to help the poor and 
yet remain within a theoretical framework that does not favour egalitarian 
measures nor provide any means for their implementation. Shiasm is frequently 
seen as the religion of the oppressed, yet it does not oppose inequalities and 
does not provide for radical distribution of wealth. In fact the very influence 
and authority of the ulama is in part based in their ability to extract khoms and 
zakat payment from the rich and give part of these to the poor. This process 
permits the religious establishment to maintain its patronage of the poor and 
retain their allegiance. Any radical measures which would result in the 
elimination of this process, either by eradicating poverty or by the state taking 
over taxation and welfare provisions, would in fact erode the most vital links 
between the religious establishment and its support base.  
 
The above section shows that the majority of Kurds are Sunnis and that the constitution 
and legal system of Iran are dominated by Shiasm and that non-Shias have been 
excluded and disadvantaged because of their religion. Consequently, the Kurds have 
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been discriminated on a religious basis and this has led to a deterioration of the legal 
status of the Kurds.  Discrimination on the basis of religion has become an obstacle to 
non-Shias, including the Kurds, obtaining equal citizenship.  
6.2.2 Legal obstacles  
Although there are no specific anti-Kurdish laws in the constitution, the authorities find 
pretexts for persecuting Kurds who openly and non-violently profess their group 
identity. Once arrested, many have experienced violations of due process that 
contravene Iranian law and fall far below international standards. Kurds are also denied 
rights to teach their language, and they face discrimination with respect to housing, 
public education and employment. The Iranian constitution does not grant autonomy to 
ethnic minorities, but it does allow the use of minority languages in education. Kurds 
have found, however, that this aspect of the constitution is often violated. Amnesty 
International (2008:2) reports ‗[a]n NGO running two nursery schools in Sandaj and 
Mahabad had been closed down because they taught in the Kurdish language‘. In a 
report to the United Nations, one scholar notes ‗[t]he authorities have refused the 
teaching of Kurdish at any level of schools in Kurdistan, and have limited the use of 
Kurdish in the print and electronic media and drastically reduced the air-time for 
Kurdish programming since 1979‘. (Ghanea 2003:27).  
Kurds face state-sponsored discrimination in housing, public education and 
employment. A 2005 report by U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Miloon 
Kothari (2005:21) finds ‗Kurds were being disproportionately affected by confiscation 
and ‗‗confiscation style‘‘ purchase of property by the government‘. Kurds complain that 
state universities grant few places to students from Kurdistan, compromising the future 
development of the region. Unemployment in Kurdish areas is notably higher than in 
other regions of the country. Evidence suggests that material advancement of the Kurds 
is also stunted by unofficial policies carried out by the authorities, including the denial 
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of business licences in primary and secondary industries such as mining and 
manufacturing. Human rights campaigners and journalists in Iran who speak out on 
behalf of the Kurds face severe consequences, which can also affect their families. ‗[i]n 
October 2008, Negin Sheikholeslami was arbitrarily arrested – she is the founder of the 
Azar Mehr Women‘s Social and Cultural Society of Kurdistan which organises training 
and sports activities for Kurdish women. Sheikholeslami also works for the Human 
Rights Organization of Kurdistan (HROK), which reports incidences of human rights 
abuses, and her arrest is the latest in a string of arbitrary arrests of HROK members‘. 
(Amnesty International 2008:39). The Kurdish Human Rights Project (2008:28) reports 
that ‗[t]here are more than 200 Kurdish prisoners of conscience in Iran, who have been 
imprisoned for expressing their opinions non-violently‘.   
   One of the commonly used security laws in the Penal Code is Article 186, which 
carries the possible sentences of death and banishment for being a member of, or 
supporting, an organisation that has waged armed struggle against the Islamic Republic. 
Another is Article 500, which punishes anyone found guilty of ‗advertising against the 
order of the Islamic Republic of Iran‘. (Iranian Penal Code: Article 500). Kurdish 
activists such as Farzad Kamangar, teacher and reporter for the Human Rights 
Organization of Iran, have been sentenced to death for ―acting against state security‖ 
and ―enmity with God‖. (KIP 2009:2).  The charges made against Kurdish activists 
often include allegations of unspecified breaches of national security or violating 
morality, which create a legal exemption from honouring human rights protections 
outlined in the constitution. For example, freedom of expression is allowed, ‗Except 
when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public‘. 
(Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1989:Article24). Activities that count as 
being ‗against‘ Islam or the Islamic Republic can be very broadly defined to suit the 
purposes of the local or national government.  
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Arbitrary detention, disappearances, unfair trials and indefinite solitary confinement are 
routine treatment for Kurdish prisoners. In an interview with Radio Farda, Roya Toloui 
described how she had been kicked, slapped, and beaten. Only when those who had 
physically abused her asked for her children to be brought into the prison and threatened 
to burn them to death, did she give them the false confessions they desired (Cameron 
and Danesh 2008:22). Aside from violating international law, the widespread use of 
torture also contravenes Iran‘s own constitutional ban on the use of torture under Article 
8. ‗Due process has also been violated in the trials of Kurdish prisoners, even though 
Article 8 of the constitution upholds the right to an open jury trial‘. (KHRP 2008:8).  
Human Rights Watch (2008:3) reports ‗In the case of Mr. Kamangar, only one judge 
reviewed the case, the defendant was not allowed to speak, and the trial lasted less than 
ten minutes‘.  
   Such violations of the right to a fair trial and judicial review are widespread 
demonstrating the low legal status of the Kurds and other ethnic minorities. Often those 
in custody are held in solitary confinement for long periods of time and they are 
prevented from any communication with their families. For the first month and a half 
that Mohammad Sadigh Kabodwand, founder and chairman of the Kurdish Human 
Rights Organisation was in custody, his family did not know where he was being 
detained. This is not unusual for political prisoners of any ethnicity.  (HRW 2008:4).  
Due to many legal obstacles which have been examined in the above, Kurds of Iran are 
ill-treated and discriminated against, demonstrating their minimal legal status. Hence, 
equal citizenship is not guaranteed by the legal system of Iran.  
6.2.3 Social obstacles 
From the very establishment of the Islamic Republic there was fear of territorial 
disintegration, and as a result, Kurdish nationalism has been undermined and depicted 
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as dangerous and anti-Iranian. Ayatollah Khomeini himself made a statement in 
December 1979 in which he declared (Cameron and Danesh 2008:47): 
Sometimes the word minorities are used to refer to people such as Kurds, Lurs, 
Turks, Persians, Baluchis, and such. These people should not be called 
minorities, because this term assumes that there is a difference between these 
brothers. In Islam, such a difference has no place at all. There is no difference 
between Muslims who speak different languages. It is very probable that such 
problems have been created by those who do not wish Muslim countries to be 
united. They create the issues of nationalism and such-isms which are contrary 
to Islamic doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam and Islamic philosophy.  
 
There were such claims at the beginning of the revolution as there was no such thing as 
minorities and no difference between Muslims. These were aimed at creating unity 
under the new regime. In practice, unity meant domination by Persian Shia elements of 
society. The result has been exclusion, rather than inclusion and assimilation. The denial 
of Kurdish identity has provoked the alienation of the Kurds from mainstream Iranian 
society. Although the majority of Kurds supported the revolution, when the draft 
constitution omitted any mention of the Kurds, most Kurds boycotted the referendum on 
the constitution. In the above statement from Khomeini in 1979, not only did he refuse 
to acknowledge the existence of Kurdish identity rights, he also suggested that those 
who made such claims were agents of foreign powers.  
   This is indicative of the state‘s view that has existed from the outset of the revolution, 
that foreign powers might exploit Kurdish nationalism to destabilise the regime. 
Khomeini‘s words give an excuse for labelling Kurds as ‗anti-Iranian‘ and ‗anti-
Islamic,‘ which stigmatises Kurds and opens them up to accusations, such as 
threatening national security or being an enemy of God, for which they can be tried in 
court. ‗[t]he geography of Kurdish communities, many of them near borders, 
contributes to the perception that they are both an internal and external threat to the 
integrity of the state‘. (Yildiz & Taysi 2004:37).  Popular and state-level suspicion of 
Iranian Kurds is not new to Iran, particularly given Kurdish history of nationalism and 
campaigns for greater autonomy. The question is whether the Iranian government is 
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doing anything to help stop discrimination against Kurds, or whether it actually 
encourages the stereotyping of Kurds as hostile dissenters.  
   Kurds suffer not only from state-level discrimination and harassment, but also from 
neglect. For example, Koohi-Kamali (2003:38) explains ‗[a]though there is difficulty 
with obtaining access to water in the eastern areas of Iranian Kurdistan, these water 
shortages could be eliminated if adequate assistance and guidance were given to the 
peasants by the government‘. According to Yildiz and Taysi (2004:79) ‗[m]any Kurds 
feel that their region suffers from intentional underdevelopment at the hands of the 
government‘. Whether this neglect is intentional or not, it contravenes Article 48 of the 
constitution (1989) which stipulates ‗There must be no discrimination among the 
various provinces with regard to the distribution of public revenues to ensure that each 
region has the necessary resources to meet its needs and capacity for growth‘. As Yildiz 
and Taysi (2004:87) point out ‗[t]his economic marginalisation severely inhibits the 
Kurds from actively participating in Iranian public life‘. Widespread prejudice against 
the Kurds has affected their livelihoods in direct ways. ‗[i]n May 2001, the non-Kurdish 
president of the Piranshehr Sugar Company was allowed to dismiss eighty percent of 
the Kurdish employees and instead hire workers of other ethnicities and those who 
collaborated with the Revolutionary Guards‘. (UN 2002:13). Despite complaints to the 
government, the Sugar Company was not penalised. The authorities also turn a blind 
eye to incidents of crime within Kurdish communities. (UN 2002:14). The educational 
system in Iran also disadvantages Kurds. A  UN report (2003:18) finds ‗[l]iteracy rates 
for the age group 15-24 in Kurdistan were notably below the national average‘. The 
degree of discrimination and harassment faced by Kurdish teachers is also high. The 
Human Rights Organization of Kurdistan (2007:3) reports in February 2007 ‗More than 
1,500 teachers and professors in Kurdistan had been fired by the authorities on religious 
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grounds. They wrote an open letter to the government decrying their lack of freedom 
and calling on human rights organisations to protest against their dismissal‘.  
   The Kurds suffer socially due to the social obstacles of the Iranian authorities. The 
social policy of Iran is not based on equal access for minorities, including the Kurds, 
supporting their low legal status.  The following sections analyse the components of 
equal citizenship in more detail.  
6.3 Discussions 
In order to investigate the legal status of the Kurds, Iranian legal system and judicial 
system of the country need to be discussed. Comparison and contrast of the Iranian 
example with the international standards is necessary. Hence, this section discusses 
freedom of expression and association and minority rights in international laws.  
6.3.1 Freedom of expression in Iranian law and in the international legal standards  
Iranian law claims to protect freedom of expression and thought, albeit with broad 
exceptions. Article 23 (1989) of the constitution states ‗The investigation of individuals' 
beliefs is forbidden, and no one may be molested or taken to task simply for holding a 
certain belief ‘. Article 24 (1989) ensures the freedom of the press, with the broad 
exception of cases the authorities consider ‗detrimental to the fundamental principles of 
Islam or the rights of the public‘. Article 15 of the Iran's constitution (1989) designates 
Persian as the ‗official and shared language of Iran" but allows for the ‗―use of local and 
ethnic languages‖ in groups, press and media and teaching of their literature in schools 
alongside Persian‘. The above articles show that non-Persian people in Iran are not 
treated equally and do not have equal opportunities for publications and expressions.  
Article 19 of the Constitution (1989) stipulates ‗the people of Iran, no matter what 
ethnicity or tribe, have equal rights, and attributes such as colour or race or language 
will not be a reason for privilege‘.  
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Despite these provisions, the cases covered in this chapter show that the editors and 
writers of Kurdish publications face violations of rights guaranteed by Iran's 
constitution and Press Law.  Article 9 of the constitution (1989) contains two seemingly 
contradictory provisions. On the one hand, it violates international human rights law 
and allows no option for balancing individual rights of freedom of expression or 
association with legitimate security considerations when it states ‗No individual, group, 
or authority, has the right to infringe in the slightest way upon the political, cultural, 
economic, and military independence or the territorial integrity of Iran under the pretext 
of exercising freedom‘. The article goes on to state that ‗no authority has the right to 
abrogate legitimate freedoms, not even by enacting laws and regulations for that 
purpose, under the pretext of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the 
country‘. The authorities often rely on the first part of Article 9 to justify restricting 
freedom of speech in the Kurdish regions, while disregarding the same article's 
prohibition on undue restrictions. Iran's Press Law and security laws arbitrarily limit 
speech protected under international human rights law. Article 6 of the Press Law, 
ratified in 1986, echoes the constitution's ban on publications that ‗violate Islamic 
principles and codes and public rights‘. (Iran Press Law 1989). In 2000, the Majles 
(parliament) amended Article 6 to include ‗private rights‘, thereby expanding the scope 
of material the government may suppress. (Private rights govern individuals' business 
and family relationships.) In 2000, the parliament passed legislation that made all 
electronic publications subject to Iran's Press Law, thus allowing the government to 
expand its restrictions to include online content.  
   The scope of Article 6 gives the Iranian authorities broad legal cover to suppress 
freedom of expression. Section 1 prohibits publication of material that is ‗atheistic or 
contrary to Islamic codes, or promote subjects which might damage the foundation of 
the Islamic Republic‘. (Iran Press Law: 1989). Section 4 outlaws material that ‗creates 
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discord between and among social walks of life, especially by raising racial issues‘. 
(Iran Press Law: 1989). Section 9 outlaws ‗quoting articles from the deviant press, 
parties, and groups which oppose Islam (inside and outside the country) in such a 
manner as to propagate such ideas‘. (Iran Press Law 1989: Article 6). Section 12 
prohibits publishing anything critical of the constitution. Article 2 of the Press Law 
(1989) ‗endeavours to prevent  pitting different groups of the community against each 
other by dividing people by race, language, customs and local traditions‘. Publications 
in local languages such as Kurdish or Azeri should be permissible, provided that the 
publication does not aim to "divide people based on their language" and the publisher 
obtains permission to publish from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. 
‗Authorities increasingly, particularly since the beginning of the Ahmadinejad 
administration, present violations of Article 2 as national security issues, including 
"endangering national security" or "disrupting public order" in the charges it brings 
against journalists in Kurdish areas‘. (Human Rights Watch 2008:4). Authorities may 
try press related offences in general courts ‗[t]he general courts include, among others, 
all penal and civil courts), Revolutionary Courts, clerical courts, or military courts‘. 
(Iran Press Law: 1989).  
   According to Article 34 of the Press Law (1989), all press-related offences must be 
tried in ‗public courts in the presence of a jury‘. Article 118 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedures also affirms that trials must be held in public with the exception of cases that 
pertain to "chastity," "family issues or private disputes per the request of both sides," or 
cases where a "public prosecution would disrupt security or religious feelings‘. (Code of 
the Criminal Procedure for the Courts of General Jurisdiction and Revolutionary Courts 
1999:118). The government prosecuted most press-related cases in Kurdish areas in 
closed sessions, often in Revolutionary Courts, without the presence of a jury. 
Revolutionary Courts were established in 1979 with the mandate to try crimes against 
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national security, slandering the founder of the Islamic Republic and the Supreme 
Leader, and smuggling narcotics. To restrict publishing activities in Kurdish areas 
through prosecutions and convictions in the Revolutionary Courts, the government 
relies especially on Article 9 of the Press Law (1989). This is used to control any 
publishing activities of members and supporters of anti-revolutionary or illegal groups 
or those convicted in the Revolutionary Courts on charges of anti-revolutionary 
activities. It also bans acting against national or international security and also those 
who act or spread propaganda against the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
   Freedom of expression is an essential element of equal citizenship. It is clear from the 
above section that articles of the Iranian constitution and Press Law are the major 
obstacles in guaranteeing equal rights for the Kurds of Iran. These constitutional and 
legal obstacles have led to the poor legal status of minorities and the Kurds. As set out 
in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
(1976:37) ‗Iran was one of the first countries in the world to ratify the ICCPR, in 1975 
(it entered into force in 1976)‘. Article 19 guarantees all individuals the ‗Freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media‘. 
(ICCPR 1976:Article14). The UN Human Rights Committee, which monitors state 
compliance with the ICCPR states ‗[t]he legitimate objective of safeguarding and 
indeed strengthening national unity under difficult political circumstances cannot be 
achieved by attempting to muzzle advocacy of multi-party democracy, democratic 
tenets and human rights‘. (Mukong v. Cameroon 1994:37). Iran consistently fails to 
meet the international commitments that it signed up to, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iran is a state party. Iran ignores its 
own laws and international obligations with regard to the protection of human rights. 
The right to equality (non-discrimination) is enshrined in both the Universal Declaration 
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of Human Rights and the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, which bans ‗any 
discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, gender, or religious beliefs or 
political affiliation‘. (Cameron and Danesh 2008:30). 
   Freedom of thought is protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 
Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, of UNESCO. In the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), Article 19 says: ‗Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference‘. 
   In order to guarantee equal citizenship for all minorities of Iran including the Kurds, 
radical legal reform is necessary. Kurds are ill-treated and discriminated against on a 
legal basis. Hence, improving the legal status of the Kurds would not be achieved 
without amending the law. . It is necessary to amend Article 9 of the constitution by 
removing "in the slightest way" from the prohibition against infringing on the country's 
independence or territorial integrity "under the pretext of exercising freedom" amend 
provisions of the Press Law that are excessively broad and used to curtail freedom of 
speech beyond the limits allowed by international law, specifically: Article 2, which 
"endeavours to negate the drawing up of false and divisive lines or, pitting different 
groups of the community against each other…" Section 4 of Article 6, which prohibits 
publishing material that "creates discord between and among social walks of life 
especially by raising ethnic and racial issues." Any restrictions on expression need to be 
strictly limited to speech likely to incite directly and imminently violence, 
discrimination, or harassment and intimidation against an individual or clearly defined 
group. The broadly-worded provisions in the Islamic Penal Code entitled ‗Offenses 
against the National and International Security of the Country‘. (Islamic Penal Code of 
Iran: 1991), permits the government to punish individuals arbitrarily for peaceful 
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political expression, including the following provisions: Article 498, which criminalises 
the establishment of any group that the government charges with ‗disrupting national 
security‘ which the government has used to prosecute peaceful dissent. Article 500, 
which sets a prison sentence of three months to one year for anyone convicted of 
"propaganda against the state of the Islamic Republic of Iran or propaganda for the 
benefit of group or institutions against the state."  The above articles are the major 
obstacles for the legal status of the Kurds.  It is necessary to amend them and adopt 
international standards in order to guarantee equal citizenship. 
   Articles of the Iranian constitution, Iran press law and Penal code have hindered 
minorities including Kurds from achieving equal citizenship. The international legal 
standards referred to above, which Iran ratified, should be reflected in the Iranian 
constitution, penal code and political system. This reform is necessary for Iran to 
comply with the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
6.3.2 Freedom of association in International Human Rights Law and in Iranian law  
In order to improve the legal status of the Kurds generally and in Iran particularly, it is 
important to adopt International Human Rights Law. This section addresses freedom of 
association in International Human Rights Law and comparing this with the Iranian 
laws and legal system. The right to freedom of association is well established in 
international law.  The right to freedom of association may be restricted, but only on 
certain prescribed grounds and only when particular circumstances apply. According to 
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights -ICCPR (1976) 
which Iran ratified it: (1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with 
others, including forming and joining trade unions for the protection of his interest. (2) 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
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national security or public safety, public order (order public), the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
   The restrictions specified in Article 22(2) should be interpreted narrowly. For 
example, terms such as "national security" and "public safety" refer to situations 
involving an immediate and violent threat to the nation. "Necessary" restrictions must 
be proportionate, that is, carefully balanced against the specific reason for the restriction 
being put in place. ICCPR explicitly has guaranteed the exercise of the rights of 
association unless it affects national security or public order and interests. This chapter 
shows that national security is defined obscurely in the Iranian law and biased towards 
the Shia sect and those of Persian ethnicity.  
   Freedom of Association is a significant element of equal citizenship. Hence, this 
section examines freedom of association in Iranian law.  Iran's constitution allows for 
the freedom of association, albeit with broadly stated exceptions. Article 26 of the 
constitution (1989) states freedom of association is granted except for those who 
‗violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or 
the basis of the Islamic Republic‘. Iranian authorities primarily rely on the set of 
"security laws" in Iran's Islamic Penal Code to suppress freedom of association. Article 
498 of the same constitution outlaws the establishment of a group for the purpose of 
‗disrupting national security‘. Article 499 sets prison terms of ‗three to five months for 
anyone who participates in such groups, unless the person can prove that he or she had 
no knowledge of its goals‘. Article 500 sets prison terms of three months to one year for 
anyone who ‗in any way undertakes propaganda against the state of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran or undertakes propaganda for the benefit of group or institutions 
against the state‘. Iran's Security Laws arbitrarily limit freedom of association protected 
by Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 22 
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states ‗everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others‘ (ICCPR 
1976: Article 22).  
   Human Rights Watch has previously documented how the authorities construe these 
broadly-worded security laws to suppress the activities of a broad range of civil society 
activists in Tehran. The government uses essentially the same mechanisms to suppress 
activities by critics in the country's Kurdish areas and persecute those activists who 
promote or engage in those activities. The legal status of the Kurds has been 
problematic for the Kurds of Iran because they are not guaranteed freedom of 
association as a fundamental human right in Iran.  
6.3.3 Minority rights in International Human Rights Law and in Iranian law  
Kurds in Iran are a minority. The following section analyses minority rights under 
International Human Rights Law in order to make a comparison between the rights of 
minorities in International law and under Iranian law. Article 27 of the ICCPR(1976) 
states ‗[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language‘. The 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted 
by the UN General Assembly(1992) states in Article 2 ‗Persons belonging to minorities 
have the right to establish and maintain their own associations‘. This means that a state 
not only cannot prevent a minority from using its language; it is under a positive duty to 
ensure that a minority can set up associations and be able to publish in their language 
and practice their religion without discrimination. In order to improve the legal status of 
the Kurds of Iran, articles of the International law would need to be adopted by the 
Iranian authorities. International bodies such as UN would then assist in fulfilling 
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equality for minorities of Iran including the Kurds because Iran is a member of the UN 
and needs to abide to the codes and articles of it.  
   The following section examines the rights of minorities in Iran and shows that the 
legal system of Iran lacks a monitoring system for the rights of minorities in the 
country. The Iranian constitution includes provisions to protect the rights of linguistic, 
ethnic, and religious minorities. Article 12 of the constitution (1989) establishes Islam, 
specifically the Twelve School of Shiaism as the official religion of the country, but 
grants other Islamic schools ‗full respect and their followers are free to act in 
accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing their religious rituals‘. Article 
13 grants religious freedom only to specifically "recognised religious minorities," 
stating that ‗Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognised 
religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious 
rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal 
affairs and religious education‘. Article 19 states ‗all people of Iran, whatever the ethnic 
group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; colour, race, language, and the 
like, do not bestow any privilege‘.  
   There is no monitoring system of the human rights record of the Iranian Republic. The 
media is controlled, or closely under scrutiny of the state and the security forces. The 
Human Rights Watch report (2007:13) states ‗[t]here is no mechanism for monitoring 
and investigating human rights violations perpetrated by agents of the government. The 
closure of independent media in Iran has helped to perpetuate an atmosphere of 
impunity‘. The Kurds are victim of deliberate discrimination. It is also clear that 
minorities are marginalised in the constitution and legal system of Iran.   
6.3.4 Judicial system of Iran and politicising judiciary 
The current judicial system of Iran was implemented and established by Ali Akbar 
Davar and some of his contemporaries. The system went through changes during the 
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second Pahlavi era, and was drastically changed after the 1979 revolution of Iran. Ever 
since then, the judicial system has been firmly based on Shia Islamic Law. Iranian 
political leaders believe that the EU human rights laws are the ―opium of the masses‖. 
Ayatollah Khomeini stated this in his key speech in commemoration of the first martyrs 
of the Revolution on 19 February 1988 ‗The Declaration of Human Rights exists only 
to deceive nations; it is the opium of the masses‘. (ghadeer.org 2009:3). The head of the 
Judiciary is appointed by the Supreme Leader, who in turn appoints the head of the 
Supreme Court and the chief public prosecutor.  
   In an Iranian court the judge acts as prosecutor, jury, and arbiter. The judge holds 
absolute power. In practice, judges may be overwhelmed by cases, and not have the 
time to properly think about each case. All judges are certified in Islamic law, and most, 
but not all, are members of the ruling clergy.  The lack of time and total control of the 
judge results in overcrowding in Iranian prisons. In addition, there are several different 
court systems, as has been reported by European human rights organisations and the US 
State Department Report of 2005. The two most active are the traditional courts, which 
adjudicate civil and criminal offences, and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. The latter 
try offences viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic Republic, including threats 
to internal or external security, narcotics and economic crimes, and official corruption. 
This may be the reason why deaths in custody are very common. The US State 
Department report (2005:23) states ‗[d]eaths in custody were common both for 
suspected militants and criminals. The Home Ministry reported that, nationwide, deaths 
in custody had increased from 1,340 in 2002 to 1,462 by the end of 2003. According to 
the NHRC, state governments had not investigated at least 3,575 previous deaths in 
custody cases‘. The rulings of the Special Clerical Court, which functions 
independently of the regular judicial framework and is accountable only to the Supreme 
Leader, are also final and cannot be appealed. The Special Clerical Court handles 
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crimes allegedly committed by clerics, although it has also taken on cases involving lay 
people. Regarding the discriminatory law and practices, Amnesty International 
(2005:36) states:  
Discriminatory laws and practices continued to be the source of social and 
political unrest and of human rights violations. People continued to be denied 
state employment because of their religious affiliation and political opinions 
under gozinesh, or ―selection‖ provisions which serve to prohibit individuals 
from working for state bodies. Analogous laws applied to professional bodies 
such as the Bar Association or trades unions. In January, gozinesh criteria were 
deployed by the Guardians‘ Council, which reviews laws and policies to ensure 
that they uphold Islamic tenets and the Constitution, in order to disqualify 
around 3,500 prospective candidates from standing in the February 
parliamentary elections.  
 
Discrimination against other ethnic and religious groups exists in Iran. This Ahl-I Haqq 
scenario is useful to understand the lack of clarity in many important issues and also 
shows how individuals, e.g. Mullahs or Ayatollahs are influential within the judiciary 
system. One case is where a Shia Muslim kills an Ahl-i Haqq devotee. The judge 
Hikmati Sadiqqi of the province of Alam Abadi Gharb does not know how to charge 
the accused. He consults the Grand Ayatollah Fazil Lingarani, on 12 December 2000, 
to seek an article in the Penal Code, by which justices can be achieved, as the Iranian 
judiciary system does not address cases where a Shia and an Ahl-i Haqq devotee were 
involved. Ahl-i Haqq are localised in the Kurdistan part of Iran. The Grand Ayatollah 
Fazil Lingarani writes a note under the letter of Judge Hikmati Sadiqqi, on 19 January 
2001, saying that Ahl-i Haqq are Kafir (non-believers) or infidels and the accused Shia 
"murder" can be discharged. This is equivalent to Fatwa against Ahl-i Haqq. (Amnesty 
International 2001:12).  
   The judiciary accommodates and defends the political system. The following diagram 




The political and Legal system of Iran is Cleary is controlled by unelected bodies  
(Hakki 2008:24). 
The party that runs Iran is not elected democratically.  The electoral candidates can only 
stand up at the next elections provided they are approved electoral candidates by an 
unelected body in Iran called the Council of Guardians. ‗[T]he Council of Guardians 
approves the candidate and the actions of the candidates to the whether they are in 
accord with the Islamic Law (Sharia)‘. (Hakki 2008:24). A recent report published by 
the Human Rights Watch (2009:22) believes ‗[t]here is violation of freedom of torture 
and ill-human treatment to such an extent that it recommends the Iranian government 
make immediate investigations into the complaints of torture and degrading treatment. 
The body also recommends that justice is brought by a prosecution or disciplinary 
action is taken against the officials who are responsible for the torture or ill treatment‘. 
The judicial system is an important tool of the Iranian authorities, is not democratic and 
its structure does not assist guaranteeing equal citizenship for the Kurds.  
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6.4 Concluding Remarks  
The majority of the Iranian Kurds are Sunni. They were ill-treated in the era of the 
Shah‘s regime on the basis of ethnic and linguistic differences. Since the revolution of 
1979, the Kurds have been ill-treated on the basis of ethnicity, language and religion, 
because the current regime is pro-Persian and a Shia sect of Islam. Iranian minorities, 
including the Kurds have no cultural and civil forums, no political party is allowed to be 
built on their own, literary and academic curricula in their languages are banned. 
Improving the poor legal status of the Kurds and achieving equal citizenship would be 
genuine if the Iranian constitution was amended to recognise all the diverse ethnic and 
religious elements of Iran.  
   Minorities, including the Kurds need to be given education and training in their own 
languages to enable them to claim their rightful place in their own society. International 
human rights organisations and the UN need to take steps on behalf of minorities in the 
world for advancing the protection of them under international law. There are no state 
TV stations and Radio in minority languages, no education in regional languages, 
neither in schools nor in universities and institutions of higher education. Tehran‘s ultra 
centralised development strategy has resulted in a wide socioeconomic gap between the 
centre and the peripheries, where there is also an uneven distribution of power, 
socioeconomic resources, and socio-cultural status. The violence in remote regions such 
as Kurdistan, Khuzistan, Azerbaijan and Baluchistan clearly has ethnic components. 
The policies like restrictions on the opposition political parties (minorities are not 
allowed to have any political parties and cultural forums), strict procedures on 
minorities‘ civil society, suppression of none-state media, subordination of the judicial 
system, and abolition of the direct election of regional minorities are routine actions in 
Iran which undermine the principle of equal access for minorities and worsens the legal 
status of the Kurds. International community and policy makers need to insist that the 
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rights of minorities and indigenous people are respected. The participation of minorities 
in the state affairs and electoral representation is essential if conflict is to be prevented 
and citizens are treated equally. The inclusion of minorities leads to stronger and more 
cohesive societies. Exclusion results in instability, conflict, and in the most extreme 
cases leads to genocide such as; gassing Kurds in Sardasht, mass grave in Khavaran. 
The international community should apply the Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UN resolution 
47/135 of 18 December 1992) and also the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
peoples to Iran and apply pressure on the Islamic republic‘s rulers to respect these 
obligations. 
   The International community should call on the Iranian Government to respond with 
policies that address effectively the widespread, entrenched and institutionalised 
discrimination, and the organised assimilation of languages and cultures in the society 
of Iranian minorities. United Nations independent experts need to inspect the 
minorities‘ situation, and also supervise the unfair elections where minorities have no 
real representatives.  The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution-IRGC 
(ideological armed forces which is separated from regular state armed forces) and the 
Mullah‘s performances as decision makers have been a dilemma and  has  failed 
(Abrahamian 2008:178). Their term as state rulers demonstrates key characteristics of 
social injustice, discrimination and state intervention in businesses. In order to improve 
the legal status of the Kurds and achieving equal citizenship for the Iranian Kurds, 
constitution of Iran, penal code of the country and political system need drastic reform 




7 Chapter seven: Denationalisation and the repression of Syrian Kurds’ civil 
and cultural rights 
The Syrian Kurds are rarely featured in the media, or in academic research dedicated to 
Syria. Even in research on the Kurdish question, most works concentrate on the Kurdish 
regions of Turkey, Iraq, and to a lesser degree, Iran. This is not just the case today. The 
Kurdish factor in Syria has always been a marginalised issue in classic works about the 
French Mandate and the period of independence in the Levant. The only exceptions are 
the works of Ismet Sharif Vanly, which are generally biased in favour of the Kurds.  
   The treatment of the Kurds according to the Syrian Constitution and the judicial 
system need to be examined. This chapter analyses the current legal status of the Kurds 
in Syria. Examining the denial of equal citizenship (equal access to political, 
educational, social and economic institutions of the country) for the Syrian Kurds is the 
major aim of this chapter. In order to achieve this aim, this chapter addresses three 
issues and how they interact with one another; the judicial system, internal oppression 
and denial the rights of the Kurds in Syria. The Syrian Constitution, the legal structure 
of the country and the policies of the government are addressed.  
   The arsenal the apparatus that is built for internal oppression can lead to a threat to the 
stability of the country. The judiciary needs to be independent so that everyone is 
treated equally before the law. Equal citizenship would be achieved by implementing 
the principle of a legal and political system that is not biased towards one ethnicity or 
religion. The politicians should not interfere in the judicial system. The law should 
remain transparent to the population and not change continuously with the needs and 
interests of the ruling political elite. Civil organisations have a substantial input in the 
making of legislation and in implementing the law. By contrast, one-party rule goes 
against the nature of civil society. It leaves the institutions of the state as nothing more 
than a political instrument in the hands of the ruling elite – the Ba‘th Party carries out 
this policy in Syria. The law continuously changes with the needs of the political 
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system, ensuring that one-party rule is maintained. The product of this is that 
individuals and communities that are defined by the political system as enemies, or not 
existing (of which Kurds are such in Syria), are oppressed and discriminated against.  
   In fact, order is broken down and there is no rule of law. The political, social, 
economic and judicial areas of life are all mixed up; no one knows which law applies to 
whom. The Constitution is a political tool of the Ba‘th Party (representing the Arab 
Socialist Resurrection movement). Syria is a republic under the authoritarian regime of 
President Bashar al-Assad. The president makes key decisions with counsel from a 
small circle of security advisors, ministers, and senior members of the ruling Ba‘th 
Party. The Constitution mandates the primacy of the Ba‘th Party leaders in state 
institutions and the parliament. President al-Asad and the Party leaders, supported by 
various security services, dominate all three branches of government. This chapter 
begins by examining the ethnic structure of Syria. Regarding the establishment of the 
country of Syria, Davis (1997:38) states:  
The Syrian republic was founded in 1943, two years after the occupation of 
Syria by Allied forces (British, Commonwealth and Free French forces) in 
1941. Elections held in 1943 resulted in the victory of the National Bloc and 
the appointment of Shukri Quwwatli as first elected President. The last 
French soldiers left Syrian territory in April 1946, which is regarded as the 
independence year of the Syrian Republic. A constitutional amendment 
allowed Quwwatli to be re-elected to office following the victory of the 
National Bloc in the 1947 elections.  
 
Syria was under the mandate of France and obtained Independence in 1920. ‗On 07 
March 1920, the parliament declared Syrian independence (including Palestine and 
Lebanon) and rejected all foreign tutelage‘ (Tejel 2009:20). The Syrian state‘s 
repression of its Kurdish population, which so far has not sought a separate state, may 
contribute to Kurdish claims for self-determination in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. It would be 
a mistake to see the Kurdish problem in Syria solely as an ethnic problem with regional 
dimensions; the Syrian Kurds also should be seen within the context of the lack of 
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democratic governance in Syria, which affects all Syrians. That the Kurds are denied 
basic human rights – especially civil, political and cultural rights – is particularly 
damaging. The situation also offers a direction for policy work, however: the 
development of democratic governance in Syria could mitigate the Kurdish problem in 
Syria and, in turn, diminish calls for separatism by other Kurds in the region. 
   The following sections present the legal status of the Kurds by highlighting the 
relevant articles of the Constitution and the penal code and policies of the Syrian 
authorities towards the Syrian Kurds. 
7.1 The legal status of Kurds in Syria  
In order to investigate the legal status of the Kurds in Syria and whether they enjoy 
equal citizenship, it is necessary to analyse the powerful legal document of the country 
which is its constitution. ‗The current Syrian constitution (150 Articles) was ratified in 
1973. Previous constitutions were Constitutions of 1930, 1950, 1953, 1958 provisional 
constitution and 1964 provisional constitution‘ (Davis 1997:137).  The status of Syrian 
Jazeera and the disagreement between France and Turkey in regard to the establishment 
of the Turko-Syrian border favoured the utilisation of the ‗Kurdish Card‘ by the French. 
As the result, thousands of Kurdish refugees, including the instigators of the Kurdish 
movement in Turkey, moved to Syria. The Syrian political space became more 
Arabised, and pan-Arab aspirations constituted elements of consensus between the 
principal political and military forces in the country, excluding all other visions of the 
construction of the state and Syrian society. This in turn contributed to the progressive 
ethnicisation of individuals and groups.  
   The establishment of a state of emergency since 1963 has caused deterioration in the 
legal status of the Kurds by dealing with the demands of the Syrian Kurds through 
emergency laws rather than an open laws and fair trials. Tejel (2009:232) argues ‗Aside 
from the emergence of a regime with an authoritative stance toward individual liberties, 
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there were other actions promoted by the Ba‘thist regime which did affect the Kurds, 
such as the Arabisation of toponyms in Christian villages. Rural exodus has been 
another socioeconomic transformation touching all peripheral regions‘.  
The Kurds have been living in their ancient historical homeland and have actively 
contributed to liberating and building up the modern republic of Syria. Successive 
Syrian governments since independence in 1946 have denied the legitimate national 
rights of the Kurdish people and their contributions to achieving independence.  
   An accurate number cannot be stated, as the Syrian authorities do not recognise 
Kurdish people, hence there are no official figures. Most Syrian Kurds live in three 
areas; Cizîr, Kurdax and Kobanê in the north and east, close to the Turkish and Iraqi 
borders, and adjoining those other parts of Kurdistan. The most important Kurdish 
towns are Qamishli, Efrîn, Amûdê, Kobanê, Hisîça, Serêkaniyê, Çelaxe, Girkoçer, 
Derbasî, Tirbespî, Çaxir, Tilberek, Dêrik and Tiltemir. According to Abas (2005:21) 
‗[h]uman rights violations still occur on a daily basis to the Kurdish population. These 
violations threaten the very livelihood of the Kurdish population. The Kurds living in 
Syria are not recognized as a minority, some not even as Syrian citizens. Their cultural 
and civil rights are withheld from them. The political parties and organizations of the 




Areas in Syria inhabited by Kurds (KHRP 2008). 
In 1963 the Syrian Ba‘th Party published a 12-point plan aimed at wiping out the 
cultural identity of the Kurds. The plan provided for the establishment of the 
Arabisation policy under which the Kurdish population was to be replaced with Arabs 
loyal to and armed by the regime, who was forcibly resettled on Kurdish land. Since 
1967, the campaign of Arabisation has replaced the Kurdish names of cities, streets, and 
buildings with Arab names, Kurdish publications are forbidden, Kurdish language 
media are not allowed, the teaching of Kurdish in schools banned, and new-borns may 
not be registered with Kurdish names. Whoever professes himself a Kurd in Syria, or 
demands cultural and political rights for Kurds is persecuted, imprisoned and 
mistreated, including women and children who are jailed for speaking their minds. 
According to Abas (2005:23): ‗[t]oday 225,000 Kurds in Syria are designated as 
―foreigners‖ and 25,000 are categorised as ―unregistered‖‘.  
In recent years, with the attention that the Kurdish issue has received in the international 
arena, the majority of young educated Kurds have discovered their Kurdish identity, in 
particular those who live in the Kurdish areas. Hence the intensive Kurdish activities in 
Syria, but the human costs have been high. According to Amnesty International 
(2005:13), concerns over discrimination against the Kurds have been expressed by UN 
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bodies, including the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
has strongly recommended that the Syrian authorities ‗[t]ake effective measures to 
combat discrimination in practice against minority groups, in particular the Kurds‘. 
Such measures should be aimed especially at improving birth registration and school 
attendance and allowing for the use of their languages and other expressions of their 
culture.  
   The decree of the Ministry of the Interior No. 122 of 30 September 1992 ordered that, 
in the Kurdish-populated provinces such as Hasaka, when registering newborn babies 
with the civil affairs administration, prior permission of the security organs must be 
obtained regarding the name of the baby. In Syria, the Kurdish language is not 
recognised as an official language and it is not taught in schools. It has been forbidden 
to publish materials in Kurdish since 1958. In 1987 the Syrian authorities extended the 
ban to the playing and circulation of Kurdish music cassettes and videos. According to 
some sources, the ban on Kurdish being taught in schools and universities was re-stated 
by a Secret Decree issued in 1989, which also banned the use of the language in all 
official establishments.  
   There are unconfirmed reports that by the summer of 2002 the authorities raised the 
maximum sentence for printing in Kurdish, as well as for the teaching of Kurdish, to 
five years imprisonment. According to Amnesty International (2005:14) ‗Secret decree 
no. 1856 – S25 was issued in November 1989 and signed by former governor of 
Hasakah province and the Prime Minister Mustafa Miro, who is of Kurdish origin. The 
names of Kurdish villages and shops were changed into Arabic. Parents were pressured 
to give their children Arabic rather than Kurdish names‘. The oppression of Kurds is 
institutionalised in Syria; the Syrian Constitution recognises neither Kurds nor their 
language and culture. Naming the country the ‗Syrian Arab Republic‘ can be seen as a 
denial of the identity of the Kurds and also shows the sensitivity of the Syrian 
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authorities towards Syrian Kurds. This practice can be seen as directly against the equal 
citizenship of all in Syria.  
   In order to investigate the current legal status of the Kurds in Syria, it is vital to 
analyse the Constitution and the structure of the government of the country. This section 
emphasises the articles of the Constitution and the government institutions which are 
relevant to the legal rights of the Kurds. According to the Syrian Constitution, neither 
Kurds nor their language or culture exists. The Syrian Constitution does not recognise 
Kurds as a people living in Syria. Article 1 of the Constitution, entitled ‗Arab Nation, 
Socialist Republic‘ (Syrian Constitution 1973:2) stipulates (1) The Syrian Arab 
Republic is a democratic, popular, socialist, and sovereign state. No part of its territory 
can be ceded. Syria is a member of the Union of the Arab Republics. (2) The Syrian 
Arab region is a part of the Arab homeland. (3) The people in the Syrian Arab region 
are a part of the Arab nation. They work and struggle to achieve the Arab nation‘s 
comprehensive unity.  
   Article 8 of the Syrian Constitution (1973) states: ‗The leading party in the society 
and the state is the Socialist Arab Ba‘th Party. It leads a patriotic and progressive front 
seeking to unify the resources of the mass of the people and place them at the service of 
the Arab nation‘s goals‘. This article uses the term ‗Arab nation‘ without mentioning 
the non-Arab inhabitants of the country. The Kurds are clearly excluded and the article 
does not mention the Kurds. Article 11 addresses the status of the armed forces ‗The 
armed forces and other defence organisations are responsible for the defence of the 
homeland's territory and for the protection of the revolution's objectives of unity, 
freedom, and socialism‘. On the constitution of Syria, BBC (2008:2) states ‗Syria's 
constitution was adopted on 13 March 1971. It vests the Ba‘th Party with leadership 
functions in the state and society. The president is approved by referendum for a seven-
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year term. The president also serves as Secretary General of the Ba‘th Party and leader 
of the National Progressive Front‘.  
   The Constitution requires the president to be a Muslim, but does not make Islam the 
state religion. ‗The constitution gives the president the right to appoint ministers, to 
declare war and state of emergency, to issue laws (which, except in the case of 
emergency, require ratification by the People's Council), to declare amnesty, to amend 
the constitution, and to appoint civil servants and military personnel‘ (BBC 2008:3).  
Since 1963 emergency law has been in effect, effectively suspending most 
constitutional protections for Syrians. The Syrian government has justified the state of 
emergency in the light of the continuing war with Israel and the threats posed by 
terrorists.  The constitutional oath is stated in Article 7 of the constitution (1973) ‗I 
swear by God, the Almighty, to sincerely preserve the republican, democratic, and 
popular system, respect the constitution and the laws, watch over the interests of the 
people and the security of the homeland, and work and struggle for the realisation of the 
Arab nation's aims of unity, freedom, and socialism‘. The term ‗Arab nation‘ is 
emphasised in this article, which is an attempt to assimilate other minorities and the 
Kurds. Article 43 of the Syrian Constitution defines citizenship and the word ‗Arab‘ is 
used three times. The article stipulates ‗[t]he law regulates Syrian Arab citizenship and 
guarantees special facilities for the Syrian Arab expatriates and their sons and for the 
citizens of the Arab countries‘ (Syrian Constitution 1973:7). 
   The discriminatory Constitution is also diffused into all aspects of life. The Kurdish 
language is banned from use at private celebrations and in the workplace. This 
discrimination by law, which is translated into oppression in society by the security 
forces, drives deprived communities and individuals underground. These otherwise 
could have made a substantial contribution to the wealth of the people, and the stability 
and prosperity of the country. These communities, however, do not abandon their socio-
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political activities; rather, they continue underground. The security laws and the security 
services do not stop their discrimination and oppression either. This vicious circle 
continues, which leads to the widening of the gap between the authority and the 
population. This may be seen as an issue internal to Syria, but history shows that this 
internal instability can be translated into regional and then international instability.   
Ill-treatment and violation of the principles of equal citizenship which are embodied in 
equal access to political and educational institutions and economic resources have 
escalated since the Ba‘th party took power in 1963. The following section addresses the 
policies of the Ba‘th party towards the Kurds. 
7.2 The Ba‘th policy and the Kurds  
The policy of the Ba‘th Party towards the Kurds has followed the trajectory of the 
regime, with its internal disputes, its changing orientation, and its paradoxes. However, 
the principles of the Ba‘thists are of interest because, in spite of the contradictions and 
the ideological treachery that have occurred along the way, they have determine the 
official nationalism of modern day Syria, and, as a result, they determine the state‘s 
relationship with Kurdish nationalism, the only nationalist doctrine to challenge it. A 
rift separates the two concepts of the nation: the first would be the result of a free 
association of citizens, of a national and wilful construction, represented by the 
westernised elites; the second would be the consolidation of a historic community and 
the expression of a sense of identity, the organic and inherited cultural nation 
represented by the popularised committees. In terms of the early years of the 
governance of the Ba‘th party Tejel (2009:58) states:  
On March 8, 1963, a coalition of officers put an end to the conservative 
regime in the name of pan-Arabism via a coup; one month after the Iraqi 
Ba‘thists had done the same in Baghdad. The new government, directed by 
Salah Bitar, reunited the unionist forces, including the Ba‘thists, 
representative of the Arab National Movement, members of the Unionist 
Movement, and other Nasserist organizations, which were opposed to the 
separatist regime. The Ba‘thists dominated all state institutions and started to 
implement their pan-Arabism policies. The Syrian constitution of 1973, 
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which is still in effect, proclaimed that Syria was a popular democracy 
directed by the Ba‘thist Party with the help of other member organizations.  
 
Ba‘thism is a variant of pan-Arab nationalism, with which it shares the central notion of 
the existence of the Arab nation as an historic fact. Despite some constitutional articles 
dedicated to the economic sector, most of the constitution of the Ba‘th Party puts the 
emphasis on Arab nationalism. Its main slogan is ‗an Arab nation with an eternal 
mission‘ this was also a matter of exclusive nationalism. Articles 10, 11, 15 and 20 of 
the constitution of the party are explicit in this sense – all political and social groups 
established in the Arab fatherland which did not actively share the Arab national idea 
are illegal. As for the policy regarding language, general principles determine that the 
Arab language should be the official language of the future unified state. The 
recognition of Kurdishness was conditional on the Kurdish acceptance of the Arab 
nationalist idea. In the end, the struggle was contained within the Alawite community, 
between rival clans, as symbolised by the generals Salah al-Jadid and Hafiz al-Assad, 
until the victory of the latter in November 1970.  
   There have been two phases of Ba‘thist policy towards the Kurds. In the period 
between 1963 and 1970, which can be described as the years of ‗ideological purity‘, this 
was marked by a preponderance of coercion as a method of managing the Kurdish 
problem. A second period, from 1970 to 2000, was much more pragmatic, combining 
coercion and the redistribution of goods as methods of managing the Kurdish problem. 
The leaders of the Ba‘th Party have enjoyed long-term benefits as a result of the success 
in overcoming the core dilemmas associated with the consolidation of a populist 
authoritarian system. Heydemann (1999:217) argues:  
Since, 1970, populist authoritarianism has continued to define and animate 
Syrian politics, society, and economy. The networks of popular organizations 
that were created in the 1960s as mechanisms of mobilization and control 
remain highly visible elements of the regime‘s apparatus of domination. This 
process required transforming the identity of state institutions, bringing the 
state apparatus under the control of the party, and making the state 
bureaucracy a reliable instrument of the Ba‘thist rule. Controlling unions and 
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other social networks, state institutions and society elements have made the 
Ba‘th party system as populist authoritarian.  
 
Since 1962, the Syrian state has divided Kurds in Syria into three major demographic 
categories: Syrian Kurds, foreign Kurds, and ‗concealed‘ Kurds. Syrian Kurds have 
retained their Syrian citizenship. Foreign Kurds were stripped of citizenship and 
registered in official archives as foreigners; in 2008, there were about 200,000 of them. 
Concealed Kurds are denationalized Kurds who have not been registered in official 
records at all and whom Syrian authorities characterize as concealed. Nearly 80,000 
people belong to this category. Among the concealed Kurds are persons whose fathers 
are classified as foreigners and whose mothers are citizens, persons whose fathers are 
aliens and whose mothers are classified as concealed, and persons whose parents are 
both concealed. In addition, there are about 280,000 undocumented Kurds who reside in 
Syria but have no citizenship, according to Kurdish sources. No government statistics 
are available on this group. (Human Rights Watch 2004:23).  
   According to the United States Institute of Peace (2009:17): ‗The rise of nationalism, 
stemming regionally from Nasserism and locally from the Ba‘th Party‘s ascendancy in 
1963, increased official discrimination against Syrian Kurds in all the above categories, 
as the Ba‘thist government‘s Kurdish policy was intended to eradicate the Kurdish 
presence from Syrian public life‘. Since the Ba‘th Party seized power after the coup of 
March 1963 and declared its autocratic regime over the country, it has been 
systematically applying all political, military and psychological means to eradicate the 
Kurdish existence and forcibly assimilate Kurdish national identity and annihilate its 
culture. These discriminatory policies have deprived the Kurds of the constitutional 
recognition of their cultural and national existence, further marking the Syrian 
authorities‘ resistance to promoting equal citizenship. 
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7.3 Exceptional census and stateless Kurds in Syria  
The Syrian regime, in flagrant breach of human rights and international law, the 
discriminatory Article 93 of the Census Law, issued on 23 August 1962 and 
implemented on 5 October 1962. It was limited to al-Hasakah and the Kurdish regions, 
which initially resulted in more around 250,000 Kurds, who had been living in their 
own homeland, being stripped of their Syrian nationality certificate. The Christian 
Science Monitor (2002:3) states ‗The repression of the Kurds began in 1962, with a 
controversial census undertaken by Syria‘s ruling Ba‘th party in which some 120,000 
Kurdish Syrian nationals were stripped of their citizenship overnight. Their offspring 
were also classified as foreigners or maktoumeen, swelling the population of 
dispossessed to around 250,000 today‘. This has therefore deprived them of their basic 
human right of surviving and prospering in their own country. Those whose nationality 
was withdrawn, and who were henceforth considered as foreigners in their own land, 
have no right to work the public sector, or to own property, nor can they have access to 
education and health facilities. They cannot register their marriages and are additionally 
not allowed to register their children in the state civil records. They cannot travel abroad 
as they cannot obtain a passport. They have no rights to practise certain professions 
such as medicine, law and teaching, which require a nationality certificate. In 
conclusion, they have no birth right to live in their own homeland. This racial and 
cultural discrimination still continues today, after more than four decades, despite many 
promises to resolve this human rights issue which has proved so disastrous for the 
Kurds and is a direct violation of the principle of equal citizenship.  
   There are about about 250,000 of the Syrian Kurds are stateless. According to the 
Syrian Human Rights Committee, some stateless Kurds subsequently were refused ID 
cards after they had completed their obligatory military service, because they were 
considered foreigners. Some young women and men who applied for and passed 
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national examinations (equivalent to A-levels) were denied any official documentation 
and were considered as non-Syrian nationals. On the stateless Kurds in Syria, the 
UNHCR (2006:5) states:  
The Committee remains concerned about the situation of a large number of 
persons of Kurdish origin who have entered Syria from neighbouring 
countries. It is also concerned about the fate of Kurds born in Syria who the 
Syrian authorities treat either as aliens or unregistered persons and who 
encounter administrative and practical difficulties in acquiring Syrian 
nationality. The Committee considers this discriminatory situation to be 
incompatible with articles 24, 26 and 27 of the Covenant. The State party 
should take urgent steps to find a solution to the statelessness of numerous 
Kurds in Syria and to allow Kurdish children born in Syria to acquire Syrian 
nationality.  
 
Education in schools and universities is closed to these stateless Kurds, who are not 
entitled to be admitted to public hospitals. They have no right to food aid during a state 
of emergency. Marriage contracts with Syrian partners are invalid. In addition, they do 
not possess rights to vote. Because they do not receive travel documents, they are 
unable to leave the country legally. The Syrian authorities have a strong control over the 
society, and Kurds in particular are under close surveillance. The issue of stateless 
Kurds should not be seen as a genuine immigration issue; rather it is a political issue, 
which is associated with the denial of Kurdish ethnicity in Syria. The stateless Kurds are 
very well documented and very well controlled by the authorities, but they cannot 
exercise their rights like other citizens. The law regarding statelessness is specifically 
designed to criminalise Kurds in Syria. 
7.4 The Arab Belt and Arabisation Policy 
Syria has been under emergency law since 1963 and is governed by the Ba‘th Party. 
The head of state since 1970 has been a member of the Assad family. Syria‘s current 
president is Bashar al-Assad, son of Hafez al-Assad, who held office from 1970 until 
his death in 2000. Bashar al-Assad has held power from 2000 until now. To authorise 
this succession, the Syrian parliament amended Article 83 [Eligibility] of the 
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Constitution, reducing the mandatory minimum age of the President from 40 to 34. A 
candidate for the presidency must also be an Arab Syrian.  
   Since the Ba‘th Party seized power in the 1963, the Kurds have been subjected to 
racial and cultural discrimination aiming to eradicate the whole Kurdish national and 
cultural existence by isolating and separating the northern and southern parts of 
Kurdistan. On 24 June 1974 the government issued Article 521, creating what is known 
as ‗The Arab Belt‘ from the seizure of an area of Kurdish-held agricultural lands 365 
km‘ (350 km long and 15 km wide). Thousands of Kurdish land owners and farmers 
were forcibly driven from their own property, which was confiscated and given to Arab 
settlers and farmers coming from Arab regions. This widespread annexation of Kurdish 
agricultural lands and the settlement of immigrant Arabs resulted in splitting families 
and the destruction of social relationships, and in Arabising the names of villages and 
towns. This has altered the character of the whole region. This inhuman deprivation of 
natural ownership rights and livelihood has terrorised the Kurdish population, who were 
deported from their cultural homelands and property and forced to live in isolation and 
destitution in large metropolitan cities. The Ba‘th regime launched a campaign to 
eradicate all Kurdish national identity including Kurdish cultural and social activities. 
Kurdish political leaders, academics and intellectuals were executed, imprisoned or 
exiled. Heydemann (1999:217) argues:  
The Arab Belt is a long band of arable, well-cultivated land that would extend 
280 km along the Turkish border, from Ras al-‗Ayn in the west, to the Iraq 
border on the east, which was roughly between 10 and 15 km wide. The plan 
anticipated the massive deportation of 140,000 Kurds, most of whom had 
been deprived of their Syrian citizenship in 1962 and who were living in 332 
villages situated inside this band. They would be replaced by Arabs.  
 
The objective, according to the Arab press, was to ‗save Arabism in Jazira‘, a location 
perceived by the Syrian Kurds as chosen to disrupt their physical links with the Turkish 
Kurds. The plan was not put into place until 1973. The Arabisation campaign of Jazeera 
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was halted by Hafiz al-Assad in 1976, but the status quo remained unchanged. ‗[The 
s]tate of emergency in place since 1963 with legal devices, was used to put into practice 
waves of repression or more intense repression to remind Kurds of their boundaries‘ 
(Tejel, 2009:137). The policy of Arabisation through the Arab Belt is an attempt by the 
Syrian authorities to deny the equal citizenship for the Kurds and deteriorating their 
legal status.  
7.5 Education in Kurdish and Kurdish cultural freedom 
The Syrian authorities assert an Arab identity for Syria, which dismisses the Kurds and 
all other ethnic and religious groups, notably Armenians, Circassians, Assyrians, 
Turkmens and Jews. Article 4 of the Constitution (1973), entitled ‗Language and 
Capital‘, stipulates ‗The Arabic language is the official language‘. There is a prohibition 
on any Kurdish publications or books. During the French mandate era in Syria there 
were two Kurdish newspapers, and Kurdish programmes were broadcast regularly from 
radio stations in Damascus and Beirut. These violations of rights occurred at a later 
date, after the promulgation of the Ba‘th Party‘s constitution. All of its provisions stress 
the human essence of Arab nationalism. Article 21, entitled ‗Objectives of the 
Constitution‘, clearly states the education system shall be in the Arabic language, which 
can be seen as a denial of the Kurdish language ‗The educational and cultural system 
aims at creating a socialist nationalist Arab generation which is scientifically minded 
and attached to its history and land, proud of its heritage, and filled with the spirit of 
struggle to achieve its nation's objectives of unity, freedom, and socialism, and to serve 
humanity and its progress‘ (Syrian Constitution 1973:4). Article 23, ‗Socialist 
Education, Arts, Sports,‘ provides: (1) The nationalist socialist education is the basis for 
building the unified socialist Arab society. It seeks to strengthen moral values, to 
achieve the higher ideals of the Arab nation, to develop the society, and to serve the 
causes of humanity. The state undertakes to encourage and to protect this education. (2) 
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The encouragement of artistic talents and abilities is one of the bases of the progress and 
development of society, artistic creation is based on close contact with the people‘s life. 
The state fosters the artistic talents and abilities of all citizens. (3) Physical education is 
a foundation for the building of society. The state encourages physical education to 
form a physically, mentally, and morally strong generation‘. Article 24 ‗Science, 
Intellectual Property‘ provides: (1) Science, scientific research, and all scientific 
achievements are basic elements for the progress of the socialist Arab society. 
Comprehensive support is extended by the state.  (2) The state protects the rights of 
authors and inventors who serve the people's interests.  
   Article 3 provides for ‗Faith and Religious Freedom‘: (1) The religion of the President 
of the Republic has to be Islam. (2) Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of 
legislation. The other religions that exist in the country are not mentioned. The Kurdish 
national day, which is also the Kurdish New Year, known as Newroz (New Day) on the 
21 March, is celebrated by Kurds throughout Kurdistan and all over the world. For 
years, celebrating Newroz was banned by Turkey and Syria. In Iraq and Iran, it is 
celebrated and is an official holiday. The Iranians do not recognise it as the Kurdish 
national day, however, and they regard it as an Iranian holiday. The former Iraqi regime 
deprived Newroz of its Kurdish origins and renamed it in Arabic, Ead Al-Rabii, i.e. 
Spring Day (Newroz is also the first day of spring and the end of the cold Kurdish 
winter).  Newroz Day disturbances are witnessed all over Kurdistan, in Iran, Iraq, Syria 
and Turkey. The occasion is described as follows ‗Newroz is a typical date to arrest 
potential Kurdish opponents to the regime, a day which is historically marked by 
protests against the authorities‘ (CNN 1999:3). For example CNN reported that ‗8000 
were arrested during the Newroz celebrations‘ in Turkey in 1999 (CNN 1999:3). 
Human Rights Watch (2007:7) observes ‗Syrian authorities also suppress expressions of 
Kurdish identity. On March 20, 2006, security services arrested dozens of Kurds for 
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participating in a candle-lit night procession in celebration of the Kurdish New Year, 
Nowruz, and used tear gas and batons to break up the march‘.  In its 2006 Annual 
Report, the Syrian Human Rights Committee (2006:8) reports ‗[t]he state of human 
rights became extremely poor in mid March 2006, after authorities arrested scores of 
Kurds who had been peacefully celebrating Eid Nawrouz, in Aleppo and the North 
Eastern regions of Syria‘. The Kurdish language is also reportedly banned from use at 
private celebrations and in the workplace. The Syrian authorities impose heavy 
restrictions on the production and circulation of Kurdish literature, including books and 
music. In the past the Syrian authorities have arrested and arbitrarily detained Syrian 
Kurds for their involvement in the organisation of Kurdish cultural activities including 
the Kurdish Nawroz (New Year) celebrations, as discussed above.  
   Kurds are not allowed to celebrate their cultural occasions and enjoy their culture in 
Syria. The Kurdish celebrations and gatherings mentioned in the above examples were 
not violent, and yet they attract the attention of the security services. McDowall 
(1998:47) states ‗[I]n the 1970 Armenians and Assyrians had private schools, clubs, and 
cultural associations, the Kurds were dealt with as spies. Two decrees from the 1980s 
forbade the use of Kurdish in the workplace, as well as during marriage ceremonies and 
festivals. Faced with the difficulty of enforcing this decree, a new circular targeting the 
work place was issued in 1996‘. The Kurds of Syria, as McDowall states, have been 
facing challenges in their daily lives. Perceiving the Kurds as spies and the Kurdish 
issue as a security threat is characteristic of the Syrian authorities. Even Kurdish 
folklore has been a victim of the ill-treatment and the absence of equal citizenship in 
Syria. In this regard an observer notes ‗In May 2000, another decree no. 122, [ordered] 
closing of all stores selling cassettes, videos, and disks in the Kurdish language and re-
emphasised the prohibition of using this language during meetings and festivals‘ (Tejel, 
2009:122).  The above section shows that banning education in Kurdish and restricting 
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the Kurdish culture have been legalised in Syria. Despite promises by the Syrian 
authorities to change the status of Syrian Kurds since 2000, the unequal legal status of 
the Kurds has been exacerbated as the consequence of issuing new decrees (the two 
presidential decrees of 2008) the Kurds by the Syrian authorities.  
7.6 Kurdish political organisations and ill-treatment due to political activities  
           Kurdish organisations are illegal in Syria and none of them is legally recognised by the 
government. Advocating Kurdish political parties is dealt with harshly by the Syrian 
authorities: ‗Kurdishness continues to be considered, in spite of some perceptible 
changes, a sign of fitna (dividing of society) by the regime‘ (Tejel, 2009:2). One of the 
most active Kurdish political parties in Syria, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Unity in 
Syria (the Yekiti Party, for short) operates under the motto, ‗Struggle for the national 
rights of the Kurdish people‘. Their activities have led to persecution of their members 
by the Syrian authorities. Yekiti has been active in recent years; a Kurdish conference in 
Washington took place on 12 March 2006, where the Yekiti Party had a prominent role. 
If members of the Yekiti Party come to the attention of the Syrian authorities, however, 
they are subject to ill treatment. 
              According to the Syrian Human Rights Organisation, many members and supporters of 
the Yekiti Party in Aleppo were arrested and taken from their homes. On 24 July 2005, 
a Syrian state security court sentenced four Kurds to two and a half years in prison for 
separatist activities. The four men, all members of the Yekiti Party, were accused of 
‗belonging to a secret organisation seeking to annex part of Syria to a foreign country‘. 
They were also charged with ‗damaging relations with a friendly country‘, referring to 
neighbouring Turkey where Kurdish militants are seeking self-rule. A Syrian security 
court sentenced Farhat Abdul Rahman Ali from the Yekiti Party and Ibrahim Nasaan of 
the Democratic Kurdish Unity Party to three years imprisonment with hard labour, 
noting that the two men were arrested by the Syrian authorities in the autumn of 2002 
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and beginning of 2003. Two prominent figures within the Yeketi Party, Marwan 
Uthman and Hasan Saleh, were arrested after they led a peaceful demonstration in front 
of the Parliament building demanding more freedoms for Kurds in Syria. Reports 
indicate that they have been severely mistreated, tortured and their relatives have been 
prevented from visiting them. They continue to await a ruling to be passed by the 
Supreme State Security Court after being charged by the prosecutor with conspiring to 
separate a part of Syria.
 Another Kurd, Ibraheem Na‘san continues to be imprisoned 
after a year and a half after promoting material which pertains to Kurdish culture. The 
Human Rights Watch (2007:11) reports:   
On May 13, 2007, the same Damascus court sentenced in absentia both 
Khalil Hussain, a member of the Kurdish Future movement, and Sulaiman 
Shummar, a member of the political bureau of the unauthorized Worker‘s 
Revolutionary Party and a leader of the National Democratic Gathering (a 
coalition of five Syrian opposition political parties), to five years in prison for 
‗weakening national sentiment‘ and ‗undertaking acts and writings 
unauthorized by the Syrian government that may expose Syria to aggressive 
acts or spoil its relations with another state.‘ Lawyers attending the hearing 
were unclear whether the five-year sentences handed down against Hussain 
and Shummar for each of the offenses were meant to be served 
simultaneously or consecutively.  
 
           This evidence shows that Kurdish political parties, including the Yeketi Party, are illegal 
and when their members come to the authorities‘ attention, they are subject to 
persecution. The Syrian authorities exercise guilt by association, i.e., punishing the 
entire family or community for what is perceived as a crime of one of their members. It 
is obvious that the Syrian authorities and the Constitution do not allow the Kurds to 
establish political or non-political bodies in the country. Hence, the freedom of speech 
and equal citizenship of the Kurds are not guaranteed by Syria‘s political and legal 
structures.  
7.7 General violations of the rights of Kurdish people 
            Before addressing the position of Kurds in the Syrian political system, three points need 
to be made. Firstly, it has to be mentioned from the outset that the majority of the 
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international human rights organisations mix specific Kurdish cases with violations of 
human rights in general, without mentioning the identity of the victims, apart from the 
fact that they are from Syria. Thus it is difficult to gain a specific picture about the 
treatment of Kurds at the hands of the Syrian authorities. An exception to this is the 
well-known case of the mass withdrawing of the right to citizenship from thousands of 
Kurds. Secondly, the Syrian government tightly controls the flow of news from the 
remote Kurdish areas. Puder (2006:34) puts it this way: 
While the world‘s attention is focused on the war in Iraq, the internal 
Palestinian strife, the Israeli-Hamas confrontation in Gaza and the clashes 
between the Lebanese army and Syrian supported Fatah al-Islam, scant 
attention has been paid to developments inside Syria. The regime of Bashar 
Assad has used this opportunity to re-launch the campaign of ethnic cleansing 
in the Kurdish region of Hasakah. The Syrian press, controlled by the regime, 
prevents access to the foreign press, and the abuses of the Kurds have gone 
practically unreported. News of the ethnic cleansing is arriving almost 
exclusively through letters and faxes from persecuted Kurds.  
 
           Thirdly, the laws are drafted in vague terms and are intended to make it convenient for 
the security services to prosecute Kurdish activists without revealing their ethnic 
identity in any manner that suits them. For example, Kurds are charged with offences 
that do not acknowledge the Kurdish identity of the accused and yet criminalise them 
for their ethnicity: working for a secret organisation aiming to annex part of Syrian 
territory to a foreign country; membership of an unauthorised organisation; attempting 
to annex part of Syrian territory to another state; or opposing national unity. The 
government of Syria has been implementing the policies of Arabisation towards the 
Kurds.   
              Syria is still controlled by undemocratic apparatuses and by the secret services. The 
Supreme State Security Court imposes harsh sentences while random arrests continue to 
target members of the Damascus Declaration, the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamists, and 
those who call for democracy and human rights. The state of emergency that has been 
imposed on Syria since 1963 permits arrest without warrant. Kurds are the largest non-
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Arab ethnic minority in Syria, comprising about 10 percent of the population of 18.5 
million. They remain subject to systematic discrimination, including the arbitrary denial 
of citizenship to an estimated 300,000 Syrian-born Kurds. Tensions have remained high 
since serious clashes between Kurdish demonstrators and security forces in Qamishli in 
2006 which left more than 30 dead and 400 injured. Despite a general presidential 
pardon for those involved in the March 2004 clashes, dozens of Kurds still face trial in 
the criminal court of Al-Hasake, reportedly on charges of inciting disturbances and 
damaging public property.  
              The lack of nationality and identity means that stateless Kurds, for all practical 
purposes, are rendered non-existent. Their basic rights to education, employment, 
property ownership, political participation and legal marriage are severely limited, 
relegating them to the outermost margins of Syrian civil society. In an attempt to 
mitigate the desperation of their plight, some Kurds have begun to mobilise themselves 
to advocate for their recognition. Others take tremendous risks to leave Syria illegally 
and seek opportunities abroad. Those caught may be deported back, imprisoned, and 
subjected to harsh treatment. Individuals who actively tried to change the situation for 
stateless Kurds have also been detained and tortured. ‗The exceptional Supreme State 
Security Court (SSSC) handed down seven-year sentences to two Kurds and two-and-a-
half-year sentences to three Kurds convicted of ―membership of an unauthorised 
organisation‖ and ―attempting to annex part of Syrian territory to another state‖. These 
charges are routinely levied against Syrian Kurdish activists.‘ (SSSC 2006:34).  During 
the events which started at the football stadium in Qamishli on 12 March 2006, many 
people were killed; almost all of them were Kurds. They were killed apparently as a 
result of the use of lethal force by the security forces. No official investigation is known 
to have been carried out into the series of incidents which led to widespread riots, into 
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the use of lethal force by the security forces, the mass arrests and reports of torture and 
ill-treatment that followed, or into the root causes of the events.  
              The authorities have arrested dozens of Kurdish activists who have demanded their 
cultural rights and more freedoms for the Kurdish ethnic minority. To sum up, one of 
the common accusations against any Kurd who wants to assert his or her ethnicity, even 
in a very discreet manner, is the accusation of belonging to a ‗secret organisation aiming 
to annex part of Syrian territory to a foreign country‘. Kurds in Syria are suffering from 
ethnic cleansing in the Kurdish areas, and it is occurring unnoticed. In addition, their 
ethnic and cultural identity is prohibited and any cultural activities they engage in are 
seen as attempts to overthrow the regime. The human rights violations against Kurds are 
disproportionate in comparison with other groups in Syria. None of the individuals who 
are mentioned in the above examples demonstrated violence against the authorities. 
‗One person was killed because he did not speak the official language of the country, 
Arabic‘ (SHRC: 2008). 
7.8 The Kurdish issue in Syria after the March 2004 unrest 
            With the war in Iraq and the federalism agreement of March 2004, which secured 
Kurdish linguistic, cultural and political rights within a federal Iraq, the Kurds of Syria 
have come under increasing attacks from both the regime and as a result of escalating 
anti-Kurdish sentiment among Syria‘s majority Arab population. On 14 March 2004, on 
the Syrian Kurdish unrest, the New York Times reported ‗Syrian Kurds, inspired by the 
changes next door in Iraq – where the Kurds are seeking to enshrine their distinct 
identity in a new constitution – have become increasingly vocal in demanding minority 
rights. The government suspects them of seeking autonomy or even trying to break 
away to join Iraqi Kurdistan‘. The March 2004 unrest in Syrian Kurdistan left a strong 
impression on the international community and also shook the political system in Syria. 
The Syrian Ba‘th authorities realised for the first time that the Kurdish issue needed to 
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be addressed. In an extensive interview with the television network Al-Jazeera early in 
May 2004, Bashar Al-Assad, the president, said: ‗Syrian Kurds are fully-fledged 
citizens; that the March Qamishli incidents were not instigated by outside influences 
and, more importantly, that the 1962 census, which revoked the nationality of over 
150,000 Kurds, had been largely unjust … The Kurds that were unjustly stripped of 
their nationality would be able to retrieve it very soon.‘ (Al-Jazeera 2004:2-3). Not 
much has happened since this promise. At the time, the president was simply attempting 
to calm the situation. Amnesty International (2004:9) states ‗At least 40 Syrian Kurds, 
including children, have reportedly been killed, most of them by the security forces, 
since violent clashes at a 12 March football match. Hundreds of people, some reports 
say up to 2,500, including children, remain in detention. Most are held incommunicado, 
without access to lawyers or relatives, and thereby at risk of torture or ill-treatment. 
              Warner (2004:43) writes ‗It is alarming that at least 40 people appear to have been 
deliberately killed or been the victims of excessive force by the security forces. These 
people may have been persecuted as a result of their Kurdish origins.‘ Amnesty 
International has received the names of hundreds of Syrian Kurds, including children, 
who remain in detention. Although some 500–600 of those arrested were reportedly 
released around 19 March 2004, the whereabouts of up to 2,500 people reportedly still 
in detention remain unknown. Some reports suggest that many of the injured are 
effectively being held in detention in government hospitals, said to be surrounded by 
security forces. Enhancing the position of the Kurds of Iraq has not led to a change in 
the policies of the Syrian government towards its Kurds. Instead the Syrian state 
establishments have intensified the pressure and have attempted to impose Arab identity 
on the Kurds of Syria. Although Iraq has come some way in giving equal citizenship to 
its Kurdish population, it appears Syria still has a long way to go. 
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7.9 The two presidential decrees of 2008  
Presidential Decree 49 of 10 September 2008 principally concerns the right of Syrian 
citizens to hold property in the border areas of the country. With immediate effect, there 
were to be no more entries in the land register. If this decree is complied with 
completely, property can no longer be bought or sold, nor can it be bequeathed to the 
landowner‘s legal heirs. Those most affected are the Kurdish and Assyrian Aramaic 
ethnic groups in the three governorates (Muhafazat) on the Turkish-Syrian border; 
Hasaka, Ar-Raqah and Aleppo. The region lies on the long border of Syria with Iraq and 
Jordan; it is semi-desert and is sparsely populated. 
   Those affected by this decree will suffer the same fate as others who have already 
been arrested. They are seen as betrayers of the country. Many Kurds already live in the 
slums around Damascus because having been driven out of their homes by Decree 49 
and subsequent lack of employment, and by the Arabisation of their ancient homelands. 
Others have left Syria to work in domestic service in Lebanon and Jordan, and many 
have tried to seek asylum in Europe. Abuse of non-violent Kurdish activists is 
widespread, as was illustrated previously. Another decree was issued on 23 November 
2008 which undermines Kurdish culture (Sahin 2009:1). An English translation of the 
decree follows: 
Province of Hasaka - City Council of Maalikia  
No. /1118/ - Date 23/11/2008 
Final Warning 
To bookstores, offices, publishing houses and printing establishments owners 
and calligraphers in Maalikia city; 
Executing the instructions of the Strengthening Arabic Language Committee 
that are concerned with protecting and taking care of Arabic language, we order 
the following: 
1. It is strictly prohibited to print any card, posting card, ads paper or bulletin 
board in any language except Arabic. And if the name of a shop or office is not 
in Arabic it must be written with Arabic characters as it is pronounced and the 
Roman characters may be written but in small size under the Arabic letters like: 
Maria. 
2. Limited advertising or billboards may be in Roman characters only.  
Appreciating your cooperation 
President of City Council of Maalikia 
Engineer Jan Al-Qess Yosef 
  
206 
(stamp and signature) 
 
The above decree shows that there is not a genuine exclusive policy to handle the Syrian 
Kurds and these decreases are obstacles in delivering equal citizenship for the Kurds in 
the country.  
7.10 Concluding Remarks  
           The extensive objective evidence provided in this chapter suggests that Kurds are an 
oppressed ethnic group in Syria. Kurds are not recognised in the Syrian Constitution as 
an ethnic group, despite the fact that the Kurds are different from ruling Arabs in their 
language and culture. Equal citizenship for the Kurds and other non-Arab minorities 
does not exist. This makes Kurds suspicious and liable to be punished more severely by 
the authorities. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims while the faith of the state is Alavi. The 
Kurdish language is banned in all aspects of life, including education, the media and all 
linguistic and cultural activities. The Syrian government practises guilt by association, 
i.e., punishing the entire family for what is perceived as a crime by one family member. 
This chapter has discussed briefly how the discriminatory law in Syria can lead to 
internal oppression. The relationship between the Kurds and the Syrian authorities has 
been tense in the last few years. Syrian Kurds, perhaps under the influence of the Kurds 
in Iraq, have been more active. Since March 2004, Syrian Kurds have started an 
intensive campaign for more ethnic rights. Dozens have been killed and hundreds are 
detained. Human rights organisations report that the Syrian authorities are in breach of 
the norms, charters and laws of internationally recognized human rights.  
Syria has a strong central government with oppressive armed forces, security and 
intelligence apparatus. This is directly controlled by the extensive and highly organised 
security and intelligence services that operate there through all levels of society and 
walks of life. Additionally there are a number of vigilante groups linked to different 
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centres of power in Syria. The extensive information and evidence that are available 
reasonably suggest that if a Kurd comes to the attention of the Syrian authorities, he or 
she is exposed to real risk of arrest and imprisonment without due process for alleged 
political involvement. In that situation, Kurds are deprived of meeting members of their 
family; subjected torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment, which is legal in 
Syria, and deprivation of access to a fair trial under an independent and properly 
constituted judiciary.  
   By Syrian law, Kurds, their language and their culture do not exist. The Syrian 
authorities assert an Arab identity for Syria which dismisses the Kurds, and all other 
ethnic and religious groups, notably Armenians, Circassians, Assyrians, Turkmens and 
Jews. The populations of Kurds and other non-Arab ethno-religious groups are not 
precisely known; the Syrian authorities do not recognise them. The Constitution only 
honours one type of Arab; the one who is in pursuit of the ‗Revolution‘s objectives: 
unity, freedom and socialism‘; and who also shall accept ‗the Socialist Arab Ba‘th 
Party‘ as the leading political group.  The Syrian government has taken advantage of the 
world‘s attention being focused on other issues to increase its oppression of its 
indigenous Kurds. At the same time, Europe is opening the door to Syria because this is 
to its political and economic advantage, while Kurds live in poverty and despair. 
Against this background the governments of Iran, Turkey and Syria continue to work 
together to ensure that Kurds accept the nationality of their respective countries, as 
second-class citizens at best, or to drive them out. The Syrian government considers that 
it has opened the door to discussions with the rest of the world, and that it can continue 
its programme of the ethnic cleansing of Kurds from its borders with impunity.  
   This chapter concludes that the state party should take effective measures to combat 
discrimination in practice against minority groups, in particular the Kurds. Such 
measures should be aimed especially at improving birth registration and school 
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attendance and allowing for the use of their languages and other expressions of their 
culture.  
   The continuing state of emergency, now in place for over 40 years, has also allowed 
the government to enforce a harsh security regime. Detention without trial, torture and 
curbs on freedom of expression are particularly serious, with those who even sign 
documents calling for greater rights being arrested and imprisoned. Abolition of the 
discriminatory articles of the Constitution and reform of the judicial system are 
milestones in improving the legal status of the Kurds of Syria. In order to ensure equal 
access to the political and educational institutions, and to guarantee civil and cultural 





8 Chapter eight: Discussions and conclusion  
The four countries of this study are part of the Middle East region. Iraq and Syria are the 
product of the end of World War One and collapsing of Ottoman Empire. However, 
Turkey and Iran as a country has been existed for a long time, but the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire affected indirectly on the structure of latter two countries. The four 
examined states attempted to consolidate themselves as unitary and homogenising 
nation-states. However, the present study argues that the four countries in need come to 
terms with the enduring reality of ethnic and religious cleavages, and find new ways of 
accommodating and respecting diversity. The pursuit of national homogenisation by 
Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria has led to resistance movements, deliberate discrimination 
and even civil war-in countries. The four case studies show that the constitutions and 
penal codes of the four countries are in crisis and need a radical reform. The new 
political and legal systems of Iraq after 2003 are less discriminatory comparing with the 
previous one, however, the other three countries‘ constitutions and penal codes are 
based on deliberate discriminations and need a radical reform.  
   In the West, the adoption of multiculturalism and minority rights has typically taken 
place after the adoption and consolidation of political democracy and market 
economics. Democratic stability and a prosperous economy were already in place when 
the state embarked on policies to ‗pluralise‘ the state. In Middle East including the four 
examined counties of the present study, by contrast, claims for multiculturalism and 
equal citizenship are often coinciding with democratisation; indeed, the latter is a 
driving force for the former. Attempting to adopt multiculturalism and equal citizenship 
in the Middle East of a democratic transition raises difficult issues that were not present 
in most Western cases. A democratising country needs to set up institutions to ensure 
equal citizenship for all individuals. Where those are not present or functioning 
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properly, minorities may use their group rights to deny equal rights and opportunities to 
members of other communities in the Middle East, or even to pressure them to leave. 
Without firm protection of individual civil and political rights, minority rights can 
create islands of tyranny, in which formerly oppressed minorities reproduce these 
patterns of exclusion at a more local level.   
   This chapter presents the conclusions of the thesis and emphasises the important 
issues surrounding the legal status of the Kurds. This chapter highlights the major and 
significant reforms needed in order to establish a state that guarantees equal rights for 
the Kurds. Lack of equal citizenship (equal access to political, educational, social and 
economic institutions of the country) for the Kurds should be taken seriously and further 
research is necessary. In order to achieve this aim, this chapter addresses five issues and 
how they interact with one another. The identities of the countries of Iraq, Turkey, Syria 
and Iran are in crisis. The absence of a liberal constitution and the existence of a 
political system biased against a particular sect, language or ethnicity. The 
constitutional attempts of these four countries to deliberate discrimination the Kurds 
rather than guaranteeing equal citizenship for them and finally what can be done 
through international organisations and carrying out internal reforms to improve the 
legal status of the Kurds.   
8.1 Structural causes of treatment of the Kurds  
It is particularly necessary in a Middle Eastern context to stress the conceptual 
difference between state, regime and government and the populations or the citizens.  
The ruling elite in the four states on which this study emphasises use a combination of 
means, varying from one state to another, to manipulate and seek to affect and transform 
the political culture of their people. The elite want to maintain their position and 
enhance their power; therefore, they implement and make available a variety of options. 
The powerful figures in these regimes, especially the leaders and their close family 
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members, want to be seen by the people as heroes, as the sole defenders of their 
interests and, above all, as their saviours. In order to achieve this, they use diverse 
channels including educational institutions, religious foundations and state media. 
Additionally they make changes to legislation and use force when necessary.   
   The four countries studied in this thesis mishandle their minority populations 
including the Kurds; this has led to an absence of equal citizenship. The poor legal 
status of the Kurds investigated in the thesis demonstrates how the Kurds are not treated 
equally. On the status of minorities and how they should be treated, Hassanpour (1992: 
xxxiv) argues:  
Why is minority status usually or at least frequently considered 
disadvantageous?  It is not necessary that such a status is a bad one; for 
instance, the Italian speaking population of Switzerland does not consider itself 
an Italian minority; they consider themselves Italian-speaking Swiss. Cultural 
differences can be overcome as well: the Parsees in India (Zoroastrians who 
emigrated from Iran after the Muslim conquest, keeping their religion and 
partly also their language) do not consider themselves a separate political 
entity. Political nationhood has prevailed over the ethnic one. On the contrary, 
the worst type of situation obtains when a minority lives in a state which is 
openly hostile to it. 
 
Establishing the states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, based on Turkish, Persian and 
Arab identities created major obstacles for the minority populations, including the 
Kurds.  Nations often matter more to people than states. Monoethnic Serbia makes more 
sense to some than multicultural Bosnia; a Hutu (or a Tutsi) Rwanda makes more sense 
to others than a peaceful shared citizenship of Tutsi and Hutu; only when Britain and 
France became nations as well as states did ordinary citizens come to care much about 
being French or British. States, on the other hand, matter morally, intrinsically. They 
matter not because people care about them but because they regulate the lives of the 
people through forms of coercion that will always require moral justification.  In the 
four countries examined, coercion rather than persuasion is pervasive in handling the 
Kurds.   
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The identities of the four countries examined in this thesis are in crisis. This is because 
the indigenous populations of these four countries belong to a specific type of nation 
which is based on one ethnicity, sect or religion. Hence, this chapter proposes a new 
form of identity based on liberal principles. Identity is put forward as a major 
contributor to the resurgence of nationalism, often against the state itself. Alternatively, 
identity may explain how groups are formed that place themselves outside civil society 
and formulate an alternative way of life, which Castells (1997:65-66) names 
‗communes based on a certain project‘. Building upon this distinction, society is divided 
into different identity groups that are based not on traditional classes in the Marxist 
sense, but on groups that seek or behold self-determination communally and opposed to 
the established society. By identity, what is meant is the idea of an individual belonging 
to a collective where the members recognise each other and where the individual finds 
guidelines of meaning and concurring behavioural patterns. ‗Identity is important 
because it is the focus around which people can become mobilised to act to change their 
conditions and to pursue social goals‘ (Castells 1997:8). A collective identity may be 
the primary means of mobilisation, while simultaneously providing the individuals 
involved with a feeling of belonging, which paves the way for social obligations.  
   A common identity may even be created and promoted politically to form a singular 
group. Thus, recognition of identity is vital for the implementation of political goals. 
Monitoring and formation of identity are fundamentally challenging to the legitimacy of 
the state. Identity from a liberal point of view entails a number of interrelated 
phenomena. First of all, identity is something of the individual and for the individual. 
The identity of a liberal collective is characterised by the idea of freedom for every 
member in it, even though each member is aware of certain duties that have to be 
performed to guarantee the maintenance of his or her own freedom and that of the 
collective. The new interests of newly formed subgroups can focus on ethnicity, locality 
  
213 
or environmentalism. Politically, their voice for reform is heard more loudly than that of 
another group that is not really a group at all. This last category of people is not 
politically mobilised nor may they be. Its members are disconnected from societal 
progress and are left behind with little or nothing. This group is hardly represented 
politically so they are hardly reckoned with. With the rise of powerful democratic 
nation-states this group previously seemed to be fading away, but now it is growing 
once more. A neoliberalism has emerged from the end of the last century which has 
been parallel with civil society and international organisations. A new form of 
governance has been advocated. A cosmopolitan liberal might say that we are caught up 
in a transition from the liberal division within the state to a more homogeneous 
liberalism. The challenge to a liberal state is emerging ethnic nationalism and other 
separatist movements. The process of collective identity construction is highly political. 
   In light of the above facts and definitions of a liberal definition of identity, the current 
status of the four countries investigated in this thesis shows that the indigenous 
populations of the four countries are not free to choose their identity; rather they have 
an identity imposed on them which is created by the state. Hence, improving the legal 
status of the Kurds to remove the ill-treatment of the Kurds is a deeper matter than the 
reform of the constitutions or judicial systems of these four countries. Instead it is a 
problem of how the states impose an identity on the minorities, including the Kurds. 
Therefore, citizenship and the nation-state in these four countries are in crisis because 
their definitions of citizenship and the nation are exclusive. It is obvious that the four 
countries are complex and they have failed in creating cosmopolitanism as a post-
national nation of identity.  
The debate on citizenship refers to rights and identities, to moral and political values, 
and to the sharing of civic responsibilities within a given political community. The 
national project on which the four studied countries are founded on is an ethno-cultural 
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conception of the nation, rather than a political one. Consociational democracies such as 
Belgium and Switzerland are based on the recognition of communal divisions, which 
are regulated by the institutionalisation of compromise through various procedures; 
power-sharing between the elites of the major groups, proportional representation for 
each community within the higher political and administrative levels and direct 
management by the communities of certain domains (such as education). De-
ethnicisation of the nation-state is a vital step in implementing equal citizenship. Equal 
citizenship is about the responsibilities as well as the privileges of citizenship. 
Improving the poor legal status of the Kurds is not motivated by citizenship centred on a 
common culture but by citizens committed to common institutions, to the conditions 
necessary for a common life. What is required to live together in a nation is a mutual 
commitment to the organisation of the state, the institutions that provide the overarching 
order of the common life. In order to improve the poor legal status of the Kurds, the 
identity of the four states needs to be inclusive not exclusive. This would lead to 
creating a nation where the inhabitants belong to the state institutions rather than to a 
specific ethnicity or sect.  
8.2 Representation and recognition  
Most of the countries in the world have ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic 
minorities that are different from the majority. Will (1996:1) states ‗[a]ccording to 
recent estimates, over 600 living language groups, and 5000 ethnic groups exist in the 
world‘s 184 independent states. It can be seen in few countries that all citizens share the 
same language, or belong to the same ethno national group‘. The diverse character of 
nations creates substantial questions for countries to achieve real democracy which does 




Minorities and majorities increasingly clash over such issues as language 
rights, regional autonomy, political representation, education, curriculum, land 
claims, immigration, and naturalization policy, even national symbols, such as 
the choice of national anthem and public holidays. Finding morally defensible 
and politically viable answers to these issues are the greatest challenge facing 
democracies today.  
  
Democratic society requires that the majority has regard to the interests of all groups 
and people in the state, not only those of its supporters. These interests of minorities 
should not be left to the mercy of the majority and their rights should not be removed by 
majority votes. Real democracy also needs to provide minorities with the opportunity to 
participate at all levels of society with their own identity without fear and on equal 
terms with the majority.  
   The right to political participation of minorities, namely the representation of 
minorities and their interests, plays a critically important role in achieving real 
democracy. Why should minorities be represented by their representatives rather than 
by the majority or other groups? The main reason is that fundamentally everyone knows 
what is best for their own interests. This also applies to minority groups with regard to 
their needs and preferences. Therefore, the Kurds should be involved in the processes of 
recognition, representation and participation in order to influence the state policies that 
affect them. Gianni Zappala provides more valuable points and broader clarification 
regarding the importance of minority representation when he explains the importance of 
mirror representation, based on the idea that members of certain groups or certain 
experiences cannot be sufficiently represented by members of another group (Zappala 
1997:137) argues:  
Parliamentary presence in relation to ethnicity first provides the political 
system with a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of all the citizenry. Secondly 
elected representatives from an ethnic background may be more responsive and 
empathetic to the wishes of the constituents from ethnic backgrounds than 
representatives who are not….. Finally, and related to the legitimacy argument, 
is the symbolic importance of having members from ethnic groups visible in 
the various legislatures. Struggles over identity politics are essentially about 
appropriate symbols and who has the power to define those symbols. As key 
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institutions where symbolic struggles often take place, parliaments should 
contain representatives of different ‗interpreters‘ of the symbols of nation.  
 
In relation to the legitimacy argument, minority representation in parliament strengthens 
the legitimacy of parliament, and thus parliamentary democracy. When people can look 
and see people like themselves, they are much more likely to identify with an institution 
and have a sense of ownership. Karina (2003:06) states ‗[m]inority representation is an 
important stage for the recognition of minorities. It provides a powerful symbol of 
minority acceptance and inclusion especially where minority groups have historically 
been excluded from the political system‘. Putting minority issues on the agenda is 
another important feature of minority representation. Being on the agenda will lead 
other members of groups to be aware of minority issues and perhaps this will create a 
public consensus regarding the need for solutions.  
   Minority representation is also of crucial importance in ensuring the rights of 
minorities and preventing discrimination against minorities. Without active participation 
in the decision-making process, other rights and the prevention of discrimination of 
minorities cannot be effectively ensured and minority rights protection can be 
substantially weakened. Especially in those states where ethnic nationalism exists, it is 
unlikely that the majority will vote for parties or candidates of other nations or ethnic 
groups. ‗Being excluded from the political system without special protection will result 
in the absence of the voice of minorities and consequently pose a risk to democracy‘ 
(Florian
 
2002/03). As a number of scholars of divided societies and ethnic relations 
point out, without minorities conventional institutions, democracies are insufficient to 
allow for a stable democratic system in diverse society. 
   In light of the above explanations, it is important that the four countries adopt an 
inclusive political system towards their minorities in order to fulfil the principles of 
representations and recognition for their citizens. This would be one of the crucial ways 
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of improving the current legal status of the Kurds. The existence of minorities is usually 
seen as a threat and as a result, special policies are adopted by states to eliminate the 
identity of minorities, who face discrimination, marginalisation and poverty. This raises 
the question of whether the existence of minorities and their demands for recognition 
and protection of their rights constitute the cause of conflicts, or whether the reaction 
that they get from states to their demands makes the minority issues more complex and 
creates the conflict. States believe that recognition of minorities leads to power leaking 
to minority groups that will thus constitute a threat to the stability of the nation-state 
system and lead to separation. A number of scholars support this idea and argue that 
recognition of minority rights decreases the interaction between majority and minority 
groups. ‗Decreasing interaction results in a lack of communication between groups and 
a lack of knowledge about other groups which in turn eventually leads to ethnocentrism, 
stereotyping and mutual distrust‘ (Blum 2001:122). Morton Deutsch (2001:122) 
explains ‗lack of communication creates misperceptions, which increases hostility 
which further hinders communication‘. This argument is inaccurate, because 
recognising and guaranteeing the rights of minorities assists the stability of a country 
and enhances the nation-state system. The current legal status of the Kurds and the 
instability of the four countries analysed is an obvious of example of this thesis‘s 
argument.  
   Recognition and representation of the Kurds in the four countries analysed is the first 
step towards a radical reform in improving their legal status and guaranteeing their 
equal citizenship. The above sections deal with the structural problems of the four state 
countries and how these problems can be challenged. The following sections examine 
the role of external factors in changing the poor legal status of the Kurds.   
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8.3 The role of external factors in improving the legal status of the Kurds  
Over the past two decades, the ideas of multiculturalism and minority rights have been 
‗internationalised‘ in two distinct ways, first, a discourse of multiculturalism in 
circulating amongst elites who participate in international networks of activities, 
scholars, and policy-makers. Through these networks, a certain way of talking about 
ethnocultural diversity is being diffused around the world, premised on principles of 
tolerance and ideas of justice. Within this discourse, minorities are seen, not as a 
problem to be solved or a threat to be neutralised, but as legitimate members of the state 
whose identity and culture must be respected. Second, formal international standards of 
minority rights are being adopted by international organisations such as the United 
Nations (UN), the Word Bank, and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). These 
organisations have attempted to codify minimum standards for the behaviour of states in 
relation to their minorities, and to establish mechanisms to monitor state compliance 
with them.  
   Debates over state-minority relations will continue to have a strong international 
dimension. This may take the form of the codification, monitoring, and enforcement of 
international legal norms on minority rights. As we have seen, there are some existing 
international standards, particularly regarding indigenous peoples, as well as proposals 
to strengthen the codification and enforcement of other types of minority rights, but 
even if international law remains quite weak, there is still the court of international 
public opinion. The idea that the treatment of minorities are intensively monitored by a 
range of international nongovernmental organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, 
Cultural Survival, and Minority Rights Groups, and any perceived injustices regarding 
quickly publicised around the world. International campaigns regarding Tibet, or East 
Timor, are relevance of the capacity to mobilise public opinion in these issues. 
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In that sense, there is no escaping the internationalisation of minority rights debates. 
State policies towards minorities will be evaluated in a global context, using a global 
discourse, in light of global trends. And, for the moment at least, this global discourse is 
dominated by the ideas of equal citizenship and liberal multiculturalism. To date, 
Middle East countries have been surprisingly absent from the global debate. There have 
seen a flurry of activity on minority and indigenous rights in virtually every region of 
the world except Middle East. There have been important developments in the Americas 
through the organisation of American states, in Europe through their council of Europe 
and the OSCE High Commissioner of National Minorities, and even in Africa, where 
the African Union has been discussing the idea of the regional charter of minority 
rights. In all these cases, it was recognised that the global debate and discourse did not 
adequately address certain regional specificities, and that it was important to formulate 
an alternative and supplementary regional framework, addressing their own needs. To 
date, however, there have seen nothing comparable in the Middle East except Turkey, as 
a result, the Middle East countries continue to be judged by standards that they little 
rule in formulating, and that may not be appropriate for them.  
   One of the major factors which may play a significant role in improving the poor legal 
status of the Kurds would be external actors. They can be international organisations, 
NGOs and the European Union. The end of the Cold War has led to a widespread 
debate about the rights of minorities and the role of the state in dealing with its 
indigenous population.  Kirisci and Winrow (19922:31) argue: ‗The activities of 
international organizations, non-governmental organisations, and multinational 
corporations in the Cold War era had already led analysts to question increasingly the 
validity of an exclusively state-centric approach. The end of the Cold War has resulted 
in a much less rigid but as the same time more unstable and volatile international 
environment‘. Declarations of independence by most of the Soviet republics resulted in 
  
220 
the acceleration of the disintegration of the USSR. The issues of minority rights and 
human rights in general are also now firmly on the international agenda. The following 
sections assess the role of international factors in assisting the process of improving the 
legal status of the Kurds in the Middle East.  
8.3.1 Monitoring human rights records 
 
This section addresses the need for a mechanism and an organisation to deliver equal 
citizenship for the Kurds, while recognising that human rights violations, are prohibited 
in the current laws of all member states including the countries ruling over Kurdistan; 
Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. Safeguarding human rights records globally can be 
achieved in three steps. Firstly, monitoring the human rights records of UN members 
and organisations that have the power of prosecution to identify the perpetrators; 
secondly, ensuring the punishment is proportional to the crime that has been committed; 
and, thirdly, ensuring that the violation is not repeated. This leads to further promotion 
of the protection of human rights.  
   Failure to guarantee equal citizenship for the Kurds is perceived by this thesis as a 
violation of human rights. Therefore, this section highlights the importance of 
monitoring the human rights in order to deliver equal citizenship for the Kurds. The 
UN, the EU Parliament, democratic parliaments and human rights organisations such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch identify states and organisations 
perpetrating human rights abuses. While these institutions are promoting good human 
rights practices and norms, monitoring alone is not adequate, as the perpetrators, 
whether they are states or non-state actors, are not transparent in their human rights 
record. As a result, a great part of these atrocities are left in the dark and the perpetrators 
continue to deceive the international community. These states breach international laws, 
treaties, conventions and norms to which they are signatories.  
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The EU Human Rights Law (EUHRL) is an example of a law that defines human rights 
violations and safeguards human rights. However, this is only applicable in one part of 
the world – EU member states. If human rights law becomes universally accepted, then 
the international community would be in a position to define a crime. There is also, of 
course, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; however, these are guiding 
principles only and are not binding. If it is accepted the EUHRL, or even the various 
UN charters related to guarantying equal citizenship as the predominant point of this 
thesis to define what constitutes human rights and the abuses of them, then it be realises 
that there are modern constitutions among UN member states their constitutions 
authorise discrimination. Few examples are given in the countries that are the focus of 
this paper and where Kurdish people are divided, i.e. Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq.  
   In the constitution of Turkey, the Turkish term is not used as an ethnicity, but as a 
nationality. For example, an Armenian born in Turkey, to parents whose nationality is 
Turkish, becomes a Turk. Therefore, nationality is being ethnicised in Turkey. By EU 
standards this is regarded as persecution or a serious human rights violation. Article 3 of 
the Constitution of Turkey stipulates ‗The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is 
an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish‘. Article 3, therefore, denies that any other 
languages can be used in the country. This seemingly ambiguous statement could mean 
that every other language is illegal, or could allow some languages whilst banning 
others. This is what has happened to the Kurdish language. Article 42 in the 
Constitution of Turkey (2007) further elaborates on Article 3 ‗No language other than 
Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of 
training or education‘. Article 66 of the Turkish Constitution (as amended on 17 
October 2001) states: ‗Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of 
citizenship is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk‘.  
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This means the Turkish Constitution defines the language of the majority, Turkish, and 
no other language can have the same status as Turkish in Turkey. It is clear that this 
article is reveals the fear of Kurds and the Kurdish language because of their minority 
status in their own country and because as indigenous people they live on their own 
historical land, which is recognised by them as the Kurdistan region in Turkey. This 
mentality is embodied in the deeds of Turkish top decision makers. In Iran, no ethnicity 
is recognised in the Iranian Constitution. The Islamic Republic has refused to recognise 
the term ‗ethnicity‘, having replaced it with the concept of Islamic umma, such as in 
Ummat Al-Islam, or the Islamic people. Article 11 of the Iranian Constitution states 
(1989) ‗In accordance with the sacred verse of the Qur‘an, ―This community is a single 
community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me‖ [21:92], all Muslims form a single 
nation‘. Despite this claim that all communities in Iran constitute one nation, Article 15 
‗The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. 
Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as text-books, must be in this 
language and script‘. Therefore, Article 15 ensures that people living in Iran all 
assimilated as Persians and this article makes one race a dominant race. In this way the 
Iranian Constitution is very similar to the Turkish Constitution. The Iranian 
Constitution, nevertheless, allows publications in vernacular (native) languages. 
   The Iranian Constitution further defines this umma. It explicitly defines the state 
religion as Shia Islam, Jafari Twelve or Ithna‗ashariyyah‘. Article 12 of the Iranian 
Constitution (1989) stipulates ‗The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelve 
Ja'fari School and this principle will remain eternally immutable‘. Although many 
communities in Iran, including Kurds and Baloch, and most Arabs, are Sunni, no Sunni 
sect is recognised. How could Iran recognise other peoples and incorporate human 
rights in its constitution, when the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran did not 
believe in universal human rights and considered it as a conspiracy to deceive people (as 
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discussed in chapter five). The Iraqi Constitution has also reinforced the Islamic identity 
of Iraq in a number of its provisions, in particular Article 2 which is stated in chapter 
three.  
   Although the current Iraqi Constitution may not be in the same class as the 
aforementioned Turkish or Iranian examples, one can realise its inherent contradictions. 
For example, Islam is fundamentally opposed to democracy because one is about the 
absolute power of God and the other about people‘s will, which in many cases oppose 
each other. Iraq has to be recognised as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-faith and 
multi-sect country. All these different identities cannot be covered by imposing Islam as 
the religion of the state. Even though over 10% of the Syrian population are Kurds, 
Article 4 of the Syrian Constitution (1973) states ‗The Arab language is the official 
language‘. Article 21 of the Syrian Constitution clearly states the educational system is 
in Arabic, which could be seen as a denial of the Kurdish language as it denies the usage 
of Kurdish in the educational system. The educational and cultural system (this is 
quoted from the Constitution, as referred to in previous chapter) aims at creating a 
socialist nationalist Arab generation which is scientifically minded and attached to its 
history and land, proud of its heritage, and filled with the spirit of struggle to achieve its 
nation‘s objectives of unity, freedom, and socialism, and to serve humanity and its 
progress. From the above, Syria and Turkey can be seen to have marginalised the rights 
of Kurds to a greater degree than Iran and Iraq. However, all need to improve the legal 
status of the Kurds in their state by active measures. These examples illustrate how the 
UN has failed to influence member states and enforce its values, norms, and treaties to 
its member states.  
   Despite the fact that the UN has promoted some useful concepts to safeguard human 
rights values globally, it has fundamentally failed to enforce the powers of its watchdog 
organisations or to implement a constitution that would impose punishment for crimes 
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and human rights abuses as solutions. The failure to enforce may currently discredit the 
UN, but what undermines it is its selectivity in prosecuting war criminals such as in 
Yugoslavia and certain nations in Africa (most recently, the Sudanese President), yet 
turning a blind eye to crimes committed in Turkey, Syria or Iran. The failure of the 
UN‘s institutions in monitoring the legal status of the Kurds would not encourage the 
four studied countries to deliver equal citizenship for the Kurds.  
8.3.2  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The right to political participation is enshrined in several United Nations instruments. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the Declaration) defines the general 
principles of the right to political participation. Although the Declaration is not legally 
binding, it provides the foundation for other treaties and frameworks of minimum 
standards for states. Article 21(1) of the Declaration (1948) states ‗Everyone has the 
right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives‘, and according to Article 21(3), ‗The will of the people shall be the 
basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures‘. If the four countries implemented 
these two principles, the legal status of the Kurds would be in a better position. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a document that could assist in reforming the 
constitutions of the four countries analysed in this thesis. The provisions of this 
significant document could be adopted by the legal and judicial systems of the four 
countries.  
8.3.3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
16 December 1966. It entered into force on 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 
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49. Article 4 states ‗1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation 
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present 
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law 
and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin. 2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 
15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision. 3. Any State Party to the present 
Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other 
States Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the 
reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the 
same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation‘. (International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 1976).  
   The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant) has similar 
content to the Declaration regarding political rights. Differing from the Declaration, the 
Covenant is a binding treaty as it imposes some obligations and provides compliance 
mechanisms for signatory states. Using similar language to the Declaration, Article 25 
of the Covenant (1976) states ‗Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, 
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable 
restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections 
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors. (c) To have access, on 
general terms of equality, to public service in his country‘. Article 25 refers to Article 2 
of the Covenant to make clear that these rights must be enjoyed ‗without any 
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distinctions‘. The distinctions in Article 2 are explained as follows ‗Each State Party to 
the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status‘. Article 27 of the 
Covenant can be associated with the political participation of minorities. Although the 
article does not refer to political rights directly, the right to effective political 
participation for minorities is parasitic to the rights recognised in Article 27, which 
provides:
 
 In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language.  
   In its general comment on Article 27, the Human Rights Committee concluded that 
the enjoyment of the rights of minorities mentioned there may require positive legal 
measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of 
minority communities in decisions which affect them. Article 18 of the Covenant 
provides ‗1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or beliefs 
may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and 
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moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions‘. Article 26 
of the Covenant provides ‗All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without 
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other statuses‘.  
   The civil and political rights of the minorities of the four examined countries are very 
poor. In order to change the current situation and advance the civil and political rights of 
the Kurds, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would need to assist 
in this process. This thesis recommends that the articles of this convention to be adopted 
by the four examined countries. One major problem with all other UN instruments is the 
lack of effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
8.3.4  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination  
The political participation of all persons without discrimination on the basis of race, 
colour or other status is guaranteed by the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD:1969). Persons belonging to national or 
ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities also enjoy equal rights of political 
participation without any discrimination. Article 5 of ICERD (1969) provides ‗In 
compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, 
States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms 
and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national 
or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following 
rights: (...)  (c) Political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections-to vote 
and to stand for election-on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the 
Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal 
access to public service‘.  
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Ill-treatment towards the Kurds is based on ethnicity; adopting conventions on the 
elimination of all forms of racial discrimination would be a significant policy to be 
pursued by the four countries of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria to improve the legal status 
of the Kurds.  
8.3.5  Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities is an important instrument concerning the 
right to political participation of minorities. Article 2.2 provides ‗Persons belonging to 
minorities have the right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic 
and public life‘ (UNDRPNERLM: 1992). Article 2.2 expresses the right to participation 
from a general aspect. The term ‗public life‘ includes being elected, the holding of 
public office, voting and other political and administrative domains. Article 2.3 of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities particularly refers to the effective participation of minorities in the 
decision-making system and states ‗Persons belonging to minorities have the right to 
participate effectively in decisions on the national, and where appropriate, regional level 
concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a 
manner not incompatible with national legislation‘ (UNDRPNERLM: 1992). In his 
commentary on the Declaration, Asbjorn Eide (2000:8) explains that the minimum 
requirement for this is ‗[p]ersons belonging to minorities have the right to have their 
opinions heard and fully taken into account before decisions which concern them are 
adopted‘. The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities would play a significant role in the process of 
improving the poor legal status of the Kurds. The Kurds are discriminated against on 
basis of ethnicity (in Turkey, Iraq and Syria) and because the Kurds are Sunni Muslims 
they are discriminated against on the basis of religion and ethnicity in Iran.  
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8.3.6 The Council of Europe  
The Council of Europe as a regional club has an international impact. The documents, 
conventions and apparatus of the Council of Europe have inspired many countries 
across the world in the process of democratisation and improving the rights of 
minorities. In terms of the Kurds, the Council of Europe has already had a positive 
impact on improving the legal, political and cultural status of the Kurds of Turkey. This 
impact could be extended to other countries which have Kurdish populations.  
   The jurisdiction of the Organization of Security and Co-operation of Europe (OSCE) 
and the Council of Europe do not extend beyond the boundaries of Turkey. Hence, the 
series of tripartite discussions between Turkey, Iran and Syria are more an exercise in 
damage control rather than conflict resolution. In relation to the process of guaranteeing 
equal citizenship for the minorities and the Kurds, the conventions, recommendations 
and approaches of OSCE and Council of Europe would guide and inspire the policy and 
law makers of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.  
8.3.6.1 The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides the 
right to regular, free and fair elections within the context of political rights. The Article 
states ‗The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the 
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature‘ (CPHRFF:1953). Article 3 does 
not have a broad definition concerning the right to political participation compared with 
other international instruments. For example, the right to vote and to be elected is not 
mentioned explicitly in this article. However, Donna (1959:180) states on this article 
‗[p]resupposes the existence of a representative legislature, elected at reasonable 
intervals, as the basis of a democratic society‘. Moreover, the article has been clarified 
by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and by the Commission. As 
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regards the right to vote and to be elected, the Commission (No. 9267/81:97) concludes 
‗[i]n principle, the provision guarantees the right to vote and the right to stand as a 
candidate for election to the legislature. States may impose certain restrictions on the 
right to vote and to be elected as long as those restrictions are not arbitrary and do not 
infringe the free expression of the opinion of the people‘. 
   The Court has dealt with a number of issues concerning the political representation of 
minority groups. In the case of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, the Court had 
to decide whether Article 3 of Protocol 1 guarantees linguistic rights during the election 
period. The applicants were French-speaking Belgian nationals living in the Flemish 
regions. The applicants complained that they were prevented from sitting on the 
Flemish Council because they took their oath in French. The Court decided there was no 
violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 (ECtHR: 1987) stating:  
In any consideration of the electoral system in issue, its general context must 
not be forgotten. The system does not appear unreasonable if regard is had to 
the intentions it reflects and to the respondent state‘s margin of appreciation 
within the Belgian parliamentary system – a margin that is all the greater as the 
system is incomplete and provisional. One of the consequences for the 
linguistic minorities is that they must vote for candidates willing and able to 
use the language of their region. A similar requirement is found in the 
organisation of elections in a good many states. Experience shows that such a 
situation does not necessarily threaten the interests of the minorities.   
 
In a joint dissenting opinion, five members of the Court expressed their disagreement 
with the decision and stated that this may result in the violation of free expression. 
According to the dissenting opinion:   
Such a situation, excluding, as it does in practice, representation of the French-
speaking electorate of Halle-Vilvoorde at regional level, does not ensure ‗the 
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature‘ as 
stipulated in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-3), and it creates a language-based 
distinction contrary to Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention. (ECtHR: 1987).   
 
If freedom of expression means freedom to receive information and opinions, what 
happens if people do not understand the state language? For instance, as will be 
explained below, in the case of Kurdish minorities in Turkey, many cannot speak or 
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understand the state language. In this case, these kinds of restrictions would also violate 
their freedom of expression. Moreover, a broad scope in the state‘s margin of 
appreciation can be used as a justification by states to legitimate unnecessary 
restrictions on the use of non-official languages and to create other barriers to political 
representation. In a number of cases against Turkey, the Court has dealt with the issue 
of the dissolution of political parties. These parties were usually dissolved on the 
grounds that they aimed at undermining the unity and territorial integrity of the state. 
They were alleged to advocate terrorism and have the goal of dividing Turkey by 
referring to the Kurdish issue and proposing solutions to this question. In these cases the 
Court has usually stated that there was no incitement to the use of violence and breach 
of the rules of democracy. For example, in the case of the United Communist Party of 
Turkey and others v. Turkey the Court (ECtHR: 1998) states:   
The Court considers one of the principal characteristics of democracy to be the 
possibility it offers of resolving a country‘s problems through dialogue, without 
recourse to violence, even when they are irksome. Democracy thrives on 
freedom of expression. From that point of view, there can be no justification 
for hindering a political group solely because it seeks to debate in public the 
situation of part of the State‘s population and to take part in the nation‘s 
political life in order to find, according to democratic rules, solutions capable 
of satisfying everyone concerned.   
 
The Court decided that political parties are protected within the scope of Article 11 and 
found a violation of Article 11. In the cases of the Freedom and Democracy Party 
(OZDEP) v. Turkey, The Socialist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey, The United 
Macedonian Organization Ilinden-PIRIN and others v. Bulgaria and in some other cases 
regarding the dissolution of political parties, the Court reached the same conclusion and 
found violations of Article 11.  
   As regards the high threshold in the electoral system in the case of Yumak and Sadak 
v. Turkey, the Court examined whether the 10-per cent threshold in Turkey violates the 
Convention. The applicants were Kurdish politicians from Turkey who failed to get 
elected to parliament at the 2002 elections on account of their party not exceeding the 
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10-per cent national threshold, despite the party obtaining approximately 45 per cent of 
the votes in their region. According to Turkish law, a political party is required to 
receive 10 per cent of the national vote in order for it member(s) to enter parliament. 
The applicants complained that the imposition of the 10-per cent threshold in the 
parliamentary election violated their rights under Article 3 of Protocol 1. In this case, 
the Court pointed out that the 10-per cent threshold is higher than in any other European 
country and that it needs to be lowered. The Court avoided drawing this conclusion in 
its decision and the 10-per cent threshold was left within the margin of appreciation of 
the government. The Court (ECtHR: 2007) concluded that there was no violation of 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 and stated:  
While noting that it would be desirable for the threshold complained of to be 
lowered and/or for corrective counterbalances to be introduced to ensure 
optimal representation of the various political tendencies without sacrificing 
the objective sought (the establishment of stable parliamentary majorities), the 
Court considers that it is important in this area to leave sufficient latitude to the 
national decision-makers. In that connection, it also attaches importance to the 
fact that the electoral system, including the threshold in question, is the subject 
of much debate within Turkish society and that numerous proposals of ways to 
correct the threshold‘s effects are being made both in parliament and among 
leading figures of civil society.   
 
From the above section, it is obvious that the European Convention on Human Rights 
has had a considerable impact on improving the status of human rights of the citizens of 
Turkey. Hence, this Convention could play a significant role in changing the poor legal 
status of the Kurds in Turkey and consequently will affect the legal system of regional 
countries (Iraq, Iran and Syria), in guaranteeing equal citizenship for the Kurds.  
8.3.6.2 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
 
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is the most 
important and comprehensive convention under the Council of Europe regarding 
minorities. It is the first legally binding multilateral treaty devoted to protecting 
specifically minority rights. The Framework Convention provides mechanisms for the 
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implementation of the Convention. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe is entrusted with the task of monitoring the implementation by state parties.  
   Article 15 of the Framework Convention regulates the right to effective participation 
in general. The explanatory report on the Framework Convention and the 
opinions/recommendations of the Advisory Committee provide further clarification 
regarding the concept and the efficiency of the political participation. The explanatory 
report to the Framework Convention provides some measures that states may adopt to 
give effect to the public/political participation of national minorities. These measures 
are ‗consultation with these persons, by means of appropriate procedures and, in 
particular, through their representative institutions, when Parties are contemplating 
legislation or administrative measures likely to affect them directly; involving these 
persons in the preparation, implementation and assessment of national and regional 
development plans and programmes likely to affect them directly; undertaking studies, 
in conjunction with these persons, to assess the possible impact on them of projected 
development activities; effective participation of persons belonging to national 
minorities in the decision-making processes and elected bodies both at national and 
local levels and decentralised or local forms of government‘ (Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities: 1995).
 
In its several opinions and 
recommendations concerning the implementation of the states parties, the Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention has made a significant contribution to the 
political participation of national minorities.  
   The establishment of institutions and practices is one of the ways that the Advisory 
Committee suggests facilitating the effective political participation of national 
minorities. The Advisory Committee emphasises the importance of establishing 
advisory or consultative bodies and how these institutions can make a valuable 
contribution to increase the level and quality of dialogue between national minorities 
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and the relevant authorities. In a number of its opinions the Advisory Committee 
provides important information on how these institutions should operate. According to 
the Committee: ‗The areas in which national minorities are consulted should not be too 
restrictive and it should not be confined to just cultural and educational issues‘ 
(ACFC/INF/OP/I (2003)002:Para88). Paragraph 66 also states ‗[t]he effective 
participation of minorities requires that consultative or advisory bodies should be 
consulted on all issues specifically affecting minorities‘.  
   As regards representation in the advisory or consultative bodies, the Advisory 
Committee stresses the importance of providing permanent consultation structures for 
representatives of national minorities and involving all minorities in the advisory 
bodies. According to the Committee, authorities should consider creating a more 
consolidated structure for consultations of national minorities and involve all national 
minorities, including the numerically smallest ones on the advisory or consultative 
bodies. Such consultation of national minorities in relevant decision-making systems is 
also important at the local level and it should be taken place in all municipalities 
concerned. The Advisory Committee explains desired the working method and 
character of consultative bodies. According to the Committee, occasional meetings and 
consultations between national minorities and relevant authorities are not fully effective. 
The consultative bodies and authorities need to meet regularly and frequently to 
promote effective consultation and dialogue between authorities and national minorities. 
This should be considered at the local and regional level as well. The views of 
consultative bodies are sometimes disregarded without explanation by state agencies.  
   The Advisory Committee thinks that as well as seeking advice from consultative 
bodies more regularly, state authorities should also give reasons whenever they do not 
accept the views of consultative bodies. The Committee has noted that lack of staff and 
other resources restrict the effectiveness of the consultative bodies thus authorities 
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should provide further resources and sufficient staff. The Committee has drawn 
attention to unbalanced representation of minorities in consultative bodies and its results 
on decisions thus suggest authorities examine ways of strengthening the representation 
of minorities. The Committee further suggests that the number of minority members in 
consultative bodies should be more than a majority. The Advisory Committee points out 
that the members of national minority groups in consultative bodies should not be 
perceived as the sole and exclusive interlocutor of the authorities in minority questions. 
   The Advisory Committee comments on some issues in the context of electoral 
representation. For instance, regarding the language requirements for candidates in 
parliamentary and local elections, the Advisory Committee points out that this 
requirement has a negative impact on the effective participation of national minorities, 
that it is not compatible with article 15 of the Framework Convention and thus should 
be abolished. The parliamentary representation of small communities and dispersed 
members of national minorities (for example, Roma) is another issue regarding the 
effective political participation of national minorities, as states usually explain the 
situation of larger groups of national minorities in their reports. In this case authorities 
are encouraged to seek other means to take account of minority interests. The Advisory 
Committee is also concerned about the mechanisms for participation of travellers and 
insists on adequate provision for such non-territorial minorities. As regards citizenship, 
state parties usually report to the Advisory Committee on the formal equality of all 
citizens in terms of political rights. It can be argued that such equality should be evident 
in the very designation and design of the constitutional system. For example, 
designation in the constitution of the state is based on a particular nation or ethnic 
group, rather than all its citizens. In this case the Advisory Committee has noted that 
where a particular national or ethnic group is so nominated, particular steps should be 
taken to enhance effective participation for other groups as well.  
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The Kurds are a national minority and, with other minorities, they suffer from an 
exclusive legal and constitutional system in each of the four countries studied. The 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities can be used as 
guidance in improving the situation of national minorities of the four countries, because 
the minorities, including the Kurds, are vulnerable and need protection and this 
framework would play an important role in protecting their rights.  
8.3.6.3 European Charter of Local Self-Government 
 
The European Charter of Local Self-Government is an international treaty that was 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in June 1985. The 
treaty recognises improving local democracy as a method of protection of national 
minorities. The Preamble of the Charter emphasises the particular role and importance 
of local self-government and its contribution to the process of the construction of 
democratic principles in Europe. The Charter provides a number of significant 
principles for the member states of the Council of Europe concerning local self-
government. These principles are as follows ‗The right of citizens to participate in the 
conduct of public affairs is a democratic principle shared by all member States of the 
Council of Europe. It is at local level that this right can be most directly exercised. The 
existence of local authorities with real responsibilities can provide an administration 
which is both effective and close to the citizen. The safeguarding and reinforcement of 
local self-government is an important contribution to the construction of a Europe based 
on the principles of democracy and the decentralisation of power. The existence of local 
authorities endowed with democratically constituted decision-making bodies and 
possessing a wide degree of autonomy with regard to their responsibilities, the ways and 
means by which those responsibilities are exercised and the resources required for their 
fulfilment‘ (European Charter of Local Self-Government: 1985).  
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While the Charter states safeguarding and reinforcement of local self-government 
secures decentralisation of power as well as principles of democracy, this can be applied 
to the representation of minorities, as representation of minorities requires a 
decentralised state. Furthermore, state parties undertake to guarantee the political, 
administrative and financial independence of local authorities under the Charter. The 
Charter also provides for the principle of local self-government to be recognised in 
domestic legislation, and where practicable in the constitution. Adopting local 
democracy is another way of improving the human rights of the Kurds and guaranteeing 
equal citizenship. The Charter discussed in this section has outlined the concept of local 
self-government. Hence, this Charter could inspire the four countries to adopt different 
ways of governance which would consequently empower minorities and improve their 
legal status.  
8.3.7 The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National 
Minorities in Public Life 
Many recommendations of the European Union would be beneficial to assist the four 
examined countries to improve the legal status of the Kurds. However, this section 
emphasises on The Lund Recommendations because they are relevant to national 
minorities.  The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National 
Minorities in Public Life were drafted in 1999 by a group of international experts at the 
request of the High Commissioner of European Union National Minorities (OSCE) is 
the first comprehensive instrument on the mechanisms for achieving the inclusion of 
national minorities in public institutions. John Packer argues ‗[t]he Lund 
Recommendations are an authoritative interpretation of the relevant international 
standards concerning the political participation of minorities‘ (Packer 2000:41). The 
Lund Recommendations start by emphasising the importance of the effective 
participation of minorities for democratic society and explain their aim. The first Article 
of the Lund Recommendations (1999) states:  
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Effective participation of national minorities in public life is an essential 
component of a peaceful and democratic society. Experience in Europe and 
elsewhere has shown that, in order to promote such participation, governments 
often need to establish specific arrangements for national minorities. These 
Recommendations aim to facilitate the inclusion of minorities within the state 
and enable minorities to maintain their own identity and characteristics, thereby 
promoting the good governance and integrity of the State. 
  
The rest of the Lund Recommendations explains what should be done and how to 
achieve the aim stated in the first Article. Ensuring opportunities exist for minorities to 
have an effective voice at the level of central government is important for this purpose. 
These may include ‗Special representation of national minorities, for example, through 
a reserved number of seats in the parliament and other guaranteed participation in the 
legislative process; Formal or informal understandings for allocating cabinet positions, 
or other seats/positions in judicial and governmental organs; Mechanisms to ensure that 
minority interests are considered within relevant governmental organs and Special 
measures for minority participation in the civil service‘ (Lund Recommendations: 
1999).  
   Regarding electoral systems, the Lund Recommendations suggest that the electoral 
system should facilitate minority representation and influence. This can be achieved in 
different ways. For example, ‗States shall guarantee the right of persons belonging to 
national minorities to take part in the conduct of public affairs, including through the 
rights to vote and stand for office without discrimination‘ (Lund Recommendations: 
1999). It also includes the freedom to establish political parties based on communal 
identities as well as those not identified exclusively with the interests of a specific 
community. Where minorities are concentrated territorially, single member districts 
may provide sufficient representation; proportional representation systems where a 
political party‘s share in the national vote is reflected in its share of the legislative seats 
may assist in the representation of minorities; some forms of preference voting, where 
voters rank candidates in order of choice, may facilitate minority representation; and 
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lower numerical thresholds for representation in the legislature may enhance the 
inclusion of national minorities in governance. 
   The Lund Recommendations suggest states establish formal advisory or consultative 
bodies to facilitate effective communication between governmental authorities and 
national minorities. Such bodies should be able to raise issues with decision makers, 
prepare recommendations, formulate legislative and other proposals, monitor 
developments and provide views on proposed governmental decisions that may directly 
or indirectly affect minorities. Governmental authorities should consult these bodies 
regularly regarding minority-related legislation and administrative measures in order to 
contribute to the satisfaction of minority concerns and to the building of confidence. 
The effective functioning of these bodies will require that they have adequate resources. 
Moreover, the Explanatory Note to the Lund Recommendation (1999) considers:   
Such bodies can be standing or ad hoc, part of or attached to the legislative or 
executive branch or independent therefrom (...) In order to be effective, these 
bodies should be composed of minority representatives and others who can 
offer special expertise, provided with adequate resources, and given serious 
attention by decision makers. Aside from advice and counsel, such bodies can 
constitute a useful intermediary institution between decision makers and 
minority groups. They can also stimulate action at the level of government and 
among minority communities. 
  
The Lund Recommendations state that effective participation of minorities does not 
merely consist of involvement in the decision-making process or consultation, it goes 
beyond these and it requires a much broader involvement within state organisations. 
This may mean the establishment of non-territorial or territorial arrangements of self-
governance. In order to achieve this, ‗[i]t is essential for governmental authorities and 
minorities to recognise the need for central and uniform decisions in some areas of 
governance together with the advantages of diversity in others‘ (Lund 
Recommendations: 1999). States usually resist these kinds of claims as they always 
have a fear of threats to their territorial integrity and the result of secession. Providing 
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such arrangements usually helps minorities to integrate with the state in which they live. 
Walter A. Kemp significantly notes:  
Self governance may satisfy many of the desires of minority populations that seek 
greater control over decisions that affect them … In order to prevent secessionist 
tendencies, minorities must feel that they are equal partners in the state and that 
their views will be protected. They must feel that the state and its institutions are 
theirs. To reach this level they need to be empowered, to be involved in effective, 





The Lund Recommendations (1999) also notes: ‗Experience in Europe and elsewhere 
shows the value of shifting certain legislative and executive functions from the central 
to the regional level‘. The main purpose of suggesting the establishment of these 
arrangements is to improve the opportunities of minorities to exercise authority over 
matters affecting them. The Lund Recommendations (1999) provides another alternative 
‗Appropriate local, regional, or autonomous administrations that correspond to the 
specific historical and territorial circumstances of national minorities may undertake a 
number of functions in order to respond more effectively to the concerns of the 
minorities.‘ Such regional or local arrangements can have authority over education, 
culture, use of minority language, environment, local planning, natural resources, 
economic development, local policing functions, and housing, health, and other social 
services. Functions of taxation, administration of justice, tourism and transport could be 
shared by central and regional authorities. Finally it should be noted that such 
arrangements do not require the transfer of authority from democratically elected 
national governments to unaccountable local elites. According to the Lund 
Recommendations, any of these regional or local arrangements must respect the human 
rights of all those affected, and must be based on democratic principles to ensure that 
they genuinely reflect the views of the affected population. The Lund Recommendations 
represent another tool and guidelines which could be beneficial to the four studied 
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countries in including their minorities. The Lund Recommendations would assist in 
improving the poor status of the legal status of the Kurds. 
   The above sections highlighted the role of external players and factors in improving 
the reduced legal status of the Kurds. It also shows how international instruments, 
European law and treaties and the experiences of other countries can be used to benefit 
the four studied countries in advancing the rights of minorities, including the Kurds. 
This chapter concludes by the following section which gives the summary of necessary 
steps that would be carried out by the authorities of the four examined countries to 
deliver equal citizenship for the Kurds. The following section also would the final 
remarks of this thesis.  
8.4 Final remarks  
To recapitulate the examination of the relevant constitutional law of the four countries 
from previous chapters, Article 66 of the Turkish Constitution (as amended on 17 
October 2001) states ‗Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of 
citizenship is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk‘. 
Article 3 states: ‗The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. 
Its language is Turkish.‘ Article 42 elaborates this further ‗No other language than 
Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of 
training or education‘. No ethnicity is recognised in the Iranian constitution. The 
Islamic Republic has refused to recognise the term ‗ethnicity‘ and replaced it with the 
concept of Islamic umma, such as in Ummat Al-Islam or Islamic people. Despite the fact 
that the Kurds, Baloch the Arabs of Khuzestan are Sunni Muslims, no Sunni sect is 
recognised. The Iranian Constitution explicitly defines the state religion as Shia Islam. 
   Depoliticisation of the question of the Kurds might serve to create a more favourable 
atmosphere in which to solve the Middle East‘s Kurdish question. The Kurdish issue is 
perceived and treated by Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran as a security threat rather than the 
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matter of a minority population that has a poor legal status and needs a political and 
legal solution which embodies reforming the constitution, the legal system and 
especially the penal code. Article 4 and 21 of the Syrian constitution (referenced in 
chapter six) deny the education, cultural and legal rights of the Kurds. In order to 
improve the poor legal status of the Kurds in Syria, the above article should be 
abolished and replaced with a more tolerant and inclusive provision which guarantees 
equal access to cultural, educational resources and state institutions. The Iraqi 
Constitution (2005) has reinforced the Islamic identity of Iraq by a number of articles, 
in particular, Article 2: First: Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a 
fundamental source of legislation: A. No law that contradicts the established provisions 
of Islam may be established. B.   No law that contradicts the principles of democracy 
may be established. C.  No law that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated 
in this constitution may be established. Second: This Constitution guarantees the 
Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious 
rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice such as Christians, 
Yazedis, and Mandi Sabeans. The first part of this Article 2, (A), is an attempt to 
impose an Islamic identity on the whole population of Iraq by not allowing of making 
laws which contradict Islam.  
   Minority rights are the key to pluralism and peace in the Middle East. In order to 
achieve stability in the region, guaranteeing the legal rights of the Kurds, as the largest 
ethnic minority of the four examined countries is the key. Hence, one of major internal 
factors or incentives to improve the legal status of the Kurds would be a stable region 
without interventions and sources of instability. Failure to deliver equal citizenship and 
integrate the minorities of the Middle East has been the source of internal instability and 
external weakness. Ghanea (2008:320) argues ‗[w]hat we commonly think of as the 
‗Arab and Muslim world‘ is in fact a rich and varied mosaic of peoples. Over the last 50 
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years, many Middle Eastern and North African minorities have been oppressed or 
struggled to survive – be they national groups (Berbers, Kurds, Turkmens, etc.), 
religious communities (Christians, Zoroastrians, Baha‘is, etc.) or both (Armenians, 
Jews, etc.). Sects, such as Shia in the Gulf States and Sunnis in Iran, have not been 
successfully integrated within Islam itself.  Now, more than ever, thriving minorities are 
the cornerstone of a healthy civil society and the key to pluralism and peace in this 
troubled region‘.  Looking at the internal and external proposals to improve the poor 
legal status of the Kurds, challenges and opportunities do exist.  
   The right of a minority to its identity is crucial. The rights of national minorities can 
only be realised through various forms of autonomy. The problem of other-definition 
cannot be avoided though. The authorities need to recognise first, openly, the existence 
of a minority; but they may prefer to deny recognition, in order to crush the identity of 
what is in reality a minority group. Recognition may also be denied by the central 
authorities out of fear of disintegration of the state that may ensue. Given what 
happened to the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, the leaderships of many 
states, particularly of those states in unstable and volatile regional environments such as 
the Middle East, are especially sensitive to any developments which may threaten, 
however indirectly, the territorial integrity and indivisibility of their state.  The 
international community should be aware of Turkey‘s legitimate security concerns and 
be mindful of the wider dimensions of the Kurdish question in the region. In contrast to 
Iran, Iraq and Syria, Turkey is an easier target for Western governments to criticise 
because of its democratic credentials, its geographical status and Turky‘s attempt to join 
the EU. Ironically, such condemnations of the policies of the Turkish government are 
also in effect a demonstration of indirect praise for the workings of Turkish democracy.    
   Delivering equal citizenship for the Kurds requires equal access to the educational 
system and the labour market and shared facilities for ethnic groups; the right to be 
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different and the right not to participate in national society in certain respects; the 
availability of national identity to all citizens regardless of their cultural differences; the 
decentralisation of political power and the acceptance of different principles for local 
party organisation; and the taking of measures to ensure that the state should not be 
identified with a set of symbols exclusively representing one or a few components of 
the population. In establishing a new constitution and judicial system to improve the 
poor legal status of the Kurds, the existence of ethnic nationalism, the clash between 
religion and secularism, centralisation and ideologies that have failed Middle Eastern 
societies would be major challenges in the four countries studied. The global wave of 
democratisation, the awakening of the rights of indigenous populations, and the 
unpleasant history of the region has meant that more rights have been obtained by the 
Kurds. Events in Iraqi since 2003 and the potential membership of Turkey to the EU 
offer opportunities for change and weakening the exclusive culture of the four studied 
countries. Since recognition is essential to secure the rights of minority groups in a 
state, the struggle for recognition of minority groups in the political arena has become 
central.  
   Non-recognition of the Kurds can create sources of domestic conflict, while legally 
guaranteed recognition can promote long-term stability and peace within a state. 
Recognition is an essential step for securing the rights of the Kurds and gives power to 
the Kurds by providing them with the opportunity to be involved in the decision-making 
process. Representation in parliament is one of the most significant and common means 
for the effective political participation of minorities. Involvement in parliament and the 
decision-making process strengthens the protection of minorities, helps them to 
integrate in the state and creates the opportunity for dialogue between the minority and 
the majority, thus enabling mutual accommodation between them. The task then is to 
find ways to reconcile the need for larger economic units with the growing demand for 
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smaller political units based upon ethnic identity. Part of the solution lies in legitimising 
the idea that modern states need not be centralised, that centralism has outlived its 
usefulness, and that federalism, cultural autonomy and condominium arrangements, 
accompanied by guarantees of the rights of linguistic and religious minorities, can be 
effective instruments for satisfying nationalist aspirations for decentralisation and self-
government without redrawing international boundaries. Part of the solution may lie in 
finding ways to provide international standing to ethnic groups short of state 
sovereignty, perhaps through representation for ethnic groups within regional and 
international organisations.  
   The International community will need to come up with creative solutions to what 
will surely remain one of the central issues for the remainder of this century and 
beyond. A fundamental change in the relationship between peoples and states takes 
place. This new relationship is taking an extraordinary variety of forms: the demands 
for secession and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union and the creation of a 
Commonwealth of Independent States; the disintegration of Yugoslavia; the quest for 
autonomy by the Kurds; secessionist movements among the Kashmiris, Sikhs, 
Timorese, Eritreans and many other peoples; concerns over multiculturalism in the 
USA; anxieties over relations between nationals and the new migrants from North 
Africa and the Middle East in western Europe; and debates over migration and refugee 
policies in all advanced industrial countries and in much of the Third World. ‗Peoples‘ – 
however they identify themselves by ethnicity, religion, language, tribe or shared 
history – want new political institutions or new relationships within existing institutions. 
When these arrangements are not satisfactory or their demands are met with force they 
may resist or flee across regional and national boundaries. Throughout the world, 
government leaders watch with concern the ethnic and religious conflicts within 
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neighbouring states, recognising how quickly these conflicts can threaten their own 
internal security. 
   What is for some peoples the quest for identity and autonomy, to others represents a 
force for internal disintegration. Governments detest such claims within their own 
borders, but may find it in their interest to support such claims when they are made 
upon their adversaries. Cynics note that Arab states including Syria oppose the legal 
rights of the Kurds, but seek it for the Palestinians. India condemns Pakistan‘s support 
for the Kashmiris, but has supported the Pashtuns and Sindhis. Iran has funded the 
Kurds to undermine the Iraqi government and defends the rights of Palestinians, but 
refused to grant autonomy to its own Kurds. The Chinese have supported the Nagas and 
Mizos, but suppressed the Tibetans. Turkey defends Turkmens in Iraq and the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria, while it oppresses the Kurdish minority on its own soil. These 
examples illustrate the central point: state builders simultaneously seek to strengthen the 
state by undermining ethnic minorities within their own country while supporting the 
ethnic minorities of their adversaries. This explains the inconsistent position taken by 
many Third World governments including the four examined countries of this thesis, 
who in the chambers of the United Nations declare their opposition to self-
determination and the restructuring of international borders, but within their own 
regions play the ethnic card against their neighbours. The four studied countries are 
examples of violating the rights of minorities, including the Kurds. The issue of the 
Kurds need to be de-securitise by the countries rule the Kurds.  
In conclusion, this thesis recommends the following principles: minority rights are 
human rights, and equal citizenship should replace other frameworks in the four 
countries studied, recognition of the rights of minorities and abolition of discriminatory 
laws are the cornerstone of a healthy civil society and the key to pluralism and peace in 
this region, the Kurds are not the only victims of failed states in the Middle East, they 
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are but one of the victims, false sense of ethnic homogeneity is no longer a solution, 
regarding Turkey‘s membership in EU, real reform is necessary, not cosmetic reforms 
and the state should not be biased to one ethnicity or a sect of religion.   
   Finally, taking the following steps would improve the legal status of the Kurds and 
guarantee equal citizenship for the Kurds.  The development of a human rights standard 
with which all UN member states would comply; part of this would be a model 
constitution for the UN member states to implement; in addition, it would be a model of 
human rights law that would not allow certain punishments to be carried out, and set a 
standard for treating those accused of crimes. The establishment of an international 
body responsible for promotion and implementation in this global human rights 
standard. The establishment of an international body to ensure a healthy and safe 
environment is maintained in conflict areas and the establishment of an international 
body that investigates allegations of discrimination and denying the rights of an ethnic 
group such as the Kurds. The above recommendations and steps might be not be easy to 
be implemented, however, they are necessary in the path to improve the legal status of 
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